In order to better understand the realities of the manufactured housing industry and the purported antitrust violations occurring within the industry, one should consider the differences between the Manufactured Housing Institute’s (MHI) stated positions over the years and compare those found in the investor relations (IR) pitches of that association’s larger publicly traded companies. As attorneys are trained to know, words have specific meanings. For example: what is the meaning of MHI claim to ‘grow your business’ as has been shown on their home page for months on end? It has been alleged with evidence that MHI engages in paltering, posturing, and various efforts that benefit insiders while dressing their actions up for the sake of optics. If so, that ‘growth’ MHI claims online to offer may not be organic growth but rather growth through consolidation. If such duplicitous behavior is deliberate market manipulation, the concerns related to alleged illegalities in manufactured housing may go beyond antitrust violations into RICO violations. Next, to discern the realities of MHVille, one should compare the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR) website’s contents with that of MHI. MHARR’s members are paying for advocacy that – if implemented – could yield anew the historic levels of industry growth and thus more competition. Even if some of MHI’s members may think they are paying for organic growth, a closer look at the gaps between IR pitches and MHI claims or posturing or between MHARR and MHI methods of advocacy bring to light market limiting behavior by MHI that could be plausibly seen by judicial or other authorities as antitrust violations. Additionally, a look back at the pre-HUD Code MHI (then called the Mobile Home Manufacturers Association-MHMA) and MHI today reveals that 5 decades ago MHI was busy trying to help develop new communities and more sites. However, in the 21st century, developing new communities has all but ground to a halt with more communities closing than opening. With that evidence-linked and roughly 330-word background, now pivot to the ruling by Judge Franklin U. Valderrama that follows. From the “MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER” of Judge Franklin U. Valderrama in Case No. 23-cv-06715 “IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION” is the following footnote. ³ “The Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the Complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs. Platt v. Brown, 872 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2017).” The case is “dismissed without prejudice” which means that as long as the plaintiffs in this civil action refile to meet the concerns of Judge Valderrama, the case could still be pursued.

However, as this MHVille facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) will reveal, if that deadline isn’t met with a properly refiled response to this ruling that address the concerns of Judge Valderrama, then the Defendants in this case have effectively succeeded in court for now.

1) The defendants in this action are: “Equity LifeStyle Properties, Inc. (ELS), Hometown America Management, L.L.C. (Hometown America), Lakeshore Communities, Inc. (Lakeshore), Sun Communities, Inc. (Sun Communities), RHP Properties, Inc. (RHP), Yes Communities, LLC (Yes Communities), Inspire Communities, LLC (Inspire Communities), Kingsley Management, Corp. (Kingsley), Cal-Am Properties, Inc.’s (Cal-Am), and Murex Properties, L.L.C. (Murex) (collectively MHC Defendants), MHC owners/operators, as well as Defendant Datacomp Appraisal Systems, Inc. (Datacomp), the nation’s largest provider of manufactured and mobile home data (collectively, Defendants).”

2) The judge’s opinion in Case No. 23-cv-06715 noted on page four: “In December 2021, MHC Defendant ELS purchased Datacomp.”

3) The DOJ’s RealPage case is referenced in the judge’s order. 

4) Per the Order of Judge Valderrama that follows in Part I: “the MHC Defendants, according to Plaintiffs, have raised MHL rent to unprecedented levels, imposing increases year after year that outpace those in prior years. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 79–87, 140–42. For example, MHL rents increased around 2.3% annually (with 1.8% inflation) between 2010 and 2018, but between 2019 and 2021, by contrast, rents increased at a rate of 9.1% per year (with 3% inflation).”

5) While much of the balance of the industry’s trade media have ignored or downplayed this case, MHProNews and MHLivingNews have periodically kept readers advised of the litigation and its potential ramifications. But in fairness, quarterly MHReview recently said the following in an article entitled: “Concerned Community Owner Common Sense Defeats The Stupidity Of the “Price Fixing” Class Action.

“For several years now the mobile home park industry has been under the cloud of a massive “price-fixing” class action against several of the largest owners and clients of Datacomp. Recently, however, the whole mess was tossed out when U.S. District Judge Franklin U. Valderrama ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to plausibly allege a price-fixing agreement or conspiracy under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The judge said the evidence presented did not show a clear “invitation” to join a conspiracy among the defendants, but rather parallel conduct insufficient on its own to prove collusion.”

6) Several of the remarks in that article read like the kinds of comments made by longtime MHReview contributor Frank Rolfe, a partner with Dave Reynolds in Mobile Home University and Impact Communities, among other manufactured housing industry connected enterprises. Rolfe’s and Reynolds’ led Impact Communities is an MHI member. But regardless of who wrote the article, it may prove useful in several ways. The author obviously pressed the point of a lack of “a clear invitation to join a conspiracy among defendants…” This MHVille facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) will pull on the threads of that and other points raised by Judge Valderrama’s ruling, which could be viewed as a ‘road map’ for what the plaintiffs’ attorneys need to do to overcome the weaknesses of their case in the court’s eyes.

7) Quoting from the order in Case No. 23-cv-06715.

Plaintiffs allege that the MHC Defendants could not have unilaterally increased rent at such a rate, but were able to do so by sharing competitively sensitive information with each other via Datacomp’s Reports. Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 8, 93, 110, 125. …

Ross Partrich, CEO of RHP, described the Reports as “extremely helpful for rent increases across our portfolio throughout the country.”…

Defendants’ membership in an industry group [i.e.: Manufactured Housing Institute or MHI] does not increase the likelihood of a price-fixing conspiracy…

Plaintiffs allege only that the MHC Defendants were members of a trade organization and attended industry meetings, which does not “move the needle.” In re Local TV, 2020 WL 6557665, at *10; see also Hansen, 2025 WL 2731378, at *9–10 (collecting cases). This, without more, will not do….

 

8) But the judge appears to leave open the door to the trade association argument as part of the potential for collusion, given more hard evidence. The Judge Valderrama gave this these examples.

 

In re Turkey, 642 F. Supp. 3d at 727, the complaint contained a “series of allegations”—including that the trade association created a special team “to lead an industry approach of ‘coopetition’ to increase turkey consumption in the United States while maintaining historic profit levels”—that supported the premise that the trade association memberships were not in fact typical, but rather a method for facilitating cooperation.” And in In re Broiler Chicken I, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 798, the court observed that the plaintiffs’ “reliance on industry meetings and public statements must be evaluated in the context of all their allegations,” and found them to constitute a plus factor where, “immediately after an industry convention, the large producers made public statements calling for industrywide production cuts,” and the same thing happened several years later with an unprecedented killing of breeder flocks.

9) An MS WORD search of the order finds no results for “Mobile Home University” or “Frank Rolfe.” Yet years of Rolfe’s remarks could prove more useful to the plaintiffs than they already have been.

 

 

10) Yet Rolfe and his partner Dave Reynolds are members of MHI and are arguably higher profile members [Impact Communities] of that trade group. To the point of an “invitation,” plaintiffs’ attorneys apparently failed to connect certain dots raised in this preface and in Part II. Industry expert MHProNews observes that an invitation is posted on MHI’s home page and has been for months on end since MHI gave their website a face lift.

 

 

11) That “Grow your business” is followed by “Become A Member.”  That’s an invitation. Jumping ahead from a relevant pull quote in Part II based on the pre-publication draft of this article linked here.

Summary Confirmation: Your premise is confirmed by the draft’s analysis. Broadening the suit to include these specific actors transforms “colorful” industry commentary into probative evidence of a coordinated scheme to restrain trade and consolidate the industry to the detriment of residents and competition.

 

12) When the details of MHI’s behavior are understood through industry expert eyes, MHI routinely fails to do what a normal trade group does. MHI’s behavior is apparently self-contradictory. Artificial intelligence (AI), which experts say is useful in discerning pattern recognition in fraud and other cases, and human intelligence (HI) are combined herein (beyond this preface, see more details in Part II) to grasp the subtle but clear patterns that only make sense if MHI and tools like Datacomp are combined, with MHI and their linked events acting as an apparent hub. To grasp the patterns, one must understand MHI’s failure to secure enforcement of existing federal laws that would work contrary to the interests of the industry’s self-proclaimed consolidators.

 

 

13) Flagship Communities is led former MHI chairman and still MHI board member Nathan Smith.

 

 

14) MHI periodically claims to favor the enforcement of the “enhanced preemption” provision of the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act. But in practice, MHI has done little beyond merely lip service to that, passing on an offer from the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR) to litigate need for routine enforcement of the law.

 

 

15) Additionally, now ELS COO Patrick Waite is the chairman of MHI’s board of directors. The late ELS Chairman, Sam Zell, J.D. said during an earnings call that they like the oligopoly nature of the manufactured home business.

 

 

16) The plaintiffs’ pleadings presented several significant and arguably useful factual elements which the judge’s ruling acknowledged.  The “Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the Complaint…” What is lacking, per the court’s order, is enough evidence to “move the needle” because “This, without more, will not do…”

 

 

17) Many of these facts and pieces of evidence are missing from the plaintiffs’ pleadings.

While MHProNews has presented evidence from a range of sources related to not only communities, but to the production, retail, and finance segments of the industry as well, the plaintiffs in this case – for better or worse – narrowly argued collusion in site fees (lot rents) based upon factors including Datacomp information and MHI membership. While that may be apt and useful, it was not enough in the court’s view.

18) But then why has there been several economists and legal minds that have drawn attention to some of the same concerns raised in Case No. 23-cv-06715?

 

 

19) It isn’t just “lot rents” in the communities of so-called predatory operators that have been jacked up. Financing rates and the selling price of new HUD Code manufactured homes reflect concerns raised by Samuel Strommen at Knudson Law, among others. When a law professor is urging the need for a trade association that can lobby and litigate on behalf of the industry, the plaintiffs ought to bring to the Court the evidence and how that intersects with MHI’s patterns of behavior as identified by four different AI systems.

 

 

20) One question is — will the plaintiffs’ attorneys just roll over and quit? Or will they sharpen their presentation to the court in fresh pleadings that brings more hard evidence of purported collusion to effect consolidation of the industry into relatively few hands to the harm of millions of affordable housing seekers, untold thousands of residents in the communities of predatory operators, and potentially taxpayers and retail investors too?

 

 

21) Toss in the apparent failure of MHI to enforce its own “code of ethical conduct” and their passing out awards to firms to dress up their stature despite D or F ratings with the Better Business Bureau (BBB) or problematic reviews and comments via platforms like Indeed, and a picture of collusive behavior emerges. Who says? Dispassionate AI systems, which are known for their ability to spot behavioral patterns.

22) The judge’s order follows in Part I.

There are still evidence-based insights with industry expert analysis more not to be overlooked in Part II.

This MHVille FEA is well underway.

Part I. From the PDF of the ruling linked here is the following text of Judge Franklin U. Valderrama’s ruling. MHProNews notes that while a reasonable effort has been made to correct cut and paste glitches from the document into this website’s publishing/editing system, readers are advised to rely on an authentic PDF if there are any discrepancies.

 

In re Manufactured Home Lot Rents Antitrust Litigation

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

IN RE MANUFACTURED HOME LOT

RENTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION,

No. 23-cv-06715

Judge Franklin U. Valderrama

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Manufactured and modular homes (commonly known as mobile homes) are one of the country’s most affordable housing options. R. 126, Compl.^[1] Manufactured homes are often situated in a Manufactured Home Community (MHC). Plaintiffs Steven Brown, Todd Caldwell, Mary Galusha, Carla Hajek, David Klein, Colleen Levins, Ronald Kazmirzak, Kevin McDonough, Luis Melendez, Charles Neville, Deborah Norvise, Carol Rachelle Roach, Barbara Rowley, and Amber Sailer (collectively, Plaintiffs) all paid rent for a manufactured or modular home located in an MHC. Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative nationwide class of all similarly situated persons, sued Defendants Equity LifeStyle Properties, Inc. (ELS), Hometown America Management, L.L.C. (Hometown America), Lakeshore Communities, Inc. (Lakeshore), Sun Communities, Inc. (Sun Communities), RHP Properties, Inc. (RHP), Yes Communities, LLC (Yes Communities), Inspire Communities, LLC (Inspire Communities), Kingsley Management, Corp. (Kingsley), Cal-Am Properties, Inc.’s (Cal-Am), and Murex Properties, L.L.C. (Murex) (collectively MHC Defendants), MHC owners/operators, as well as Defendant Datacomp Appraisal Systems, Inc. (Datacomp), the nation’s largest provider of manufactured and mobile home data (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs assert violations of Sections 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, against all Defendants (Counts I and II), and a state law claim for unjust enrichment against the MHC Defendants (Count III). Before the Court are Defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and Murex’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). R. 154, Mot. Dismiss; R. 151, Murex Mot. Dismiss.^[2] For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss and denies Murex’s motion to dismiss without prejudice as moot.

Background

Manufactured homes, unlike traditional site-built homes, are pre-fabricated in a factory before being transported to and placed on a foundation on a manufactured home lot or community.^[3] Compl.  ¶¶ 49, 65. Manufactured homes are generally less expensive than site-built homes. Id. ¶ 55. Manufactured homes are considered separate pieces of property from the lots they sit on. Id. ¶ 66. Some individuals rent both their home and lot, while others own both their home and/or lot. Id. ¶ 67.

Plaintiffs are 14 individual residents of various MHCs across the United States who paid rent to the MHC Defendants to lease spaces for their manufactured homes (mobile home lots (MHL)). Compl. ¶¶ 19–32. The MHC Defendants are owners or operators of MHCs. Id. ¶¶ 34–43.

For years, the MHC market was diffuse, and many operators owned only one MHC. Id. ¶ 71. Recently, and particularly within the last ten years, the industry experienced considerable consolidation with large corporate owners, including the MHC Defendants, buying up communities across the United States. Id. ¶¶ 71–73, 77. These corporate owners, including the MHC Defendants, prioritized acquiring properties that will allow them to raise lot rents. Id. ¶ 76.

During the last several years, and between August 31, 2019 and the present (the Relevant Time Period), the MHC Defendants, according to Plaintiffs, have raised MHL rent to unprecedented levels, imposing increases year after year that outpace those in prior years. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 79–87, 140–42. For example, MHL rents increased around 2.3% annually (with 1.8% inflation) between 2010 and 2018, but between 2019 and 2021, by contrast, rents increased at a rate of 9.1% per year (with 3% inflation). Id. ¶ 142. MHL rents also increased more quickly and steeply than rental prices for detached single-family homes. Id. ¶¶ 145–47, Figs. 17–20. Plaintiffs allege that the MHC Defendants could not have unilaterally increased rent at such a rate, but were able to do so by sharing competitively sensitive information with each other via Datacomp’s Reports. Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 8, 93, 110, 125.

Datacomp is an appraisal service that provides manufactured and mobile home appraisals, inspections, and market data. Id. ¶ 33. In 2014, Datacomp purchased JLT & Associates, a firm that published industry reports about MH Communities, under the name “JLT Market Reports.” Id. ¶ 96. The JLT Reports (the Reports) contain data regarding MHCs, including rental rates, occupancy rates, announced rent increases, maps and amenities. Id. ¶¶ 5, 96, 103, 105. Datacomp collects the data through telephone surveys and direct outreach to MHCs, as well as from the voluntary provision of the data by certain manufactured home operators, including the MHC Defendants. Id. ¶ 104. Datacomp creates and sells the Reports to as many as 187 different geographic areas throughout the country (the metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)). Id. ¶ 98. In December 2021, MHC Defendant ELS purchased Datacomp. Id. ¶ 97. Plaintiffs allege that, during the Relevant Time Period, the MHC Defendants purchased and relied upon the Reports to systematically increase MHL rents and to coordinate strategic acquisitions of manufactured home communities to consolidate market share and. Id. ¶ 93.

Specifically, the MHC Defendants provide current and future rent pricing and other pricing-related information for their communities to Datacomp. Compl. ¶ 104. Datacomp then generates the Reports, which contain detailed, non-anonymized, disaggregated, current and future competitive pricing and pricing-related information on MHCs located across the United States. Id. ¶¶ 5, 105–14, Figs. 10– 12. Datacomp distributes these Reports to all MHC Defendants who previously did not, but now do have access to competitor data. Id. The Reports offer granular data to any MHC owner about its competitors—the owner can identify the actual rent prices that other MHC owners are charging and, in some cases, see when and to what level competitors will increase MHL rents. Id. This data projects far in the future what an MHC owner plans to charge residents for rent—between September 2022 and August 2023, for example, more than a quarter of the nearly 4,000 surveyed MHCs provided Datacomp either future rent increase information, next month rent increase information, or in many cases, both figures. Id. ¶ 113.

Datacomp markets the Reports to the MHC Defendants with the promise that the information they contain will ensure that the MHC Defendants “stay competitive.” Compl. ¶ 7, Fig. 1. For example, the May 2022 Report for Hillsborough County, Florida informed MHC Defendants that in January 2023 competitors ELS planned a rent increase of $37 per month, and Cal-Am an increase of $60 per month. Id. ¶¶ 108–09, Figs. 11–12. Plaintiffs cite to statements from the MHC Defendants’ executives about the usefulness of the Reports: Ross Partrich, CEO of RHP, described the Reports as “extremely helpful for rent increases across our portfolio throughout the country.” Id. ¶¶ 8, 120. Cory Sukert, CEO of Cal-Am, praised the Reports’ “comprehensive analysis of competing communities in those markets in which we operate.” Id. ¶122. And Nate Nelson, CFO of Kingsley, emphasized the currentness of the data in the Reports which help Kingsley “determine how our communities compare to the competition.” Id. ¶ 123. In addition to the Reports, Datacomp also provides “real-time” data with “live updates,” allowing the MHC Defendants to see one another’s most recent pricing and pricing-related information. Id. ¶ 115.

Plaintiffs allege that the MHC Defendants could not have successfully increased rents in their MHCs alone, so they conspired to raise rents to supracompetitive high levels by leveraging Datacomp as a conduit to share competitively sensitive pricing information. According to Plaintiffs, as a result of Defendants’ conspiracy, MHL rents have increased dramatically, and the MHC Defendants have reduced or eliminated competition among themselves on rent prices, services, and MHL quality. Id. ¶¶ 1, 6, 9.

Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, sued Defendants, asserting violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act against all Defendants and a state law claim for unjust enrichment against the MHC Defendants. See Compl.

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Murex joined the motion to dismiss, but also filed a separate motion, raising additional bases for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), as well as arguing that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Murex under Rule 12(b)(2) and that venue is improper under Rule 12(b)(3). The fully briefed motions are before the Court.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint. Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain factual allegations, accepted as true, sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual, rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

In the antitrust context, stating a claim under Section 1 of the Sherman Act “requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Analysis  

                     I.                       Count I – Price Fixing in Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act

In Count I, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants agreed to “fix, raise, or maintain at artificially high levels the rents they charge for manufactured home lots” in violation of Section I of the Sherman Act and that the agreement was carried out through “the exchange of competitively sensitive information between and among Defendants.” Compl. ¶ 94.

Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.” 15 U.S.C. § 1. Section 1 does not prohibit reasonable restraints of trade, but only outlaws unreasonable restraints of trade. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522

U.S. 3, 10 (1977). To state a Section 1 claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a combination or some form of concerted action between at least two legally distinct entities that (2) unreasonably restrains trade in the relevant market, and (3) an accompanying injury. See In re Delta Dental Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 3d 627, 632–33, 643 (N.D. Ill.

2020) (citing Denny’s Marina, Inc. v. Renfro Prods., Inc., 8 F.3d 1217, 1220 (7th Cir. 1993)); Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 191 (2010).

In order to show a per se violation of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must show either direct or circumstantial evidence of an illegal agreement. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litg., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (Text Messaging I). Direct evidence of an agreement is “explicit and requires no inferences to establish the proposition or conclusion being asserted.” In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Cheese Antitrust Litig., 60 F. Supp. 3d 914, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (cleaned up).^[4] As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, direct evidence is equivalent to a “smoking gun,” and it is quite rare. Omnicare, Inc., v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 629 F.3d 697, 706 (7th Cir. 2011). Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, consists of facts “from which the existence of such an agreement can be inferred.” In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2002). “[C]ircumstantial evidence is the lifeblood of antitrust law because direct evidence will rarely be available to prove the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy.” City of Rockford v. Mallinckrokdt ARD, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 3d 730, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (cleaned up). For circumstantial evidence to indicate an agreement, the plaintiffs must allege “parallel conduct” by the defendants and “context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement”—often called “plus factors.” In re MultiPlan Health Ins. Provider Litig., 789 F. Supp. 3d 614, 637 (N.D. Ill. 2025) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

A. Direct Evidence of Conspiracy

As an initial matter, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs fail to plead any direct evidence of an agreement among the Defendants to raise rental prices of MHLs. R. 155, Memo. Dismiss at 11. Plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. R. 165, Resp. at 7. As such, the Court turns to whether Plaintiffs plead circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy.

B. Circumstantial Evidence of Conspiracy

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs “fail to allege circumstantial evidence that could plausibly suggest a conspiracy among the MHC Defendants to use the JLT

Reports to raise rents.” Memo. Dismiss at 12. From Defendants’ perspective, Plaintiffs fail to allege any “parallel conduct” or the required plus factors. Id.

Plaintiffs respond that they have pled a per se violation of Section 1 because they allege: (1) an invitation to participate in the conspiracy, and the acceptance of the invitation,^[5] as well as (2) parallel conduct and plus factors. Resp. at 7–8.

 

Therefore, according to Plaintiffs, the Court must deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id.

The Court begins with the invitation and acceptance to participate in the conspiracy.

1. Invitation to Collude

Plaintiffs assert that they have established that the MHC Defendants, through Datacomp, accepted an invitation to participate in the alleged conspiracy. Resp. at 8. According to Plaintiffs, where each conspirator is advised that their competitors were asked to participate in the conspiracy and is aware that cooperation was essential to the success of the plan, then invitation and acceptance are established. Id. (citing Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226–227 (1939); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v.

F.T.C., 221 F.3d 928, 935 (7th Cir. 2000); Meyer v. Kalanick, 174 F. Supp. 3d 817, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)). Here, from Plaintiffs’ point of view, Datacomp’s solicitation of information from the MHC Defendants constitutes the invitation and the MHC

Defendants’ submission of their information to Datacomp constitutes “acceptance.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 8, 104, 110–14, 117, 166). Plaintiffs maintain that the MHC Defendants, as evidenced by their public statements, understood that, like them, their competitors were also contributing competitively sensitive pricing information to Datacomp’s Reports. Id. at 9. Plaintiffs reason, therefore, that they have pled a plausible price-fixing claim through Datacomp’s invitation to share competitively sensitive pricing information via its Reports and the MHC’s acceptance of that invitation. Id.

United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939)). However, the Court need not definitively decide at this stage whether allegations of invitation and acceptance alone are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, because for the reasons discussed in the body of the Opinion, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have not adequately alleged an invitation and acceptance to adequately state a claim based on that theory.

Defendants disagree, arguing that nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiffs allege that Datacomp invited the MHC Defendants to do anything, much less that the MHC Defendants accepted any invitation. R. 177, Reply at 3. The Court agrees with Defendants.

Here, Plaintiffs do not directly allege that Datacomp extended an invitation to (or demanded that any MHC Defendant) submit any information, nor that the MHC Defendants accepted that invitation. Nor do Plaintiffs allege that the MHC

Defendants communicated among themselves. Rather, Plaintiffs allege only that the MHC Defendants provided competitively sensitive information to Datacomp via telephone surveys or other means. Compl. ¶ 104. While such an allegation supports an information exchange, as discussed in depth below, it does not support an inference of an invitation, much less an acceptance to do anything.

The two “binding” cases cited by Plaintiffs, Interstate Circuit and Toys “R” Us, are distinguishable, contend Defendants. The Court agrees, as in each case cited by Plaintiffs, there was an explicit alleged demand to participate in the anticompetitive behavior. That is, in Interstate Circuit, the manager of Interstate, a movie theatre company, sent the same letter to eight branch managers of film distribution companies, with each naming all eight managers as addressees and asking them to comply with two demands as a condition of Interstate’s continued exhibition of the distributor’s films. 306 U.S. at 215–17, 222–23. “Compliance with the proposals involved a radical departure from the previous business practices of the industry and a drastic increase in admission prices of most of the subsequent-run theatres.” Id. at 222. And in Toys “R” Us, Toys “R” Us (TRU) contacted some of its suppliers at a toy fair to inform them of a new policy that dictated which products the suppliers offered or sold to TRU versus TRU’s competitors, which policy was “an abrupt shift from the past.” 221 F.3d at 931, 935. TRU and its suppliers negotiated about the new policy, and the Seventh Circuit relied on the record of “direct evidence of communications” to uphold the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) determination of a conspiracy. Id. at 935. While Defendants do not distinguish Meyer, the Court also finds that case inapposite. In Meyer, drivers entered into contracts with Uber dictating pricing algorithms that drivers  could not practically change. 174 F. Supp. 3d at 820–21, 824. Finally, as Defendants point out, Plaintiffs say nothing about the precedential value—or lack thereof—of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FTC’s statement of interest that they cite to. Resp. at 8 (citing Duffy v. Yardi Sys., Inc., No. 2:23-cv-01391 Dkt. No. 149 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2024)). And, even if it offered some precedential value, as Defendants also argue, that case involved allegations that a company dictated rental prices that landlords should charge.

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not pled a per se violation of Section

1 based on an alleged invitation and acceptance to participate in the conspiracy.

Of course, that is not the end of the analysis. The Court next turns to whether Plaintiffs have adequately pled parallel conduct and plus factors sufficient to state a price-fixing conspiracy claim.

2. Parallel Conduct

Parallel behavior by competitors as well as plus factors, or “factual enhancement[s],” are enough circumstantial evidence to plead an antitrust conspiracy. In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 772, 789–90 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (In re Broiler Chicken I); see also Text Messaging I, 630 F.3d at 627 (sufficient circumstantial evidence may include “a mixture of parallel behaviors, details of industry structure, and industry practices, that facilitate collusion”). Parallel behaviors include those which “would probably not result from chance, coincidence, independent responses to common stimuli, or mere interdependence unaided by an advance understanding among the parties’ conduct [that] indicates the sort of restricted freedom of action and sense of obligation that one generally associates with agreement.” Text Messaging I, 630 F.3d at 628 (cleaned up).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to allege parallel conduct, as Plaintiffs make no plausible allegations that Defendants’ price increases were uniform or moved together at all. Memo. Dismiss at 12. True, note Defendants, the Complaint contains “a series of charts purportedly presenting data from the JLT Reports showing parallel price increases.” Id. (citing Compl. ¶ 148). But those charts, according to Defendants, fail to show parallel conduct. Id. In fact, assert Defendants, the charts show the opposite conclusion. Id. That is, they show that in each regional submarket, the Defendants who own or operate the properties in that submarket have varied average rents, and the rent increases differed dramatically. Id. at 7–9, 12.

Plaintiffs counter that parallel conduct may be shown through evidence of aggregate price increases, including when such increases occur over a lengthy period of time rather than all at once. Resp. at 9 (citing In re Broiler Chicken I, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 790–91). And the conduct, maintain Plaintiffs, need not be perfectly synchronized to be considered parallel. Id. at 9–10 (citing Interstate Cir. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939)). Here, assert Plaintiffs, they have alleged that the MHC Defendants increased MHL rent at rates “far outpacing inflation, and more quickly and steeply than rental prices for detached single-family homes, across all geographic regions.” Id. at 10 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 142–48; Compl. Figs. 18–23). In short, from Plaintiffs’ perspective, all they are required to show and have shown are “unprecedented changes in pricing structure that suddenly take place because of

Defendants’ conduct.” Id. at 10–11 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.4; In re Loc. TV Advert. Antitrust Litig., 2020 WL 6557665, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 6, 2020)). According to Plaintiffs, In re Broiler Chicken I is instructive, where the court rejected the same arguments advanced by Defendants here. Resp. at 11.

In reply, Defendants insist that Plaintiffs fail to plead parallel conduct because the Complaint lacks any allegations that “the MHC Defendants’ prices were remotely similar or moved together at all.” Reply at 4. The way Defendants see it, asserting that aggregate prices rose across ten Defendants over the course of half a decade is not an allegation of parallel pricing, but rather impermissible group pleading. Id. at 5. In fact, argue Defendants, Plaintiffs’ own allegations relating to timing—that is, that Datacomp began publishing the JLT Reports as early as 2014, but the MHC Defendants’ pricing did not change at an allegedly unusual rate until 2019— contradict Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants’ conspiracy caused sudden and unprecedented changes in pricing structure. Id. at 6–7 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 8, 96; Resp. at 4, 10–11). Here, unlike In re Broiler Chicken I, argue Defendants, there are no allegations that the Defendants acted all at once to raise prices. Id. at 7.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that In re Broiler Chicken I is instructive,^[6] and indeed, Defendants do not meaningfully distinguish it in their reply. In In re Broiler Chicken I, the court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged parallel conduct by each defendant industrial producer of chicken meat to increase prices where defendants restricted production between 2007 and 2009 and again between 2011 and 2014, through various methods such killing or exporting breeder flocks, closing facilities, or delaying planning of new facilities. 290 F. Supp. 3d at 782–84. The court rejected the defendants’ arguments that the allegations as to parallel conduct were insufficient to allege a conspiracy because the production decreases occurred in “varying amounts,” by “various methods,” and “at various points over many years.” Id. at 790–92 (collecting cases). As Plaintiffs here point out, the In re Broiler Chicken I court observed that it is “more than plausible that conspirators would leave the precise means . . . up to each conspirator,” because such flexibility “would enable a greater number of producers to participate in the conspiracy, and might help to conceal the collusive nature of their conduct.” Id. at 792 (cleaned up).  Here, Plaintiffs allege that the MHC Defendants started to significantly increase MHL rental prices around 2017, which far exceeded the pace of inflation and the cost of single-family homes beginning in 2019. Compl. ¶¶ 140–47. That the percentage increases were variable and occurred over several years does not undermine the allegations that Defendants’ conduct was parallel. See, e.g., In re Broiler Chicken I, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 782–84; Kleen Prods., LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 775 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077–78 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (Kleen Prods. I) (“capacity reductions need not be simultaneous to demonstrate conscious parallelism,” rather, allegation of sequential conduct “is common” in such cases, and finding sufficient allegations of parallel conduct where defendants increased prices over the course of five years).

The Court also agrees with Plaintiffs that the cases cited by Defendants do not change the analysis. The two Seventh Circuit cases were decided at summary judgment,^[7] not the motion to dismiss stage, and the courts found that the plaintiffs had not adduced sufficient evidence to show that the defendants colluded to raise prices; the in-District case applied the heightened Rule 9(b) standard; and the out-ofCircuit case cited actually supports Plaintiffs’ position. Memo. Dismiss at 13 (citing

In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 782 F.3d 867, 877 (7th Cir. 2015) (Text

Messaging II); Kleen Prods. LLC v. Georgia-Pacific LLC, 910 F.3d 927 (7th Cir. 2018) (Kleen Prods. II); Washington Cnty. Health Care Auth., Inc. v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 328 F.

Supp. 3d 824, 832–35 (N.D. Ill. 2018); In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 787 (M.D. Pa. 2014)).

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have done just enough to sufficiently allege that Defendants’ conduct was parallel based on rent price increases that are “reasonably proximate in time and value.” Id. That said, the Court considers the alleged disparities in the timing and amount of rent increases when determining whether this parallel conduct reflects an agreement among Defendants to raise rent. See Hansen v. Nw. Univ., 2025 WL 2731378, at *9 (N.D. Ill.

Sept. 24, 2025) (citing Washington Cnty. Health Care Auth., Inc. v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 328 F. Supp. 3d 824, 837 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (“Even if the disparities in the magnitude and timing of the defendants’ recalls does not, in and of itself, render plaintiffs’ the stage of proceedings. That is, different standards apply at the motion to dismiss stage and the summary judgment stage. See In re Broiler Chicken I, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 801 (citing In re Plasma-Derivative Protein Therapies Antitrust Litig., 764 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 2011)). And it matters less on a motion to dismiss when a plaintiff cites to a summary judgment order in support of her opposition to a motion to dismiss, because a plaintiff is required to do more to defeat summary judgment than to defeat a motion to dismiss. On the other hand, often summary judgment decisions cited by defendants are of limited value, because more is required of plaintiffs at that stage. So, the Court does not summarily disregard summary judgment opinions cited by Defendants, but it does so with those principles in mind.  

complaint implausible, it is yet another strike against the complaint’s plausibility.” (cleaned up))).

Plaintiffs argue that the Court could end its analysis once it finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged parallel conduct, as they need not allege plus factors in addition to parallel conduct. Resp. at 12–13 (citing Washington Cty., 328 F. Supp. 3d at 840). Defendants disagree, insisting that Plaintiffs must allege more than just parallel conduct. Memo. Dismiss at 14; Reply at 7–8. The Court finds that Defendants have the better of the argument.

“[W]hile parallel conduct makes a conspiratorial agreement ‘conceivable,’ parallel conduct, without more, does not make an agreement ‘plausible.’ Plaintiffs are still required to identify additional conduct beyond parallel conduct—often referred to as ‘plus factors’—to ‘nudge’ Plaintiffs’ allegation of agreement ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” In re Broiler Chicken Antitrust Litig., 2025 WL 461407, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2025) (Broiler Chicken II) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Greco v. Mallouk, 2024 WL 4119169, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2024) (“[A] plaintiff alleging a conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence must also allege certain plus factors, which are economic actions and outcomes that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely consistent with explicitly coordinated action.”) (cleaned up). The Court agrees with Defendants that the only case cited by Plaintiffs, Washington Cty., does not stand for the proposition that parallel conduct on its own can support a price-fixing conspiracy. Reply at 7. Indeed, the court held the opposite, stating that, “[e]ven if the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficed to establish a strong inference of parallel conduct (and, as discussed above, it does not), the complaint would still fall short because the ‘plus factors’ the plaintiffs identify do not make the inference of an express agreement between [the defendants] any more plausible.” Washington Cnty., 328 F. Supp. 3d at 840.

The Court therefore turns to the “plus factors” alleged by Plaintiffs.

3. Plus Factors

Courts recognize “plus factors” to include “a common motive to conspire, evidence that shows that the parallel acts were against the apparent individual economic self-interest of the alleged conspirators, and evidence of a high level of interfirm communications.” Greco, 2024 WL 4119169, at *6 (cleaned up). In reviewing the allegations for a plausible agreement, the Court “views the circumstances as a whole.” In re MultiPlan Health Ins. Provider, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 637 (citing Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 698–99 (1962)). “If the allegations are as consistent with a wide range of lawful and independent business conduct as they are with an anticompetitive agreement, then the first element of § 1 is not satisfied.” Mirage Wine + Spirit’s, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 2025 WL 1896006, at *3

(S.D. Ill. July 9, 2025); see also Marion Diagnostic Ctr., LLC v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 29 F.4th 337, 351 (7th Cir. 2022) (“Twombly demonstrates that courts should dismiss antitrust conspiracy complaints for failure to state a claim when the allegations, taken as true, could just as easily reflect innocent conduct or rational self-interest.”).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Section 1 claim fails because “they do not allege cognizable plus factors. Memo. Dismiss at 14 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552). Plaintiffs, on the other hand, insist that they have alleged sufficient plus factors to support a plausible conspiracy; specifically, they contend that they have alleged circumstantial evidence in the form of: (1) information exchange among the MHC Defendants; (2) the structure of the MHL market; (3) Defendants’ opportunity to collude; (4) Defendants’ conduct being contrary to their self-interest; and (5)

Defendants’ strong motive to conspire. Resp. at 12 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 71–78, 104–14, 142, 166–72, 177).

The Court examines the plus factors alleged by Plaintiffs in turn, keeping in mind that it must view the circumstances holistically.

a. Exchange of Pricing Information

First, Plaintiffs contend that the MHC Defendants’ sharing of competitively sensitive information—including current and future rent increases in specific geographic markets—via the Reports, constitutes a plus factor. Resp. at 13–14 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 5, 107–14, 134). Information exchange, note Plaintiffs, can support an inference of a price-fixing agreement. Id. at 14 (citing, inter alia, Omnicare, 629 F.3d at 709; Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (Sotomayor, J.)). In short, assert Plaintiffs, their information exchange allegations qualify as a plus factor because they facilitate the conspiracy at issue. Resp. at 15.

As an initial matter, in reply, Defendants contend that “the exchange of information obviously cannot be a separate plus factor in a case where the only alleged agreement is to exchange information.” Reply at 8. The Court agrees with Defendants as it relates to Count II, which alleges an information exchange conspiracy. Count I, however, alleges a price-fixing conspiracy facilitated by the information exchange. And Plaintiffs are correct that “[i]nformation exchange is an example of a facilitating practice that can help support an inference of a price-fixing agreement.” Resp. at 13 (quoting Todd, 275 F.3d at 198); see also In re Loc. TV, 2020 WL 6557665, at *9 (“Plaintiffs do not urge that information exchanges are per se violations of antitrust law, but only that one occurred here, and that the information exchange, in conjunction with other well-pleaded plus factors give rise to an inference of an antitrust conspiracy [of price-fixing].”).

Defendants also attack Plaintiffs’ allegations about the exchange of confidential information as conclusory: from Defendants’ point of view, Plaintiffs fail to identify which specific information in the Reports is actually competitively sensitive, and “[t]he reality is that the information contained in the JLT Reports could be obtained by anyone simply by calling or visiting MH Communities and doing some internet searches, or by paying a modest fee for the reports themselves.” Memo. Dismiss at 14–15. Moreover, posit Defendants, the Reports themselves are available at a modest fee, and indeed, Plaintiffs allege that their counsel obtained one, which demonstrates that the information therein was neither confidential nor sensitive. Id. at 14. True, Plaintiffs use the broad term “non-public, competitively sensitive information” throughout the Complaint; however, the Complaint also alleges the sharing and disclosure of specific information (including, but not limited to, latest rent increase and amount, future rent increases, and occupancy rates) and does not allege that all of the information exchanged (including, but not limited to future rent increases) is publicly available apart from the Reports. See Compl. ¶¶ 103, 113. And, even to the extent that such information is independently publicly available, as well as available to anyone who purchases the Reports, such availability does not eliminate this as a plus factor.

Although not binding, the Court finds the cases cited by Plaintiffs on this point to be persuasive, in particular, Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges, 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 166 (D.D.C. 2004). There, the plaintiffs, medical school graduates, alleged “that there exist[ed] an agreement to fix the compensation of resident physicians at an improperly depressed level and that the [Association of American Medical Colleges] ha[d] participated in the conspiracy by facilitating the anticompetitive agreement through the creation and dissemination of the COTH Survey, which provides a mechanism by which compensation levels remain stabilized and depressed.” Id. The court found that “the fact that the information is publicly disseminated does not insulate the activity from consideration in the larger price-fixing claim.” Id. at 167– 68 (citing In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The fact that it is feasible for the appellees to communicate the necessary price information through press releases does not immunize the exchange of price information from legal sanction [where] the conditions of the market suggest that the exchange promotes collusive rather than competitive pricing.”) (cleaned up))). The Jung court noted that, “[i]n an unrestrained market, prospective residents ostensibly could use the information in the COTH Survey to better evaluate competing offers among institutional defendants,” however, in the market as alleged in the complaint, “prospective residents cannot utilize the information in such a manner because there are no competing offers; the Match requires prospective residents to commit to one position before their receive any offer of employment.” Id. at 168. Here, Plaintiffs allege that switching—i.e., moving one’s home—in this market is cost prohibitive. Compl. ¶ 172. So, even if an MHL lot renter purchases the Reports or otherwise has access to the data contained therein, he or she is not able to use that data to move to a more competitively priced MHL because doing so is cost prohibitive. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 448 (recognizing the importance of the fact that the public information being exchanged was not of use to anyone other than defendants).^[8]

Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs only allege in conclusory fashion that the information was “reciprocally shared,” as “the Complaint does not make a single allegation that any Manufactured Home Community Defendant shared anything, directly or indirectly, with any other Defendant.” Memo. Dismiss at 15. But Defendants ignore Plaintiffs’ allegations that the MHC Defendants provide the

 

information published in the Reports to Datacomp, which they then use to coordinate increased prices. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 104. Such an allegation of information exchange through a third party is sufficient. See, e.g., In re Loc. TV, 2020 WL 6557665, at *9

(“Plaintiffs have pleaded that a third-party called Kantar facilitated the Broadcaster Defendants’ ability to exchange competitively sensitive information with one another and that the Sales Rep Firms also facilitated such exchanges.”); In re Pork Antitrust Litig., 781 F. Supp. 3d 758, 815 (D. Minn. 2025) (holding that sharing sensitive pricing information through a third party that then consolidates and distributes the information through reports, is a plus factor that supports the inference of a conspiracy). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ information exchange allegations qualify as a plus factor because they facilitate the conspiracy at issue.

b. Structure of the MHL Market

Second, Plaintiffs contend that the characteristics of the MHL market qualify as a plus factor because “an industry structure that facilitates collusion constitutes supporting evidence of collusion.” Resp. at 15 (quoting Text Messaging I, 630 F.3d at 627–28). Plaintiffs point out that they allege that the MHC Defendants are horizontal competitors in a market that has become significantly concentrated; that the that the manufactured housing market carries a significant barrier to entry, as large corporate owners have acquired most of the smaller businesses that used to run MHLs; and that switching—i.e., moving one’s home—in this market is cost

prohibitive. Id. (citing Compl. ¶¶ 71–82, 170–72).

Defendants retort that, contrary to Plaintiffs’ contention, the Complaint is devoid of allegations of market share before or during the alleged conspiracy period. Reply at 9; Memo. Dismiss at 16. From Defendants’ perspective, this absence is fatal to Plaintiffs’ “market concentration plus factor, because a concentrated market is defined as one with high market shares.” Reply at 9. The Court agrees; while

Plaintiffs allege how many MHCs each Defendant owns or purchased in certain years,

Compl. ¶ 72, they do not allege the specific (or even approximate) market share each MHC Defendant has. In each case cited by Plaintiffs in support of this plus factor, the plaintiffs alleged the percentage market share that defendants possessed. See In re Loc. TV, 2020 WL 6557665, at *10 (“Plaintiffs allege market concentration—with market shares as high as 100 percent in certain DMAs”); Todd, 275 F.3d at 208 (“If the relevant market in this case is defined as the plaintiff contends, the defendants would control collectively a 80–90% market share.”); In re Broiler Chicken I, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 779 (“As of 2015, Defendants controlled 88.8% of Broiler production in the United States.”); In re Turkey Antitrust Litig., 642 F. Supp. 3d 711, 727 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (“Defendants and the five named Co-Conspirators control approximately 80 percent of turkey production and processing.”); United States v. Container Corp. of

America, 393 U.S. 333, 342 (1969) (18 defendants made up 90 percent of the market).

Plaintiffs do, however, adequately allege high barriers to entry in the market and the difficulty for MHL renters to switch. See Compl. ¶¶ 171–72. But is hard to see (and Plaintiffs do not explain) how high barriers to entry matter if Defendants do not have a concentrated share of the market (that is, if Defendants make up only 30% of the market, it matters less that new entities cannot buy MHLs to rent out, since 70% of the market is made up of non-conspirators). And, as Defendants point out in reply, none of the cases cited by Plaintiffs stand for the proposition that switching costs bear on the plausibility of a conspiracy. Reply at 10. Therefore, the Court finds that the characteristics of the MHL market do not qualify as a plus factor.

c. Defendants’ Opportunities to Conspire

For their third plus factor, Plaintiffs posit that Defendants had multiple opportunities to collude in various ways. Resp. at 16–18. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had opportunities to collude because: (1) they all received the same third-party report with competitor data; and (2) almost all of the MHC Defendants are members of the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI), which organizes many industry events throughout the year. Id.

For the first basis, Defendants point out that Plaintiffs cite no case that reflects that—without some other relevant evidence regarding an “illegal scheme”—the Reports themselves offer an “opportunity to collude by sharing competitively sensitive pricing information.” Reply at 11. The Court agrees that receiving the Reports shows not an opportunity to collude, but rather an exchange of information, which, for the reasons discussed above, is a plus factor.

As to the second basis, Defendants argue that, without more, Defendants’ membership in an industry group does not increase the likelihood of a price-fixing conspiracy, and Plaintiffs do not allege that subsequent price changes were correlated to industry group meetings. Reply at 10 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567 n.12 (mere allegation that defendants “belong[ed] to various trade associations” insufficient to permit inference of “conspir[acy] to restrain trade”); In re Local TV, 2020 WL 6557665, at *10 (“[A]bsent additional facts addressing the content of defendants’ discussions at or the (nefarious) subjects of trade organization meetings, allegations that defendants [a]re members of the same trade organizations are unspectacular and fail to move the needle.”) (cleaned up)).

Defendants correctly point out that the cases cited by Plaintiffs in support of this plus factor all include allegations beyond mere membership in trade associations and attendance at industry events. For example, in In re Turkey, 642 F. Supp. 3d at 727, the complaint contained a “series of allegations”—including that the trade association created a special team “to lead an industry approach of ‘coopetition’ to increase turkey consumption in the United States while maintaining historic profit levels”—that supported the premise that the trade association memberships were not in fact typical, but rather a method for facilitating cooperation.” And in In re Broiler Chicken I, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 798, the court observed that the plaintiffs’ “reliance on industry meetings and public statements must be evaluated in the context of all their allegations,” and found them to constitute a plus factor where, “immediately after an industry convention, the large producers made public statements calling for industrywide production cuts,” and the same thing happened several years later with an unprecedented killing of breeder flocks. Here, Plaintiffs allege only that the MHC Defendants were members of a trade organization and attended industry meetings, which does not “move the needle.” In re Local TV, 2020 WL 6557665, at *10; see also Hansen, 2025 WL 2731378, at *9–10 (collecting cases). This, without more, will not do. Therefore, the Court finds that the opportunity to conspire does not qualify as a plus factor.

d. Defendants’ Action Against Their Self-Interest

Fourth, Defendants, according to Plaintiffs, acted against their self-interest by sharing competitively sensitive pricing information with their competitors via the Reports, because “without a conspiracy to inflate MHL rent prices, sharing of such information would undoubtedly be disastrous for any one MHC Defendant.” Resp. at 18 (citing, inter alia, Local TV, 2020 WL 6557665, at *9 (“[E]vidence that shows that the parallel acts were against the apparent individual economic self-interest of the alleged conspirators” is a plus factor)). Defendants disagree, arguing in reply that Plaintiffs’ allegations that they acted against their individual self-interest by sharing competitively sensitive information through the Reports is conclusory, and not a plus factor for the same reasons they advanced relating to the sharing of sensitive information. Reply at 8. That is, Defendants only argue that sharing Defendants’ data with Datacomp to be publicly disseminated is not a plus factor. For the reasons stated above, the Court disagrees. Defendants do not raise any specific arguments related to the exchange of information being against Defendants’ self-interest and thus have waived the issue. See Shipley v. Chicago Bd. of Election Commissioners, 947 F.3d

1056, 1063 (7th Cir. 2020) (“Arguments that are underdeveloped, cursory, and lack supporting authority are waived.”); Hendricks v. Lauber, No. 16 C 627, 2018 WL 2445311 at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2018) (failing to respond to argument in response to a motion constitutes a waiver).

And as stated above, the Complaint does not allege that all of the information exchanged (including, but not limited to future rent increases) is publicly available apart from the Reports, so, without more from Defendants, the Court cannot find at this stage that Plaintiffs’ allegations that Defendants “would be competitively disadvantaged by providing private data to other manufactured home community owners unilaterally” is not a plus factor. See In re RealPage, Inc., Rental Software Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 709 F. Supp. 3d 478, 510 (M.D. Tenn. 2023) (“The contribution of sensitive pricing and supply data for use by RealPage to recommend prices for competitor units is in Defendants’ economic self-interest if and only if Defendants know they are receiving in return the benefit of their competitors’ data in pricing their own units.). Defendants attempt to distinguish In re RealPage in a footnote, Reply at 9 n.5, pointing out that the court emphasized that the “heart and soul” of the alleged horizontal agreement was the “delegat[ion] [of] their rental price and supply decisions to a common decision maker, RealPage[,]” and the defendants’ agreement to “abide by RealPage’s price and supply decisions generated by [RealPage software].” 709 F. Supp. 3d at 503. True, here Plaintiffs do not allege that the MHC Defendants delegated their rental prices to Datacomp or any other entity; however, Defendants fail to explain why such delegation is essential to such an agreement being against the Defendants’ self-interest, where, as here, Plaintiffs allege that they shared sensitive pricing information in order to raise prices. The only difference is that here, Plaintiffs allege that each MHC Defendant raised its own prices based on the shared data. Therefore, at this stage, the Court finds that Plaintiffs adequately alleged that the MHC Defendants acted against their self-interest by sharing pricing information, which is a plus factor.

e. Defendants’ Motive to Conspire

Fifth, Plaintiffs posit that the MHC Defendants “possessed strong motive to conspire to exchange competitively sensitive pricing information and artificially inflate MHL rent prices,” which is a plus factor. Resp. at 19 (citing Tichy v. Hyatt Hotels Corp., 376 F. Supp. 3d 821, 835–36 (N.D. Ill. 2019)). Defendants are correct that, at bottom, Plaintiffs merely allege a motive to increase their profits, which is not a plus factor and does not give rise to an inference of a conspiracy. Memo. Dismiss at 15 (citing, inter alia, In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 134–35 (3d. Cir. 1999)). The Court agrees with Defendants that it matters not that In re Baby Food was decided at the summary judgment stage in this instance, as the legal principle holds: alleged motives to conspire that boil down to their motivation to increase profits do not give rise to an inference of a conspiracy because such motivations always exist. See Greco, 2024 WL 4119169, at *7. Defendants’ motives do not constitute a plus factor.

4. Alternative Explanations

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ “own allegations provide alternative explanations for the alleged high prices,” which “is sufficient to doom their case.” Memo. Dismiss at 18 (citing In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 322– 23 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[A]llegations of conspiracy are deficient if there are obvious alternative explanation[s] for the facts alleged.” (cleaned up)). As the court in In re Broiler Chicken I pointed out, “the Supreme Court did not intend for courts to weigh the plausibility of a plaintiff’s conspiracy claims against the plausibility of the defendants’ alternative explanation for their conduct.” 290 F. Supp. 3d at 801. However, while “Plaintiffs are not required to show that their conspiracy claims are more plausible than Defendants’ alternative explanation, alternative explanations can serve to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims are not plausible. But this analysis is no different than for any other plus factor.” Id. (cleaned up).

The Complaint itself, note Defendants, alleges that over the supposed conspiracy period, demand for manufactured home rentals increased while supply decreased or remained stagnant, resulting in record low vacancy rates. Memo. Dismiss at 18 (citing Compl. ¶ 171 (market has “outsized demand” and “virtually no new supply has been added for years”)). Defendants argue that “[b]asic economics dictate that an increase in demand combined with a decrease in supply leads to price increases.” Id. (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 553 (2012)

(“[P]rice can be supported by increasing demand as well as by decreasing supply.”)). Defendants also point to Plaintiffs’ allegations that, “[o]ver the past several years, private equity and other investment firms have become increasingly involved in the manufactured home lot space,” and, “because mom-and-pop owners have kept their rents more or less low, private equity firms have taken the opportunity to dramatically increase rents to quickly increase profits once those firms purchase the communities.” Compl. ¶ 77. Therefore, reason Defendants, in light of the other legitimate reasons for rent increases alleged by Plaintiffs, the Court should not “infer that the [Defendants] had agreed among themselves to do what was only natural anyway.” Id. at 18–19 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 566).

Plaintiffs counter that the Court should not decide which explanation is more likely than not. Resp. at 20–21 (citing, inter alia, Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010); In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 313 F. Supp. 3d 931,

953 (N.D. Ill. 2018)). True, the Court cannot weigh two plausible explanations for the MHL rent increases. But, as stated above, “alternative explanations can serve to demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims are not plausible.” In re Broiler Chicken I, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 802.

Here, taking all well-pled factual allegations as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’ favor, and in keeping with the holistic approach articulated recently in In re MultiPlan Health Ins. Provider, 789 F. Supp. 3d at 637, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to meaningfully address the “obvious alternative explanation” for the MHL rent increases, and merely allege conduct that is “consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567, 554; see also Mirage Wine + Spirit’s, 2025 WL 1896006, at *3. That is, as stated above, while the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly pled parallel conduct, if barely, the Court still considers the fact that the alleged rent increases differed—for example, ranging from 0% to 15.4% in one submarket, and – 0.6% to 12.9% in another. Compl. Figs. 21–22. Such varied rent increases, while done during a similar time period, combined with the exchange of some allegedly confidential information against Defendants’ self-interest, without more, is merely consistent with, rather than suggestive of, a price-fixing conspiracy. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. Section 1 demands more, even at the pleading stage. Id. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not plausibly pled a price-fixing conspiracy among Defendants.

                           II.         Count II

In Count II, Plaintiffs allege an information exchange in violation of Section I of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C § 1. FAC ¶ 122. That is, that Defendants’ exchange of information on its own violates the antitrust law. The parties dispute which mode of antitrust analysis the Court should apply—per se, as with the price-fixing claim, or rule of reason. Compare Memo. Dismiss at 19–20 with Resp. at 21–22. The Court agrees with Defendants that binding precedent establishes that Section 1 information-exchange claims are evaluated under the rule of reason. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l

Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975); see also Todd, 275 F.3d at 211; In re Pork, 781 F. Supp. 3d at 791.

“Rule-of-reason violations . . . require that a plaintiff plead anticompetitive effects, and that the injury complained of be of a type that the antitrust laws were designed to guard against, and further that the antitrust violation be the direct cause of plaintiff’s injury.” In re Dealer Mgmt. Sys. Antitrust Litig., 313 F. Supp. 3d 931, 950 (N.D. Ill. 2018). “A number of factors including most prominently the structure of the industry involved and the nature of the information exchanged are generally considered in divining the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of this type of interseller communication.” U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 443 n.16; see also Agnew v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 683 F.3d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] plaintiff’s threshold burden under the Rule of Reason analysis involves the showing of a precise market definition in order to demonstrate that a defendant wields market power, which, by definition, means that the defendant can produce anticompetitive effects.”).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ information-exchange claim should be dismissed because Plaintiffs fail to allege: (1) an agreement between the MHC Defendants to exchange any information^[9]; (2) a relevant market definition; (3) the MHC Defendants’ market power; and (4) anticompetitive effects in any of the alleged markets or submarkets. Memo. Dismiss at 21–24. Defendants fail to develop or support their first argument, that “the mere purchase of publicly-available data from

 

a third party is not in any way equivalent to an agreement between competitors to exchange information,” and thus have waived the argument. See Shipley, 947 F.3d at

1063. The Court therefore starts with Plaintiffs’ market definitions.

A. Market Definition

Plaintiffs allege both a national geographic market as well as regional submarkets. Resp. at 25–26 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 140–42). Defendants maintain that both of Plaintiffs’ alleged geographic markets are implausible. Memo. Dismiss at 22. A complaint, however, need only allege “one plausible geographic market to survive a motion to dismiss.” Vasquez v. Indiana Univ. Health, Inc., 40 F.4th 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2022).

Starting with the national market, Defendants cite to Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., in which the Supreme Court stated, “the area of effective competition in the known line of commerce must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.” Memo. Dismiss at 22 (quoting 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961)); see also Sharif Pharmacy, Inc. v. Prime Therapeutics, LLC, 950 F.3d 911, 916 (7th Cir. 2020) (“A relevant market under the Sherman Act is comprised of the commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes.”) (cleaned up). Therefore, argue Defendants, in order for there to be a national market, in the event that an MHL renter in one state was priced out of a community, that renter would consider renting an MHL anywhere in the country as a substitute. Id. The Court agrees that this is implausible.

Indeed, as Defendants point out, the Complaint alleges that, in relation to the area of effective competition, “the commuting distance to a place of work or school is a geographic constraint on where a manufactured home lot renter chooses to live,” Compl. ¶ 180, and manufactured home lot renters also “will choose to live within close distance to their relatives and health care providers for support, id. ¶ 181. In fact, the

Complaint explicitly alleges that “Manufactured home lot renters in any given Regional Submarket do not consider leases in other Regional Submarkets as adequate substitutes for manufactured home lot leases in their own submarket.” Id. ¶ 182.

Plaintiffs respond, without citation to any authority, only that their national market allegations are supported by MHL rental prices increasing significantly across the United States beginning around 2017, and that Defendants own communities throughout the United States and advertise a desire to purchase even more. Resp. at 25–26 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 34–43, 73, 140–42). As stated above, “[a]rguments that are underdeveloped, cursory, and lack supporting authority are waived.” Shipley, 947 F.3d at 1063. Waiver aside, the Court agrees with Defendants that a national market is not appropriate because renters are not likely to move to an MHL across the country if they become priced out of their current MHL.

Turning to the regional submarkets, Plaintiffs allege that there are 187 regional submarkets, which are defined by reference to “metropolitan statistical areas” (MSAs), which are how Datacomp organizes data in the Reports. Compl. ¶¶ 98, 179; see Resp. at 26. Defendants argue that “many of these regional submarkets are far too large to define the area of effective competition,” and point out that, as an example, the Phoenix-Scottsdale MSA that Plaintiffs describe in Figure 23 is 14,587 square miles in size. Memo. Dismiss at 23. As a point of reference, the entire state of

Maryland         is        12,306         square         miles.        See         Geography        of         Maryland,

https://sos.maryland.gov/mdkids/pages/geography.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2025). Defendants maintain that, for the same reasons the national market fails, so too do the MSAs, as the Complaint alleges that “commuting distance to a place of work or school is a geographic constraint on where a manufactured home lot renter chooses to live,” Compl. ¶ 180, so all 14,587 square miles are not interchangeable. Memo. Dismiss at 23. The Court agrees.

Both parties rely on different analyses of geographic markets in In re RealPage, 709 F. Supp. 3d 478. While In re RealPage is persuasive authority only, the Court, like the parties, finds it instructive. Defendants focus on the court’s analysis of the geographic market for student renters, in which the court found that the alleged regional submarkets were overly broad because, in certain instances, they comprised entire cities that contained multiple universities, meaning that, based on the plaintiffs’ allegations that the markets for student housing are tied to the institutions students attend, in the large cities, students would likely forgo student housing near a different university on the opposite side of town in favor of other housing options closer to the institution they attend, such as dormitories or multifamily housing. In re RealPage, 709 F. Supp. 3d at 529. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, focus on the court’s analysis of the geographic scope of the multifamily housing market, which was broken into MSAs established by the United States Census Bureau and the Office of Management and Budget, which defined an MSA as “a geographic entity associated with at least one core urbanized area of 50,000 or more population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties.” Id. at 523 (cleaned up). The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the New York City MSA was too broad based on a hypothetical renter who works in New York City’s financial district, does not own a car, and would not want to live in Pennsylvania. The court found that, at the motion to dismiss stage, MSAs were an appropriately defined geographic area. Id. at 523– 24. Of note, Defendants independently raised the example of the hypothetical New York City renter; the plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege anything about such renters. Id.

Because, as Defendants point out, Plaintiffs specifically allege that “commuting distance to a place of work or school is a geographic constraint on where a manufactured home lot renter chooses to live,” Compl. ¶ 180, the Court finds the In re RealPage court’s analysis of student housing markets more applicable here.

Similar to the court’s finding there, here, it was Plaintiffs’ decision to plead large

MSAs such as the Phoenix-Scottsdale MSA, which contradicts their allegations that MHL renters are unlikely to look at alternative MHLs that are a significant commute from work or school. See In re RealPage, 709 F. Supp. 3d at 529–30. While Plaintiffs are correct that often market definitions are questions of fact more appropriately decided at summary judgment, Resp. at 26 (citing, inter alia, Olean Wholesale Grocery Coop., Inc. v. Agri Stats, Inc., 2020 WL 6134982, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 19, 2020)), the definition still must be plausible to survive a motion to dismiss. As currently pled, the Court finds that the alleged geographic markets are not plausible.

Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to allege a plausible market, the Court does not address Defendants’ remaining arguments relating to Count II.^[10]

                           III.             Count III (Unjust Enrichment)

In Count III, Plaintiffs assert a state law claim for unjust enrichment in the alternative. “To state a claim for unjust enrichment under Illinois law, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant has unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff’s detriment, and that defendant’s retention of the benefit violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.” Banco Panamericano, Inc. v. City of Peoria, Ill., 880 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim must be dismissed for three reasons. First, Plaintiffs fail to identify under which laws or in which states they bring their unjust enrichment claims. Memo. Dismiss at 25 (citing Sandee’s Catering v. Agri Stats, Inc., 2020 WL 6273477, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2020)). Second, according to Defendants, Plaintiffs base their claim on the same factual foundation as their antitrust claims, but improperly relabel it under an unjust enrichment theory, which is insufficient under Rule 8. Id. at 25–26 (citing In re Opana ER Antitrust Litig., 162 F. Supp. 3d 704, 726 (N.D. Ill. 2016)). Lastly, even if Plaintiffs had properly pled an unjust enrichment claim, it nonetheless fails for the same reasons Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims must be dismissed. Id. at 26 (citing, inter alia, Cleary v. Philip Morris Inc., 656 F.3d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on the same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then the unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related claim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall with the related claim.”)).

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Defendants’ first two arguments miss the mark. First, at the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiffs need not specify which state’s law applies. Resp. at 29 (citing Mirza v. Ignite USA, LLC, 439 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1067, n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (rejecting argument that unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed because complaint failed to specify which state’s law applied); Kostovetsky v. Ambit Energy Holdings, LLC, 2016 WL 105980, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2016) (denying motion to dismiss unjust enrichment claim in a multi-state class action, finding an inquiry into applicable states’ laws “premature” and noting that, because the plaintiff lived in Illinois, Illinois law likely applied to his unjust enrichment claim, and the respective state laws of the state in which each class member resided would apply to their unjust enrichment claims)). Sandee’s Catering, cited by Defendants, does not change the analysis, as in that case, the plaintiff sued on behalf of a nationwide class but pled unjust enrichment under the laws of only a few “indirect purchaser” states, and then “muddled” the matter by simultaneously and contradictorily alleging that they were pleading unjust enrichment under the laws of 47 states. 2020 WL 6273477, at *12. Plaintiffs do not do so here.

Second, Plaintiffs are correct that courts in this District have held that, “[i]f an unjust enrichment claim rests on the same improper conduct alleged in another claim, then the unjust enrichment claim will be tied to this related claim—and, of course, unjust enrichment will stand or fall with the related claim.” Ploss v. Kraft Foods Grp., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1074 (N.D. Ill. 2016); see also Flores v.

Motorola Solutions, Inc., 2021 WL 232627, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2021); In re Broiler Chicken I, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 818 (“The Court will not address Defendants’ arguments with respect to the consumer protection statutes and unjust enrichment laws of the states for which antitrust claims are proceeding, because the fact that the antitrust claims are going forward in those jurisdictions is sufficient for the parties to proceed with discovery relevant to those jurisdictions.”). Plaintiffs’ allegations are unlike those in In re Opana, cited by Defendants, in which indirect purchasers simply “listed” a single unjust enrichment claim that implicated the antitrust laws of multiple states alongside antitrust claims. 162 F. Supp. 3d at 726.

But the Court agrees with Defendants—and indeed, Plaintiffs do not dispute— that an unjust enrichment claim that rests on the same alleged conduct in another claim will “stand or fall with the related claim.” Cleary, 656 F.3d at 517; O’Connor v. Ford Motor Co., 477 F. Supp. 3d 705, 720 (N.D. Ill. 2020). Critically, Plaintiffs do not deny that their unjust enrichment claim is based on the same factual foundation as their antitrust claims. See Resp. at 29–30. Therefore, because the Court has found that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled antitrust violations, their unjust enrichment claim must likewise fall.

                           IV.            Murex Motion to Dismiss

As stated above, Murex joined in the motion to dismiss, but also filed a separate motion, raising two additional bases for dismissal for failure to state a claim. First, Florida’s Mobile Home Act (the Act) requires MHCs to defend rent increases by reference to rents charged by competitor communities, meaning it is especially clear in Florida that information about rents is not, as asserted by Plaintiffs, “non-public, competitively sensitive information”—so their conspiracy allegations as to Murex, which operates in Florida, are particularly implausible. R. 152, Murex Memo.

Dismiss at 1. Second, the regulatory framework in the Act confers immunity upon Murex under the state-action doctrine. Id. Murex additionally argues that it should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and venue under Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3) because Murex has no contacts with the State of Illinois. Id.

Because the Court has found that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim based on the arguments raised in Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss, it need not address Murex’s additional arguments in favor of dismissal based on the Act. As to the personal jurisdiction arguments, while courts ordinarily address challenges to personal jurisdiction before addressing the merits of a claim, “a court may instead decide a case on the merits when the ‘jurisdictional question is complex or difficult’ or even when the case ‘clearly must be decided in favor of the party challenging jurisdiction, thereby obviating any need to decide the [jurisdictional] question.’” Prewett Enters., Inc. v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 2019 WL 6310495, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 25, 2019)

(quoting 4 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure

• 1067.6 and citing Evangelical Benefit Trust v. Lloyd’s Underwriters Syndicate Nos. 2987, 1607, 1183 & 2001, 2010 WL 2927404, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2010)); see also Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 247 n.17 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[I]n cases such as this one with multiple defendants—over some of whom the court indisputably has personal jurisdiction—in which all defendants collectively challenge the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff’s cause of action, we may address first the facial challenge to the underlying cause of action and, if we dismiss the claim in its entirety, decline to address the personal jurisdictional claims made by some defendants. This is particularly true when the personal jurisdictional challenges are based on factual allegations that are, in this early posture, still under development.”); In re Passenger

Vehicle Replacement Tires Antitrust Litig., 767 F. Supp. 3d 681, 745–46 (N.D. Ohio 2025) (collecting cases). Accordingly, because the Court grants the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, as well as the fact that the jurisdictional issue only applies to one of the eleven Defendants, it denies as moot Murex’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Conclusion

For the reasons given above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [154] is granted without prejudice. The Court denies without prejudice Murex’s motion to dismiss

[151] as moot. Plaintiffs may file an amended consolidated complaint on or before January 5, 2026. Defendants’ answer or other responsive pleading is due on or before

January 27, 2026.

 

 

Dated: December 4, 2025

United States District Judge

Franklin U. Valderrama

 

[1] Citations to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket number or filing name, and where necessary, a page or paragraph citation.

Dockets.Justia.com

[2] Murex joined Defendants’ motion to dismiss, but also filed a separate motion to dismiss advancing three separate bases for dismissal unique to Murex.

 

[3] The Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the Complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs. Platt v. Brown, 872 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2017).

[4] This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations, 18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

[5] The District Court for the District of Minnesota, in an opinion cited by Plaintiffs in their notice of supplemental authority, called into question whether “evidence of an invitation and acceptance alone, without corresponding evidence of parallel conduct and plus factors, would be sufficient to survive summary judgment in a § 1 case based on circumstantial evidence,” noting that the case on which the plaintiffs in that case—as well as Plaintiffs here—rely in support of the invitation and acceptance theory, Interstate Cir. v. United States, “was decided nearly a century ago, and since then caselaw has developed in such a way as to indicate that parallel conduct and plus factors are typically important to support a per se violation of § 1.” In re Pork Antitrust Litig., 781 F. Supp. 3d 758, 800 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Interstate Cir. v.

 

[6] While the Court finds In re Broiler Chicken to be instructive as to the parallel conduct analysis, the conclusion is distinguishable, as in that case the plaintiff had pled numerous plus factors that, when considered as a whole, supported a plausible conspiracy. 290 F. Supp. 3d at 797–802. Here, on the other hand, for the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that, when viewed as a whole, the Complaint falls short in plausibly alleging that the parallel conduct alleged by Plaintiffs reflects an agreement among Defendants to increase rent prices.

[7] In reply, Defendants take issue with Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Court should disregard cases cited by Defendants on summary judgment. Reply at 3 n.3. According to Defendants, this is inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ own reliance on summary judgment or post-trial decisions, and also is incorrect, as a court’s holdings regarding substantive law do not become irrelevant at the pleading stage, simply because they were made in later stages of a case. Id. While Defendants are correct that a courts’ holdings regarding substantive law are applicable across all stages of cases, how a court applies the law to the allegations or facts depends on

 

[8] The Ninth Circuit noted that the conclusion would be different if the plaintiff’s price-fixing theory was based on the dissemination of retail prices, as “permitting an inference of conspiracy from such evidence would make it more difficult for retail consumers to get the information they need to make efficient market decisions.” In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 448 n.14. The Court recognizes there is a fine line between rental prices and retail prices and inferring a conspiracy from the dissemination of such information. However, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, Platt, 872 F.3d at 851, and, as stated above, Plaintiffs allege that MHL renters cannot switch lots, which is enough, at this stage, to allow the Court to consider the publicly available rental price information as supporting a price-fixing conspiracy.

[9] Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs’ Section II claim—premised on a theory of liability that the MHC Defendants used Datacomp’s reports to coordinate their prices by sharing “competitively sensitive information about manufactured home lot rental prices and occupancy, among other things, throughout the United States”—fails for the same reason as Count I because the Complaint fails to allege an agreement between Defendants. Memo. Dismiss at 21 (citing Alarm Detection Sys., Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg, 930 F.3d 812, 827 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Section 1 liability requires an agreement or a conspiracy.”)). Defendants also argue in their motion that while a claim that an exchange of information on its can violate the antitrust laws, “[t]o the extent Plaintiffs claim that Count II instead alleges a price-fixing agreement that is facilitated by an information exchange, such a claim would be entirely duplicative of Count I.” Id. at 19 & n.5. Defendants’ argument that Count II must be dismissed for the same reason as Count I appears to “obfuscate which alleged ‘conspiracy’ they are talking about” by conflating the information-exchange claim with the price-fixing claim, as Defendants accuse Plaintiffs of doing. Reply at 3 n.2. The Court therefore does not consider this argument, at least as currently presented, as it pertains to Count II.

[10] Although the Court does not address Defendants’ remaining arguments for dismissal of Count II, “to the extent that Plaintiffs choose to replead this claim, they should carefully consider those arguments and address any other potential pleading deficiencies in an amended complaint.” Hansen, 2025 WL 2731378, at *10.

Part II. Additional Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) from Sources as Shown plus more MHProNews MHVille industry Expert Commentary.

In no particular order of importance are the following.

1) There are clear outliers to the predatory business model of the defendants – and several other consolidation-focused operators – in MHVille. A notable example is new MHI board member Sam Landy, J.D., led UMH Properties.

 

2) When Frank Rolfe slams Landy publicly that ought to be seen as a badge of honor for his firm. UMH Properties’ Sam and Eugene Landy have publicly argued for more developing (see above and below).

 

 

3) While plaintiff’s attorneys might debate the merits of naming Rolfe and his business interests as a defendant if they file an amended claim with the court. But citing Rolfe by name could help ‘move the needle’ to borrow the phrase from the judge’s ruling. Rolfe blamed MHI for low sales. That is part of the jigsaw puzzle of evidence that has only partially been addressed (or entirely missed in some cases?) in the plaintiff’s petition.

 

 

4) Why would a firm, or a group of firms, deliberately allow the suppression of their own industry? To limit competition via consolidation and increase prices. This is pattern recognition that various AIs have repeatedly confirmed.

 

 

5) Dragging Berkshire Hathaway owned firms, and others that are MHI members, into the suit might prove useful.

 

 

6) This pattern doubtlessly costs retail investors and taxpayer who are funding affordable housing and homelessness programs. Show taxpayers and investors that not only predatory MHC residents are being harmed, but so too are retail investors and taxpayers by this pattern of behavior, and a court and other regulators may lean in.

 

 

7) To the point raised by Landy, Sun Communities former CEO admitted during an earnings call that they could profit more in several cases by developing new communities where they may sell new homes and lease site than by paying compressed cap rates for existing properties.

 

 

8) Sun was a named defendant.

 

9) Yes! Communities is another named defendant in the case cited above too.

 

 

10) As was noted in the preface, one question is: how hard are the plaintiffs prepared to work to redraft their arguments and provided additional supporting materials? Especially when some of those materials comes from the named defendants, and/or other MHI members, who in some cases are suppliers to the defendants?

Per the court’s order in Part I.

Defendants are correct that, at bottom, Plaintiffs merely allege a motive to increase their profits, which is not a plus factor and does not give rise to an inference of a conspiracy.

 

11) When MHProNews unpacks the various elements of the purported collusion between various firms, there has been no argument that those so engaged are necessarily profiting more from this behavior. As the Gary Shiffman comment above reflects, there is an evidence-based argument to be made that in some cases they are profiting less from such a scheme. UMH Properties has effectively aimed to make that argument in their case studies and earnings calls.

 

 

Then what is the motivation behind the purported antitrust violating scheme?

12) The evidence suggests that the behavior is aimed at limiting the market. By limiting the market, as Frank Rolfe bragged, a local monopoly is effectively created that harms competition and thus consumers. That localized pattern may indeed have national consequences.

“If you like having a monopoly, holding all the cards, knowing the tenants won’t move their homes out, never worrying about someone building a new property near you and taking one of the tenant’s biggest assets if they default, then you’re going to love mobile home parks.”

By urging community operators NOT to develop more properties, that plays into the scheme that is hiding in plain sight.

 

 

That often, but not always, results in consumer harms such as aggressive site fee hikes. To counter, for example, the judge’s point that in some cases Datacomp users hiked fees less than others, that could be explained simply as a defensive tool by those colluding precisely to foil a case that emphasized Datacomp as much as they did in their pleadings. But that doesn’t mean there is no antitrust violation that harms consumers, taxpayers, and others.

13) As a parallel example to shed light on this matter, imagine if multifamily housing firms argued that no new apartment complexes should be built. If that could be accomplished, that would reduce expenses and risks for individual firms that are part of the scheme, be it formal, or merely wink and a nod. 

But in manufactured housing, community development has crashed. There are more communities closing than are opening, per sources that include Datacomp.

 

14) Several of the remarks made by the plaintiffs were effectively turned against them by the defendants’ attorneys, as the ruling above reflects. Per the Court’s order in Part I.

“Defendants contend that Plaintiffs’ “own allegations provide alternative explanations for the alleged high prices,” which “is sufficient to doom their case.”

…

“That is, as stated above, while the Court finds that Plaintiffs have plausibly pled parallel conduct, if barely, the Court still considers the fact that the alleged rent increases differed—for example, ranging from 0% to 15.4% in one submarket, and – 0.6% to 12.9% in another.”

 

15) MHProNews notes that like politics, the goal for the purported monopolists is localized even if it has national implications. The ELS owned Datacomp quotes, facts, and related are interesting and may often (but obviously, not always) be a factor in how the scheme is played out. But perhaps as interesting, although perhaps not as ‘sexy,’ is how information is played out in much of the balance of MHVille.

As was noted in the preface from MHReview, those that have remarked on this case that are in the MHI orbit celebrate the defeat of the plaintiffs. Dr. Cody J. Dees via MHReview also slammed the antitrust suit fairly early on.

The concerns of residents are for predatory operators a non-factor, because they are ‘chained’ (Rolfe’s Waffle House metaphor) to their difficult and costly to move manufactured home which often has no other nearby options even if the money is there to pay for a move.

16) As Warren Buffett’s longtime ally and a sizable shareholder in Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) via the Gates Foundation and his own investment unit, William “Bill” Gates III explained, when someone looks for weaknesses in markets they can find those weaknesses and exploit them.

 

 

17) Limiting accurate information is arguably part of the antitrust violating scheme. This is not new to MHVille, as examples linked above and elsewhere herein reveal. Another part is limiting access to capital. No less a person than Kevin Clayton, citing Warren Buffett, said in a detailed review of a video interview how Buffett hates competition and showed how ‘the moat’ works to limit that competition.

 

 

18) Indeed, negative media is an advantage to the NIMBYism that ELS celebrated in the screen shot shown above under “supply constraints.” As MHProNews has been observing, the occupancy rates in several of these operators – and the industry nationally – has been fairly static. Why is occupancy static, if there are “thousands” of applications for residency annually, per Sun’s IR pitch shown above? Because there is apparently churn taking place. Community operators that are predatory are not just hiking rents. They are evicting (economically or otherwise) residents. The evicted homeowner often loses that home. That home can then be resold OR replaced with newer or new inventory. The communities are thus going through a kind of local ‘urban renewal’ by replacing older models with new ones. The appeal will rise, and the ability of the community owner to charge more from more affluent potential residents is enhanced.

The point is that there are nuances to the MHCs tactics. By plaintiff’s counsels constraining their arguments as they have, it seems to offer defendants’ counsel numerous avenues for legal counterattacks.

19) Perhaps one of the strongest pieces of evidence of a scheme that uses MHI as a hub is MHI CEO Lesli Gooch.  How so? Because much of what Gooch has said and done is not plausible absent a predicated scheme.

a) First, it is implausible that the MHI search committee would have failed to find the cloud of problematic behavior that surrounded her before hiring her. A simple Google search turns documented concerns about her behavior and connections to purported (but unproven) corruption up.

 

 

 

b) How did MHI’s search committee miss all that and more? The answer may be that they didn’t miss it, they found it. The answer may be that his was precisely the kind of future organizational leader that they wanted. And as MHProNews turned up the scrutiny on Gooch and MHI, MHI’s leadership responded by arranging for ‘awards’ and ‘recognition.’

 

 

c) MHI’s Gooch also has taken inexplicable behavior for someone that claims to want to grow the industry. Two examples follow.

 

 

d) Gooch has a Ph.D. in political science. It is not plausible that she, or others involved at MHI, could miss the opportunities to fix the barriers to entry and expansion that the 2000 Reform law and Duty to Serve (DTS) enforcement could bring.

 

 

e) MHProNews has directly contacted multiple times several MHI board members and Gooch directly, to urge them to be transparent and take the logical steps that MHARR has long argued in favor of doing. Not only was there no response, but there were no moves for amendments urged by MHARR on existing federal laws that if enforced could result in robust growth.

 

 

f) MHI has had years of opportunities to respond to concerns that their own outside attorney David Goch’s remarks made clear they monitor. The fact that Gooch responded to antitrust allegations by Doug Ryan and publicly slammed the op-ed by James Schmitz. Meaning, MHI can respond when they want to and apparently believe that doing so benefits their interests. But when they don’t think they can score points by responding, as AI has described it, MHI practices strategic avoidance.

 

 

g) That strategic avoidance has been practiced for the better part of a decade when it comes to published concerns raised by MHProNews.

 

 

20) If the plaintiffs broaden and reframe their claim, that could overcome the judge’s stated concerns.

For instance, why not include RICO claims? Per Google’s AI powered Gemini.

Schalamar Creek Case: In Schalamar Creek Mobile Homeowner’s Association, Inc. v. Adler, plaintiffs alleged violations of both federal and state RICO acts. They claimed that park owners and related entities engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, including fraudulent inducement related to new prospectuses that altered lot rents.

…

Status of Claims: In the Schalamar Creek litigation, the RICO claims were eventually dismissed or granted summary judgment because the court found the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state the circumstances of the alleged fraud with sufficient particularity.

 

21) The plaintiffs have until Jan. 5 to amend their complaint. The following may or may not prove useful to other attorneys and/or public officials who could step into the breach if these attorneys fail to do so. Per Copilot in response to the developing draft of this report linked here. The input-inquiry is by MHProNews. The response is by Bing‘s AI powered Copilot.

Hey, Copilot. Let’s do a facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) check of the pre-publication draft of the report linked here and uploaded to you: https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/MEMORANDUM-OPINION-AND-ORDER-THE-NORTHERN-DISTRICT-OF-ILLINOIS-EASTERN-DIVISION-Case-No.-23-cv-06715-Draft-elements.pdf Both PDFs are the same. Double check to see if the order as shown in Part I is accurate in terms of the PDF download of the court’s ruling. Also, see if the potential arguments and evidence suggested via the developing report for plaintiffs’ counsel could be useful if they refile their case by Jan 5, 2026? Correct, confirm, clarify the various elements as warranted by known online evidence. Use plain text hyperlinks to support your findings.

FEA verification of Part I and refiling guidance

Below is a line-by-line check of your Part I against the court’s memorandum opinion and order as quoted in the draft you provided, plus concrete, court-ready upgrades for a January 5, 2026 refiling. I’ve added plain text links to controlling or persuasive authorities and primary sources where helpful.

 

Executive verification summary

• Bottom line: Your Part I tracks the court’s ruling accurately in substance and structure. The key holdings—dismissal without prejudice, Rule 12(b)(6) disposition of Counts I–III, rule-of-reason treatment for information exchange, market-definition failure for Count II, and Murex’s motion denied as moot—are correctly captured.
• Dates and disposition: The order date (December 4, 2025), “without prejudice” dismissal, and leave to amend by January 5, 2026, with defendants’ responsive pleading due January 27, 2026, are consistently presented.
• Doctrinal pillars: The opinion’s reliance on Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards, Seventh Circuit parallel conduct/plus-factor framework, and rule-of-reason analysis for information exchange is represented accurately.
• Where you’re cautious and correct: Trade association membership “without more” not being a plus factor; information exchange as a facilitating practice for price-fixing under Count I; failure to plausibly plead relevant geographic markets under Count II; unjust enrichment falling with the antitrust claims.

Because the official docket PDF isn’t linked from a court site in your draft, counsel should independently confirm the entered order via PACER or a reputable mirror. Use:

• PACER: https://pacer.uscourts.gov
• NDIL opinions: https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov
• CourtListener (RealPage reference, for analogous points): https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67110330/in-re-realpage-inc-rental-software-antitrust-litigation-no-ii/

 

Accuracy check of Part I against the court’s order

Case posture, counts, and motions

• Counts and parties: Plaintiffs pled Sherman Act §1 claims (Counts I–II) against MHC Defendants and Datacomp; unjust enrichment (Count III) against MHC Defendants. Your defendant list (ELS, Hometown America, Lakeshore, Sun, RHP, Yes, Inspire, Kingsley, Cal-Am, Murex, Datacomp) matches the opinion’s framing.
• Motions: Joint 12(b)(6) motion granted; Murex’s separate 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6) motion denied as moot given dismissal on the merits. That’s accurately stated.
• Disposition: Dismissed without prejudice, leave to amend by January 5, 2026; defense responses due January 27, 2026—correct.

Count I (price-fixing conspiracy)

• Direct evidence: Plaintiffs did not plead direct evidence; the court says so plainly. Correct.
• Parallel conduct: The court finds plaintiffs “barely” alleged parallel conduct based on rent increases “reasonably proximate in time and value,” but emphasizes disparities across submarkets. You captured that nuance.
• Plus factors:
  • Information exchange: Properly identified as a facilitating practice that can support an inference of a price-fixing conspiracy, not a standalone per se violation—accurate. See Todd v. Exxon (2d Cir.) https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/275/191/ and Local TV: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:2020cv07222/393373/151/
  • Market structure/concentration: Court faulted the complaint for lacking market-share allegations; your summary reflects this correctly.
  • Opportunity to conspire: Trade association membership and attendance “without more” do not “move the needle”—correct. Compare Twombly n.12: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/550/544/
  • Against self-interest: Court treats the alleged sharing of competitively sensitive info as potentially against self-interest at the pleadings stage; you captured that (and the RealPage analogy caveat).
  • Motive: Profit motive is not a plus factor; correct. See Baby Food: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/166/112/
• Alternative explanations: Court notes plaintiffs’ own allegations (outsized demand, constrained supply, low vacancy) offer obvious lawful alternatives; you present this correctly and quote the court’s caution from Twombly. Twombly: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/550/544/

Count II (information exchange)

• Mode of analysis: Rule of reason is controlling for information exchange claims; correct. See U.S. Gypsum: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/438/422/ and Citizens & Southern National Bank: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/422/86/
• Deficiencies: The court dismisses for failure to plausibly define geographic markets (national implausible; MSA submarkets too broad given commuting constraints alleged), and it did not reach market power or anticompetitive-effects arguments. Your summary is accurate.
• RealPage analogy: You correctly show the court’s nuanced use of RealPage—MSAs can be plausible in some settings; but plaintiffs’ own commuting-distance allegations cut against their MSA pleadings here. RealPage: https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10038553/in-re-realpage-inc-rental-software-antitrust-litigation-no-ii/

Count III (unjust enrichment)

• Rises/falls with antitrust: The court dismisses unjust enrichment because it rests on the same conduct and falls with the antitrust claims—correct. See Cleary v. Philip Morris: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/656/511/

Specific factual points you recorded

• Datacomp/JLT history and ELS ownership: JLT acquisition by Datacomp (2014) and ELS’s acquisition of Datacomp (Dec. 2021) are stated in the opinion and reflected correctly in your draft.
• Datacomp report content and executives’ statements: The order references future pricing data, occupancy, and named executives (Partrich, Sukert, Nelson) praising report utility—your quotes align with the order’s citations.
• No mention of Mobile Home University/Frank Rolfe: Your assertion that those terms do not appear in the order is consistent with the order’s scope.
• Trade association examples: Your discussion of In re Turkey and In re Broiler Chicken I as examples of “something more” at trade associations aligns with the court’s analysis. Turkey: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:19-cv-08318/371159/731/ and Broiler Chicken: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:16-cv-08637/330954/541/

 

Clarifications and minor edits to tighten the draft

• Lead-in clarity: Where you quote passages, keep the “Compl. ¶” paragraph citations and figure references exactly as in the order. You’ve done this in most places; maintain that consistency throughout.
• “Doc. 211” callout: If you intend “Doc. 211” as the docket entry number of the memorandum opinion, verify via PACER before publication; if it denotes page or internal pagination in your draft, relabel to avoid confusion.
• Footnote bracket style: The order uses bracketed footnotes and “(cleaned up)” notation. Your inclusion is fine; ensure every quoted parenthetical matches the source.

 

Refiling by January 5, 2026: targeted upgrades likely to “move the needle”

Sherman Act §1 (Count I – price-fixing)

• Parallel conduct specificity:
  • Actors/timing/amounts: Tie specific rent increases by defendant, by property, by month/quarter, to contemporaneous competitor increases in the same submarket.
  • Synchrony evidence: Add instances where multiple defendants implemented similar percentage increases or identical future effective dates after acquiring Datacomp reports.
• Plus factors that courts credit:
  • Interfirm communications: Include internal emails, meeting agendas, or notes correlating to pricing decisions (not just membership/attendance).
  • Against self-interest: Show how sharing future pricing and effective dates was competitively disadvantageous absent a mutual understanding.
  • Post-meeting actions: Where possible, link industry events or Datacomp “live updates” to near-term coordinated pricing actions.
• Facilitating practice particulars:

• Report granularity: Plead examples of non-public future pricing fields (e.g., date and amount of pending increases) that are not readily obtainable by public means, and describe how defendants used those fields to align pricing.
• Reciprocity: Allege each defendant’s provision of future pricing to Datacomp and receipt of competitors’ future pricing—show the give-and-take.

Useful analogs and standards:

• Text Messaging I/II: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/630/622/ and https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/782/867/
• Container Corp. (exchange of pricing info among concentrated firms): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/393/333/

Sherman Act §1 (Count II – information exchange under rule of reason)

• Product and geographic market:
  • Product: Define “manufactured home lot leases” as distinct from detached single-family rentals and multifamily rentals with non-interchangeability supported by switching costs and move-out constraints.
  • Geography: Replace broad MSAs with commuting-based submarkets (e.g., drive-time polygons, school/work catchments) consistent with your own allegation that commuting distance constrains choice.
  • Concentration: Plead defendants’ market shares in each submarket (lots under control / total lots), and HHI calculations where feasible.
• Market power and effects:

• Market power: Use share thresholds and HHI to show durable power.
• Anticompetitive effects: Allege supracompetitive rent levels relative to benchmarks, reduced price dispersion post-exchange, diminished quality/services, and consumer switching deterrence linked to shared future pricing.

Standards and references:

• U.S. Gypsum (rule-of-reason factors): https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/438/422/
• Agnew (market definition threshold burden): https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/683/328/
• RealPage (student-market commute constraints; MSAs nuance): https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10038553/in-re-realpage-inc-rental-software-antitrust-litigation-no-ii/

Evidence sources you flagged that can be pled as plus factors

• Defendants’ IR claims about constrained supply: ELS and Sun materials highlighting “virtually no new supply,” “strategic advantage,” and low move-out rates can support barriers-to-entry and lock-in, but must be paired with concentration metrics to carry weight.
• Executive statements about Datacomp reports: Partrich/Sukert/Nelson quotes are helpful; add internal usage documents, pricing playbooks, or directives referencing Datacomp fields.
• Datacomp fields and “live updates”: Screenshots or exemplars showing future effective dates and amounts, plus logs of when defendants accessed and acted on this data, are powerful.

What to avoid or use carefully

• Trade association membership alone: As the court says, “without more” this does not move the needle. Pair any MHI references with concrete post-meeting pricing actions, coordination artifacts, or special committees/policies suggestive of collusion.
• Colorful quotes not tied to defendants: Frank Rolfe’s statements can illustrate industry dynamics, but they must be tied to named defendants’ conduct to carry pleading weight.
• Profit motive: Not a plus factor. Use conduct-based plus factors instead.

 

RICO add-on: proceed with caution

• Reality check: Manufactured housing RICO claims have been dismissed at pleading/summary stages for lack of standing, failure to plead predicate acts with particularity, and causation gaps (e.g., Schalamar Creek outcomes).
• If considered:
  • Predicates: Plead concrete mail/wire fraud instances with Rule 9(b) particularity (who/what/when/where/how), or other valid predicates.
  • Enterprise and pattern: Define the enterprise distinctly from defendants, show relatedness and continuity.
  • Causation: Tie the predicate acts directly to rent injuries.
• Practical: Unless you have strong, particularized fraud evidence, RICO may dilute the antitrust focus and invite dismissal. Antitrust refiling with tightened markets/plus factors is the cleaner path.
  Schalamar Creek background: https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/schalamar-residents-press-rico-ada-class-action-lawsuit-claims-vs-northwest-mutual-murex-properties-steve-adler-et-al-plus-manufactured-housing-stocks-updates/

 

Quick checklist for the amended complaint

• Parallel conduct: Specific property-level rent increases by defendant, aligned in time/value; include charts tying actions to Datacomp access.
• Plus factors:
  • Information exchange particulars: Non-public future pricing fields, reciprocity, and temporal links to rent decisions.
  • Communications: Emails/notes/agendas showing pricing coordination or shared strategies.
  • Self-interest: Explain why sharing future pricing is competitively harmful absent agreement.
• Rule-of-reason (Count II): Narrow geographic markets; add market shares/HHI; plead anticompetitive effects beyond price levels (e.g., reduced dispersion, services).
• Unjust enrichment: Keep as an alternative but expect it to ride the fate of antitrust claims—ensure jurisdiction-specific elements if pursued later.
• Deadlines: File by January 5, 2026; prepare to meet NDIL local rules and any judge-specific standing orders.

 

Helpful authorities and references

• Twombly: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/550/544/
• Iqbal: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/556/662/
• Interstate Circuit: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/306/208/
• Toys “R” Us v. FTC (7th Cir.): https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/221/928/
• U.S. Gypsum: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/438/422/
• Todd v. Exxon: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/275/191/
• In re Broiler Chicken I (N.D. Ill.): https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:16-cv-08637/330954/541/
• In re Turkey (N.D. Ill.): https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/illinois/ilndce/1:19-cv-08318/371159/731/
• In re RealPage (M.D. Tenn.): https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67110330/in-re-realpage-inc-rental-software-antitrust-litigation-no-ii/
• Cleary v. Philip Morris: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/656/511/

If you want, I’ll turn this into a defendant-by-defendant pleading matrix that maps available evidence, plus factors, and market-share targets by submarket so counsel can file a sharpened amended complaint on time.

 

22) An MHProNews follow up with Copilot on the above.

Copilot, useful and interesting, but not precisely what my point is. Perhaps there would be procedural reasons not to do the following, but it seems to me that the challenges for the plaintiffs are they put too much emphasis on the Datacomp piece and not enough (or no) emphasis on potential antitrust or RICO violations that do not rely solely upon specific price increases in this or that submarket. My other observation is that by limiting their arguments to MHCs, which are potentially valid, and ignoring the way that other industry players are essentially working with community operators (see Larson quote) may be a missed opportunity, IF there are no procedural reasons that bar the plaintiffs from making such adjustments to their arguments.

You’ve put your finger on a subtle but important strategic issue. Let’s break it down in FEA terms:

1. Procedural posture and limits
• Amendment scope: Because Judge Valderrama dismissed without prejudice and gave leave to amend by Jan 5, 2026, plaintiffs are procedurally free to broaden their theory. They aren’t locked into the Datacomp-only framing. Rule 15(a)(2) generally favors “freely” granting leave to amend unless there’s undue delay, bad faith, or prejudice.
• Constraints: They must stay within the same case framework (Sherman Act §1, unjust enrichment). Adding RICO or new defendants is possible, but it risks challenges: defendants may argue the amendment is outside the scope of the leave or requires a new complaint. Courts often allow new factual theories, but adding entirely new statutory claims (like RICO) can trigger motions to strike or sever.
• Practical: If plaintiffs want to add RICO, they should be prepared to justify why it arises from the same nucleus of facts. Otherwise, they may need to file a separate action.

2. Overemphasis on Datacomp
• Court’s view: The judge treated Datacomp’s information exchange as a facilitating practice—potentially suspicious, but not enough by itself. The dismissal shows the court wanted more “plus factors” and market definition.
• Risk: If plaintiffs hinge everything on Datacomp, they risk repeating the same deficiency. Courts often require evidence of agreement or coordinated conduct, not just access to shared data.
• Opportunity: Plaintiffs could reframe Datacomp as one piece of a broader collusion ecosystem—trade association activity, executive statements, coordinated acquisitions, and financing arrangements.

3. Beyond MHCs: missed opportunities
• Other industry players: You’re right that focusing only on community operators may miss the bigger picture. Financing arms (e.g., Clayton/21st Mortgage, Vanderbilt), producers, and trade associations (MHI) interact with operators in ways that can reinforce consolidation.
• Larson quote and similar evidence: Statements by industry leaders about coordinated strategies or barriers to entry could serve as “plus factors.” Courts have credited such evidence when paired with parallel conduct (see In re Broiler Chicken).
• Strategic expansion: Plaintiffs could argue a vertical/horizontal conspiracy: lenders, producers, and operators working together to restrict supply, raise rents, and foreclose competition. That broadens the theory beyond Datacomp.

4. RICO angle
• Potential: RICO allows treble damages and can capture patterns of mail/wire fraud, extortion, or other predicate acts. If plaintiffs can show systematic misrepresentations (e.g., deceptive marketing, fraudulent reporting, coercive financing), RICO could supplement antitrust.
• Challenge: Courts are skeptical of RICO add-ons in housing/finance cases unless plaintiffs plead predicate acts with Rule 9(b) particularity. Without concrete fraud allegations, RICO risks dismissal.
• Procedural caution: Adding RICO now may complicate the case and invite motions to dismiss for improper expansion. Plaintiffs might be better off tightening antitrust pleadings first, then considering RICO separately.

5. FEA conclusion
• Facts: Court dismissed without prejudice, citing lack of plus factors and market definition.
• Evidence: Datacomp reports show information exchange, but not enough alone. Executive statements, trade association conduct, and vertical ties are available but underused.
• Analysis: Plaintiffs should broaden their theory to include collusion across the ecosystem (operators, lenders, producers, trade groups). Procedurally, they can amend to add factual breadth, but adding RICO may be riskier.
• Actionable path:
• Refile with sharpened antitrust pleadings: specific parallel conduct, plus factors, market shares.
• Integrate Larson-type quotes and trade association evidence.
• Consider RICO only if they have strong fraud predicates; otherwise, keep focus on Sherman Act §1.

👉 If you’d like, I can sketch a pleading matrix: mapping each defendant to potential plus factors (Datacomp use, trade association activity, executive statements, acquisitions, financing ties). That would give plaintiffs a roadmap for a stronger amended complaint. Would you like me to build that matrix?

— MHProNews notes that the PDF of the interaction with Copilot above is linked here and the screen capture that documents that as accurate is linked here and is posted below. —

 

23) MHProNews note that the first draft of this article is linked here. In another thread with Copilot is the following Q&A that included a revised draft linked here and shown below between MHProNews. By following the various drafts and this published version of this report, the distinctions between what human intelligence (HI) produced vs. what artificial intelligence (AI) added and/or inspired in the way of refinements is clarified. Copilot is the one responding to the MHProNews input-inquiry posted below.

Copilot, I’m working on a report https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2PrePubAIChkManufacturedHomeLotRentsAntitrustLitigationCaseNo23-cv-06715JudgeFranklinU.ValderramaOrderAndOpinionWhatOthersMissedMHVilleFEA-MHProNews.pdf that begs certain questions based on known facts and various estimates. Lets presume for arguments sake that land lease manufactured home community operators are using the Manufactured Housing Institute as a tool for oligopoly style antitrust violations. Since the internet (‘the wires’) have been used as part of this purported ploy and so have the U.S. Mail, those could be legitimate ways of bringing in evidence-based RICO as well as antitrust claims? Follow the links in the developing draft. Apply the facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) methodology. Use plain text hyperlinks to support your finding

You’re circling something real here. The question is whether you can turn it from “outrageous pattern” into “actionable pattern” under antitrust + RICO.

I’ll walk through it FEA-style: facts → inferences → how mail/wire + MHI fit into a civil RICO / antitrust theory, and what Valderrama’s opinion telegraphs about pleading this kind of case better next time.

1. Baseline legal framework (antitrust + RICO + mail/wire)

Antitrust (Sherman Act §1). To get beyond “ugly but legal,” you need:

• Agreement / concerted action between distinct entities.
• Unreasonable restraint of trade in a defined relevant market.
• Antitrust injury (harm to competition, not just to a competitor).

Judge Valderrama’s opinion in In re Manufactured Home Lot Rents Antitrust Litigation is essentially a clinic on how courts now demand not just parallel conduct, but solid “plus factors” and a plausible narrative that beats obvious “market forces” explanations.

RICO (18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1964). Civil RICO requires, at a minimum:

• Enterprise: any group of individuals or entities associated in fact (e.g., a trade group plus certain members can qualify).
• Pattern of racketeering activity: at least two related predicate acts (e.g., mail fraud, wire fraud) within ten years, showing continuity.
• Conduct / participation: defendant conducted or participated in the conduct of the enterprise’s affairs through that pattern.
• Injury to business or property by reason of the RICO violation (including causation).

Text of §1962 is here: https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/1962

Mail and wire fraud as RICO predicates.

• Mail fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1341
• Wire fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1343
• Elements:
  • Scheme to defraud or to obtain money/property by false or fraudulent pretenses.
  • Intent to defraud.
  • Use of mail or wires in furtherance of that scheme.
  • For civil RICO: plus a pattern and a qualifying enterprise.

Recent Supreme Court cases (e.g., Kelly v. United States (“Bridgegate”)) tightened the “property” and “scheme” elements; not every deceptive use of government or corporate power is mail/wire fraud unless it aims to obtain money or property.

Good general summary of mail/wire fraud in RICO context: https://aaronhall.com/rico-mail-wire-fraud-elements-prosecution/ Justice Department RICO manual: https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-fraud/file/1391311/dl?inline

So: yes, in principle, use of the internet (“wires”) and U.S. mail can be valid RICO predicate acts—but only if you can show they’re part of a deliberate scheme to defraud for money/property, not just ordinary lobbying, advocacy, or coordination.

2. Facts you’ve assembled: supply choke + consolidation + MHI behavior

From your infographic and the AI closure-summary document:

• Near-freeze in new community development. Datacomp data you cite shows only 310 new land-lease communities nationally from 2002–2016, with single-digit new communities per year after 2008 (e.g., 3 in 2016, 4 in 2012, 3 in 2011). This is effectively “no new supply” in an industry serving millions of households.
• Net loss of communities.
  • Circa 2000 estimates: up to 55,000 land-lease manufactured home communities in the U.S.
  • Lincoln Institute / FEMA study: now roughly 50,000 communities.
  • AI synthesis of research: at least 900+ specific closures identified, and likely thousands of park closures since 2000, with almost no offsetting new development and one estimate of only about 10 new communities in the two decades before 2021 being developed nationwide.

  These are ballpark, but they establish a directional fact pattern: closures >> openings.

• Regional closure data (illustrative).
  • Florida: at least 183–400+ parks closed since 2011 in different analyses; another study found 127 parks with 6,000+ units closed between 2012–2022.
  • Phoenix metro: roughly 4,500 mobile homes lost to park closures since 2000.
  • Harris County, TX: about 85 parks closed 2002–2011.
• Demand and “stickiness.”
  • Sun Communities and similar REITs report very high occupancy (around 96%) and extremely low move-outs (~0.49% annually), driven in part by $6,000–$10,000 moving costs for homes.
  • They tout tens of thousands of applicants for spaces and significantly lower cost per square foot versus apartments.

This is the foundation of a supply choke + lock-in + consolidation narrative. It’s not yet antitrust or RICO. But it is the economic context: artificial scarcity + captive consumers.

3. What Valderrama’s opinion tells you about the antitrust side

The In re Manufactured Home Lot Rents Antitrust Litigation dismissal is very instructive, but also strangely helpful to your FEA project.

Key takeaways (for your purposes):

• The court accepted that rents jumped sharply, with parallel upward trends, and that Datacomp/JLT reports enabled detailed competitor visibility. That got plaintiffs over the parallel conduct hurdle (barely).
• The case failed on the “plus factors” and alternative explanations:
  • Judge Valderrama said the alleged conduct was equally consistent with rational, independent profit-maximizing behavior in a market with rising demand, constrained supply, and private equity roll-ups of mom-and-pop parks.
  • Plaintiffs did not adequately allege market concentration (shares, dominance), even though they did allege consolidation and acquisition patterns.
  • “Invitation and acceptance” via Datacomp was rejected because there was no explicit or implied “do this if you want to join the scheme” allegation—only data solicitation and purchase.
  • Alleged plus factors like trade association membership (MHI), opportunities to conspire, and motive (“make more money”) were deemed too generic; only the sensitive information exchange and acting against unilateral self-interest survived as plausible plus factors, and even those were not enough to overcome alternative explanations.

The opinion is here: https://www.lit-antitrust.aoshearman.com/siteFiles/52013/In%20Re%20MANUFACTURED%20HOME%20LOT%20RENTS%20ANTITRUST%20LITIGATION.pdf

Docket overview: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/67753400/hajek-v-datacomp-appraisal-systems-inc/

Implication for your report and for any future case: you need to tie MHI, Datacomp, and major operators into something more than just “we share data and then raise prices in a tight market.”

4. Hypothesis: MHI as “tool” of an oligopoly + potential RICO enterprise

Your hypothetical:

“Let’s presume for argument’s sake that community operators are using the Manufactured Housing Institute as a tool for oligopoly-style antitrust violations.”

Translate that into legal categories:

4.1. Antitrust “hub-and-spoke” with MHI as hub

To turn that presumption into a plausible antitrust narrative, you’d need to show:

• Hub: MHI (and possibly Datacomp, certain law firms, and lobbyists) as coordinating node.
• Spokes: Major community operators (Sun, ELS, RHP, YES, etc.) and possibly certain finance players.
• Rim: Evidence that the spokes are not just each coordinating with MHI individually, but that there is a “rim” of mutual awareness and tacit or express understanding that they will pursue the shared plan (restrict supply, under-enforce MHIA, push rent increases, resist new community development, etc.).

Evidence categories that would matter (in your FEA):

• Documents & statements showing MHI knowing the MHIA 2000 “Reform Law” and its enhanced preemption should, if enforced, make new communities and infill easier, but strategically not pursuing enforcement or litigation – while its dominant members benefit from scarcity.
• Internal or public communications that:
  • Dismiss or deflect serious enforcement of MHIA/ enhanced preemption.
  • Strategically support local zoning barriers or “NIMBY-friendly” policies while publicly posturing as pro-affordable housing.
  • Tie policy choices to rent/asset values, cap-rate expansion, or REIT valuation narratives.

If you could show that MHI’s “inaction” is actually coordinated, purposeful inaction to keep supply constrained, and that its lobbying/communication is materially misleading to policymakers, members, or the public, then you’re edging toward agreement to restrain trade via regulatory capture/supply suppression, not just accidents of “market forces.”

4.2. RICO enterprise theory

On a RICO theory, MHI could fit as:

• Enterprise: an association-in-fact consisting of MHI + certain REITs/operators + perhaps Datacomp or other data/finance facilitators. The key is “purpose, relationships, and longevity.”
• Conduct: key actors “conducting or participating in the conduct” of the enterprise’s affairs (e.g., using MHI’s committees, board, lobbying program, and publications to further a scheme).
• Pattern of racketeering: repeated uses of mail/wire (emails, webinars, web content, mailers, legislative submissions) that further:
  • a scheme to defraud residents, smaller operators, policymakers, or investors;
  • or to obtain money/property based on materially false or deceptive representations or omissions.

The hard part: you must frame MHI’s and the REITs’ communications as fraud, not just spin. That means:

• Specific misrepresentations or omissions about:
  • The real intent behind MHIA non-enforcement.
  • The impact on supply, rents, displacement, and access to affordable housing.
  • MHI representing itself as championing affordable housing and MHIA enforcement while privately ensuring that key reforms never get teeth.

If you can document that MHI:

1. Knew that enforcing MHIA enhanced preemption and related provisions would open up development and siting;
2. Repeatedly told members, Congress, HUD, or the public that it was working for enforcement, while in reality blocking or sabotaging enforcement at the behest of large consolidators;
3. And those misstatements/omissions were used via email, website postings, webinars, mailed newsletters, legislative testimony, etc, and
4. Operators relied on that environment (and MHI materials) to justify acquisition, rent-increase, and closure strategies—

then the mail/wire activity becomes the bloodstream of the scheme rather than background noise.

5. Using the “wires” and U.S. mail as RICO predicates in this context

To your core question:

“Since the internet (‘the wires’) and U.S. Mail have been used as part of this purported ploy, could those be legitimate ways of bringing evidence-based RICO as well as antitrust claims?”

Conceptually, yes, but with critical caveats.

5.1. When internet/ mail use helps a RICO claim

They can be legitimate RICO predicates if:

1. There is a scheme to defraud.
   • For example, a scheme to obtain higher lot rents, inflated asset values, or acquisition opportunities by:
     • Misrepresenting MHI’s real agenda and efforts;
     • Misleading policymakers about MHIA enforcement and zoning;
     • Hiding an underlying plan to restrict supply and drive up rents/valuations.
2. The communications are materially false or misleading about something that matters to the recipient’s economic decisions.
3. The mail/ wire usage is “in furtherance” of that scheme.
   • Sending MHI “policy briefs,” newsletters, or “fact sheets” to Hill offices, HUD, or members that misstate MHIA’s status or MHI’s efforts.
   • Publishing web content and webinars aimed at shaping expectations of “inevitable” rent hikes and supply scarcity, while concealing the intentional policy non-enforcement behind it.
   • Investor presentations that omit or misdescribe the role of coordinated trade association strategy in sustaining scarcity and rent growth.
4. There is a pattern.
   • Not one-off; but repeated, related communications over years, tied to the same overall scheme.

In that scenario, each email, newsletter, web post, webinar, or mailed item that furthers the scheme could be a mail or wire fraud predicate if the other elements are met.

5.2. When internet/ mail use is not enough

You do not get RICO just because:

• People used email and websites while doing bad things.
• A trade group coordinated strategy but was relatively transparent about its goals.
• A policy choice (non-enforcement of MHIA) is harmful but made openly, without deception about the motives or expected effects.

The Supreme Court’s Kelly decision (Bridgegate) underscores that not all abuses of power or political schemes equal mail/wire fraud; there has to be a scheme to obtain money or property via deception, not just lying to exert political or regulatory power.

Kelly summary: https://lanzasmith.com/blog/alleging-wire-fraud-now-more-difficult-in-civil-rico-cases-after-2020-u-s-supreme-court-case-re-bridgegate-scandal/

So your record-building needs to show economic deceit, not just “bad policy” or “regulatory capture.”

6. FEA: what your existing evidence supports, and where the gaps are

6.1. Facts

• Supply:
  • Near-zero new community development for more than a decade.
  • Substantial net closures, likely into the thousands of communities and tens of thousands of homes.
  • High barriers to resident exit (moving costs, zoning, scarcity).
• Demand:
  • Very high occupancy and long tenure.
  • Strong, steady demand for affordable space.
• Market conduct:
  • Consolidation into REITs and large operators.
  • Use of Datacomp/JLT reports and other data tools to monitor competitor pricing and future increases.
  • Trade association presence (MHI) coordinating lobbying and messaging nationally.
• Legal landscape:
  • MHIA 2000 “Reform Law” and enhanced preemption exist and, if enforced, could reduce zoning barriers and enable more development and infill.
  • MHI has not litigated for enforcement in the 21st century.
  • MHARR and others publicly call this out, so the issue is not purely unknown inside the industry.

6.2. Evidence-based inferences

Reasonable inferences (but not yet legally “proof”):

• Economic incentives: big operators benefit from constrained supply and high moving costs; rising rents are rational profit-maximizing behavior in this environment.
• Institutional behavior: MHI’s non-enforcement posture and public spin likely support the scarcity/rent-growth equilibrium.
• Structural collusion risk: Data sharing via Datacomp and trade association coordination create a facilitating structure for tacit or explicit collusion.

6.3. Analysis: where antitrust + RICO plausibility could emerge

To push from “market forces + rational profit-seeking” to antitrust + RICO, you’d need:

1. Specific conduct at MHI and member firms that shows intent to restrain trade via policy sabotage.
   • E.g., internal emails or minutes indicating: “We cannot push MHIA enforcement because it would flood the market with supply and hurt valuations.”
   • Documents showing coordinated efforts to stop local/ federal moves that would expand sites, while publicly claiming to support MHIA enforcement.
2. Misrepresentation / deception elements.
   • Public-facing claims: MHI is “working tirelessly” for MHIA enforcement, DTS, and zoning fairness.
   • Contradictory internal conduct: no litigation, quiet deals, back-channel agreements that keep enforcement toothless.
   • Outreach to members, policymakers, or investors that materially misrepresents what is actually being done.
3. Causal chain to injury.
   • Residents and smaller operators pay higher rents, lose homes, or lose businesses because of the artificially sustained scarcity, which was maintained by deceptive trade association / REIT conduct, not just by local NIMBYism or macro factors.
4. Pattern of mail/wire usage.
   • Each deceptive or materially misleading email, newsletter, web article, webinar, investor deck, or mailing that furthers this scheme is a potential predicate, if framed correctly.

If you can build that record, then yes:

• The internet and U.S. mail become not just “ways they communicated,” but the channels of the fraudulent scheme, satisfying the “use of wires/mail” requirement for RICO predicates.
• MHI and key REITs/operators could be framed as part of a RICO enterprise whose pattern of racketeering includes mail/wire fraud (and perhaps other predicates, depending on facts).
• The same evidence set could be used to shore up antitrust “plus factors”, especially:
  • market structure;
  • information exchange;
  • actions against unilateral self-interest;
  • trade association-facilitated collusion.

7. How you might sharpen your report (and future litigation) around this

For your draft here: https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2PrePubAIChkManufacturedHomeLotRentsAntitrustLitigationCaseNo23-cv-06715JudgeFranklinU.ValderramaOrderAndOpinionWhatOthersMissedMHVilleFEA-MHProNews.pdf

You could:

• Explicitly separate “market forces” vs. “market manipulation” scenarios. Lay out a side-by-side showing how the same data (closures, no new supply, rent spikes, consolidation, Datacomp usage) can be read as:
  • purely rational independent behavior; vs.
  • collusive, coordinated supply restriction and regulatory sabotage. Then show what additional evidence would push one way or the other.
• Map MHI’s communications onto potential RICO elements. Without calling it legal advice, you can build a journalistic RICO grid:
  • column for statutory element (enterprise, pattern, predicate acts, injury);
  • column for example behaviors/communications;
  • column for open evidence gaps (what plaintiffs or investigators would need to subpoena or FOIA).
• Use Valderrama’s opinion as a “how-to-fail/ how-to-fix” template. Identify where plaintiffs’ existing case fell short (market share data, conspiracy narrative, alternative explanations) and juxtapose that with:
  • MHI’s role, MHIA non-enforcement, closure data, and Datacomp/new development evidence. This becomes an FEA blueprint for a stronger, more comprehensive future complaint.
• Tie supply destruction to specific human and economic harms. That sets the stage for “injury to business or property” analysis under civil RICO and reinforces antitrust injury.

If you want, the next step could be: you paste or summarize key MHI statements (testimony, press releases, “we support MHIA” claims), and we can FEA them against the kind of “scheme to defraud” elements mail/wire fraud require—looking for the sharpest contradictions between what’s said and what is actually done.

— MHProNews notes that Copilot confirmed its input above as shown in the screen capture linked here. The full Q&A PDF is linked here. —

24) Pivoting to Q&As as shown with AI powered Gemini that cross-checks the draft and Copilot’s insights as shown.

Gemini, the upload and the linked draft are the same PDF. https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/4PrePubAIChkManufacturedHomeLotRentsAntitrustLitigationCaseNo23-cv-06715JudgeFranklinU.ValderramaOrderAndOpinionWhatOthersMissedMHVilleFEA-MHProNews.pdf Do an MHProNews-MHLivingNews style facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) of the developing article. Is the court’s ruling properly cited and documented? Does the article deliver on the headline and preface? Are the elements with AI powered Copilot properly documented? Potentially, could the information found and linked from that developing draft be useful to antitrust attorneys seeking to correct problems within the manufatured housing industry, be it the attorneys in that case or other attorneys that may follow in their wake? Correct, confirm, or clarify as warranted by known evidence found online. Use plain text hyperlinks to support your findings.

— MHProNews notes that the composite screen capture of the Q&A above with Gemini Flash 3.0 is as shown below. —

 

 

25) Gemini was asked the following in a follow up by MHProNews. The fat-fingers typo in the input-inquiry below is in the original.

Gemini, this is now version 3.0, is that correct? Okay, to the points you just raised. Let’s presume for the sake of argument that the plaintiffs broadened their pleadings beyond the named defendents, which is part of what is being suggested, correct? Let’s say, for example, that Frank Rolfe, Dave Reynolds, Flagship Communities, and some others including those involved at MHI were named in a redrafted suit that is designed to meet the court’s ruling as shown. Then those industry dynamics and colorful quotes do become relevant, is that fair or not?

In the context of the FEA (Facts-Evidence-Analysis) framework and the court’s recent ruling, your assessment is fair and aligns with the “road map” for potential litigation upgrades identified in the draft.

1. Relevancy of “Colorful Quotes” and Industry Dynamics

If the plaintiffs broaden their pleadings to include additional defendants such as Frank Rolfe, Dave Reynolds, Flagship Communities, and specific leaders at the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI), the “colorful quotes” and industry dynamics become central to the legal argument.

• Moving the Needle: The draft notes that while Judge Valderrama found that mere trade association membership did not “move the needle,” citing Rolfe by name and his specific remarks could help provide the “hard evidence” of intent or invitation the court currently finds lacking.

• Establishing Intent: Quotes from Rolfe regarding the “monopoly” nature of the business, the “cards” held by owners because tenants cannot move their homes, and the lack of new competition directly address the “plus factors” required in antitrust law.

• Proving a “Plus Factor”: Statements about the “unfair” but “legal” nature of the business model could be framed as evidence of a coordinated effort to exploit a captive market.

2. Broadening the Defendants to MHI and Others

Naming MHI and its leadership (like prior chairman Nathan Smith) as defendants would allow plaintiffs to pivot the case from a narrow “Datacomp-only” theory to a broader “industry ecosystem” theory.

• The “Invitation” Evidence: The draft argues that an “invitation” to collaborate is essentially “posted on MHI’s home page,” where the call to “Grow your business” is immediately followed by “Become A Member”.

• Regulatory Capture: The inclusion of MHI would allow attorneys to explore the “curious form of regulatory capture” where the association purportedly fails to advocate for federal laws (like the MHIA 2000) that would increase supply and competition.

• “Off-Market” Acquisitions: The draft highlights how networking events are used to facilitate “off-market” acquisitions, which can be presented as a mechanism for consolidation and market manipulation.

3. Strategic Utility for Attorneys

The draft explicitly suggests that the information it contains could serve as a “pleading matrix” for attorneys.

• Correcting Market Definitions: By including firms like Flagship or individuals like Rolfe, attorneys can more accurately define “concentrated market shares” in specific sub-markets, a key deficiency identified by the judge.

• Linking Consolidation to Collusion: The draft provides a path to show that “artificial scarcity” and “lock-in” (high moving costs) are not just market forces but are deliberately maintained by the defendants through their trade association and information-sharing tools.

• RICO Potential: While risky, the draft notes that if systematic misrepresentations can be proven (e.g., MHI claiming to work for supply while internally benefitting from scarcity), it could support RICO violations alongside antitrust claims.

Summary Confirmation: Your premise is confirmed by the draft’s analysis. Broadening the suit to include these specific actors transforms “colorful” industry commentary into probative evidence of a coordinated scheme to restrain trade and consolidate the industry to the detriment of residents and competition.

— MHProNews notes that the PDF of the Q&A above is found at this link here. The screen capture that documents the accuracy of that PDF is linked here and shown below. —

 

 

26) MHProNews notes that the plaintiffs advanced some useful material, but obviously not sufficient useful factual evidence based in part one their case’s theory and arguments. Their own arguments were turned against them, as the above showed. But by revising their pleadings, by adding defendants and breading the arguments as shown, they could meet the thresholds set by the court.

MHARR has no direct ‘dog in the hunt’ of this antitrust case as was originally pleaded and reported by MHProNews.

27) But some community-focused state level trade groups publicly complained about MHI’s failures. So too have some MHI members and senior staff, past or present.

 

 

28) Look again at what former MHI chairman Nathan Smith told MHProNews in a video recorded interview. No one could accuse Smith of being anti-MHI. But he is but one piece of a broader puzzle that reflects behavior that can only be understood – per multiple AIs and human intelligence too – if there is a scheme to limit the industry that violates antitrust laws in a subtle but consistent fashion.

 

 

 

29) When ‘loyal’ MHI members have said and done things that call into question MHI’s behavior, that should merit a closer look. As MHProNews has repeatedly argued, the business model chosen by consolidators may not be the most profitable path. UMH’s Sam Landy is now on the MHI board of directors. MHI gave Landy the chairman’s award. Yet Landy has argued in a fashion that pointed effectively (by accident or design) to what MHARR has been calling for in their communications and efforts. So why are MHI leaders doing what they do if it isn’t always the most profitable path? To limit competition via barriers to entry, persistence, and exit. 

 

 

30) The vertically integrated producers-retailers-financing corporations involved in MHI appear to be working hand in glove with MHI’s consolidation focused community operators. Without addressing that reality, it is likely that this specific case would fail again unless it is properly amended before January 5, 2026. Loyal MHI member Andy Gedo, in a de facto online debate about antitrust violations in MHVille pointed to some of these same evidence-based points.

 

31) Perhaps the plaintiffs’ attorneys will sharpen their arguments by broadening their case as has been outlined herein. Either way, MHProNews will continue to report because public officials, retail investors, taxpayers, and others are the ‘victims’ of this apparent scheme too.

There is always more to know.

Stay tuned to the industry’s documented runaway #1 source for more “News through the lens of factory-built homes and manufactured housing” ^© “Industry News, Tips, and Views Pros Can Use”^© where “We Provide, You Decide.”^© This is the place for “Intelligence for your MHLife.” ^© MHProNews appears to once again be poised to top a million visits this month as it has in recent prior months, as has been confirmed by multiple third-party AIs. Thanks be to God and to all involved for making and keeping us #1 with stead overall growth despite far better funded opposing voices. Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) matters.

 

 

 

 

Statement of William C. “Bill” Boor President and Chief Executive Officer CAVCO Industries (CVCO) Chairman of Manufactured Housing Institute on Behalf of MHI-What MHI and Boor Did and Didn’t Say