In order to properly understand the present, it is prudent to look to the past and see how ‘we got to where we are today.’ Before there were federally regulated HUD Code manufactured housing or manufactured homes that officially began production on June 15, 1976, there were mobile homes. By 1972: “mobile home shipments constituted 19.5 percent of all new [housing] units and 30.5 percent of all new single-family [housing] units.” That is from a documented MHProNews obtained called Housing in the 1970s from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The full title is: “Housing in the Seventies: A Report of the National Housing Policy Review.” Per that research report, there were hundreds of more mobile home producers back then compared to 2025, even though the U.S. population is significantly larger. MHVille facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) is provided including third-party fact checking.
The HUD document states in part that there were about 10,000 mobile home dealers, and perhaps another 10,000 operations that had some level of involvement in selling mobile homes. The Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) does not on this date appear to have any data on home many street retailers there are in the United States (the equivalent of mobile home dealers in the early 1970s), but it is thought to be fewer than 1000 locations nationwide with perhaps 4,000 placed that offer new manufactured homes including land-lease communities.
“The transportation costs of mobile homes ranged from 60 cents to 90 cents per mile in 1973.”
Consolidation trends ‘back then’ in terms of merger/acquisition activity are also examined.
Also considered are some insights into conventional housing so that comparisons can be made to the mobile home industry in that pre-HUD Code era.
Put simply, there has been a dramatic reduction in the size and scope of the manufactured housing industry since the close of the mobile home era as well as a big shift up in costs, but costs are higher throughout the economy, as well as in the conventional housing business.
So that begs questions.
Why were mobile homes growing in the late 1960s and early 1970s? Why is manufactured housing stuck at around 100,000 units per year in recent years, when mobile home production topped 500,000 units a year for two years in the early 1970s?
Per HUD:
“This report is the product of the National Housing Policy Review, an intensive 6-month effort that began in March 1973. This review sought to analyze and assess the federal government’s past, present, and future role in meeting the nation’s housing needs. This report recounts the history of federal involvement in housing, explains the programs that evolved, assesses the cost-effectiveness of those programs, describes the housing activities of state and local governments, and outlines patterns of housing production and finance and the structure and technology of the housing industry.”
Insights into costs, profitability, margins, financing, durability, merger and acquisition trends and dramatic shifts in the mobile home parks of yesteryear vs. will be found in this exclusive report with MHVille facts-evidence-analysis (FEA).
The market radius for mobile home producers is found herein so it can be compared to today’s common radius for manufactured housing plants in 2025.
Comparisons to site-built housing then vs. mobile homes then are also found. What follows is from deeper into the body of research provided by the HUD report. A link to the entire research document is provided further below.
Before the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) there was the Mobile Home Manufacturers Association. What began in 1985 as the Association for Regulatory Reform (ARR) later evolved into what is now known as the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR). MHI apparently removed the history page from the public facing side of their website, but fortunately, MHProNews has that information in a report at this link here. That MHI history report also includes information on MHI-linked state associations.
Part I – Quoting from HUD’s “Housing in the Seventies: A Report of the National Housing Policy Review.”
The Nature of the Industry
The portion of the housing industry dealing with the production of housing units has had two distinct industry sectors: traditional onsite homebuilding and mobile home manufacturing. The traditional homebuilding industry is extremely fragmented, comprising more than 110,000 builders-the majority of whom annually produce less than 25 units each. By contrast, the relatively young mobile home industry is made up of between 500 and 600 companies, including an unknown number of very small producers, and is fairly well concentrated within a small number of firms that account for a large proportion of total production. There are few barriers to entry in the traditional homebuilding field. In contrast, entry is more difficult in mobile home manufacturing, where long-term capital investment is required for all but the smallest operators.
It is fair to say that in recent years, these differences between conventional homebuilding and mobile home manufacturing have begun to erode somewhat. The increasing use of prefabrication and other forms of industrialization, for example. have begun to move major elements of homebuilding into the factory, where most mobile homes have always been produced. Moreover. a growing amount of concentration and diversification by both sectors of the industry has led to a situation where a fair number (some 20 to 50) of the largest corporations are involved in both traditional homebuilding and mobile home manufacturing. Although trends such as these appear to be blurring the distinctions between the two industry sectors to some extent, the differences are still greater than any similarities.
In 1972. the traditional homebuilding sector started 2.378,500 housing units, while completions-a better measure of production performance-reached 1,999,200 units, up 47 percent from the 1.360,500 units completed in 1968. Completions of privately owned single-family units totaled 1,143,300 in 1972, a rise of 33 percent from 1968’s 858,600 units. Privately owned multifamily unit completions increased at a far greater rate; the completion of 828,200 units in structures with two or more units represented an 80 percent increase over the 461,200 multifamily units completed in 1968. ‘ Meanwhile during 1972, the mobile home manufacturing sector produced and shipped 575.940 mobile home units to dealers and land developers. including more than 85,000 double-wide units (another 25.000 units were produced to house disaster victims and provide shelter to meet other special needs). The basic mobile home output was an increase of more than 80 percent over the 317.950 units shipped in 1968.2
While data are not available on the length of time that elapses between shipment of mobile homes by manufacturers. and sale and placement onsite by dealers. there is evidence that it now takes longer to complete a conventional housing unit than was formerly the case. In 1968. a single-family unit needed, on the average, 4.3 months after construction start to be completed. In 1971. the average time necessary was 4.8 months, and in 1972, the period had increased to 5.2 months. Construction time for multifamily buildings exhibited similar increases: an apartment building with 10 to 24 units required an average construction time of 7.3 months in the period 1963 to 1967. 8.5 months in 1971, and 9.3 months in 1972.3 Some of the recent lengthening of the construction process has been due to spot shortages of certain materials or craft skills. Materials and parts substitutions, and industrialization of the construction process offer some solutions to many of these problems, and should help to achieve a balance between industry capacity and the expanded demand for housing production.
Structure of the Traditional Homebuilding Sector
During 1972. the U. S. homebuilding industry produced almost $45 billion of new residential construction, making it one of the largest and most important segments of the domestic economy. Yet. unlike other industries of comparable size such as steel or automobiles, the homebuilding industry is characterized by many small firms with relatively short existences. Housing demand and production are highly cyclical due largely to fluctuations in the supply of mortgage credit, while equity capital requirements are minimal compared to those of other industries. As a result. firms move in and out of the industry with great frequency. and it is difficult to determine precisely the number of housing producers that are operating at any given time. It is estimated4 that, as of 1967, roughly 110,000 homebuilding firms were in operation. In spite of the ease of entry. how ever, minority-owned construction firms continue to be quite rare.
The transitory nature of many of these homebuilding firms is evidenced by the fact that in 1967, about one-third did not have a payroll. The backbone of the industry consists of individual craftsmen, real estate operators. and other small entrepreneurs who may build housing during periods of plentiful mortgage credit and turn to other activities during periods of tight money. (See Chapter 3.) Other features that characterize the bulk of homebuilders operating in the U. S. are the following.
Emphasis on Single-Family Dwellings:
Builders’ responses to a 1969 National Association of Home Builders’ survey indicated that fewer than 10 percent of those surveyed considered multifamily building their primary product. Homebuilders with unit production of less than 100 units were more likely to indicate custom homes or SIngle-family homes to be sold on the speculative or open market as their primary products. On the other hand, larger producers (more than 100 units) were likely to be engaged in multifamily and/or speculative single-family building. (See Table 1.)
Flexible Business Strategies: Many home builders tend to “switch businesses” according to perceived market demands and/or the supply of money. They will also often engage simultaneously in the related businesses of speculative building, custom building. rehabilitation and re modeling, land development, and commercial and industrial construction. This has enabled many of them to survive financially when the residential housing market declines, thereby giving them the resilience to reenter that market when conditions improve.
High Incidence of Subcontracting:
According to the 1969 National Association of Home Builders’ survey, nearly 90 percent of the homebuilders surveyed subcontract at least 25 percent of their costs of construction. (See Chart 1.)
Increasing Proportion of Sole Proprietorships:
According to the same survey, about 37 percent of U. S. homebuilders are organized as sale proprietorships and 45 percent as corporations, with the remainder being partner’ ships or a combination of forms. However, when the 1969 figures are compared with the National Association of Home Builders’ 1964 survey, the proportion of builders organized as sale proprietorships had risen from 30 percent to almost 37 percent in 5 years. (See Chart 2.) Sale proprietorships are especially prevalent among single-family builders and producers of one to 25 units. These builders are the most likely to remain a short time in the industry and, therefore, the most likely to opt for a simple and inexpensive mode of entry. Conversely, among producers of more than 100 units annually, the corporate form of organization is most common, reflecting the need for greater financial re sources and the limited liability features of incorporation. (See Chart 3.)
The Large Homebuilders
Although little further detailed information is available on the industry as a whole, consider ably more can be said about the few large homebuilders at the top of the industry-Le., those companies that either have annual sales of more than $10 million or annual volume of more than 200 units. Overall, it appears that these firms, which represent less than 1 per cent of the firms in the homebuilding sector, tend to be comparatively stable, relatively well capitalized corporations. They are characterized by:
- An increasing share of the market-28 percent of 1972 housing production and 23.5 percent of dollar revenues in that year;
- A high level of acquisition and merger activity; and
- Uneven financial performance.
Despite their similarities, however, these large firms show distinct differences in terms of geographic span of operations, the incidence of public ownership. organizational structure. and other operating characteristics. The following sections discuss these key similarities and differences. It is important to emphasize, however, that these large homebuilders are the exception rather than the rule in this industry: Small homebuilders producing fewer than 200 units a year remain the dominant force representing over two-thirds of the market.
An Increasing Share of the Market:
According to an annual survey prepared by Professional Builder, the number of homebuilders with more than $10 million in annual sales grew from 119 in 1968 to 369 in 1972.5 Observing the emergence of large homebuilding firms from another point of view, the 1973 Bluebook of Major Homebuilders reports that the 511 builders with annual volume of more than 200 units have captured an increasing share of the market over the last few years. As shown in Chart 4, the unit volume of these builders represented 17.2 percent of total housing production in 1969. By the end of 1972, this share had increased to 28 percent. Moreover, about three-quarters of this 1972 share is attributable to the 225 firms with volume of more than 1,000 units annually. In terms of dollar volume, the value of housing constructed or manufactured by the largest homebuilders has increased steadily as shown in Table 2.
Although major homebuilders continue to increase total dollar volume and to capture a growing share of the total number of units produced, in 1972 their share of the industry’s total dollar volume decreased (Chart 5).7 Because small builders are more susceptible to cyclical factors, their volume declines during housing recessions more than that of the major homebuilders. The larger firms sometimes even maintain or increase their dollar volume in the face of recession, thus increasing their share of the market. In housing booms, the reverse occurs. Small builders grow faster than large builders. thus reducing the market share of the latter.
High Level of Mergers and Acquisitions: A high level of merger and acquisition activity has been associated with recent industry con centration, at least on the part of the publicly held homebuilders. whose activities are recorded. Industry observers feel, however, that this trend also is occurring among most large homebuilders-whether or not they are publicly held-and has been continuously occurring over time throughout the industry.
Between 1969 and 1972, 31 publicly held homebuilders with annual revenues exceeding $25 million engaged in a total of 84 mergers or acquisitions. This level of merger activity is extremely high compared to that of other industries. Among the top 200 manufacturing and mining firms, for example, the average number of mergers/acquisitions per company was 0.17 per year during the same period. By contrast, the average for the 31 publicly held homebuilders was 0.68 per year-about 4 times as many. Although this comparison is not a totally fair one, due to the obvious differences between construction and manufacturing, it does provide some insight into current merger and acquisition activity in the industry.
Major homebuilders have been merging with and acquiring other firms for three principal purposes. First, they may wish to diversify into broader product lines. In response to the high unit cost of and diminishing growth in single family detached housing, for example, a single family homebuilder might acquire firms with capability to construct garden apartments, mobile homes, or townhouses. Of the identified mergers and acquisitions made by the 31 large publicly held homebuilders, 43 percent were actions that provided such product line diversification.
Geographic expansion is another important motivation behind merger and acquisition activity, representing about 32 percent of the mergers/acquisitions identified. Geographic expansion provides the benefit of shielding the builder from the possibility of serious dislocations in a single market area. Many large firms undertake geographic expansion through acquisition of existing builders in order to profit by the established builder’s reputation and relationship with local governments and building officials. The importance of quickly gaining an understanding of local market preferences, suppliers, and sources of labor subcontractor capability is obvious. The diversity of local building codes is also a key force behind acquisition of this kind.
Finally, vertical integration has accounted for 25 percent of the mergers and acquisitions identified. Such integration generally has taken the form of combinations with building supply organizations, housing fabricators, land development enterprises, and financial institutions.
Despite this high level of merger/acquisition activity, economic concentration of home building is still relatively low. with the largest homebuilding firm accounting for less than six tenths of 1 percent of the Nation’s total conventional housing production.
…
The Housing of Low Income Americans
A low income makes it difficult for consumers to afford good housing, adequate food, clothing, and other essentials of life. The inferior housing so often occupied by low income families is only one manifestation of fundamental social and economic problems.
Over the years, the size and composition of the Nation’s low income population have changed. The number of people whose in comes were below the Bureau of the Census’ low income threshold 4 has declined significantly during the 1960’s-from 39,9 million, or 22 percent of the total population in 1960, to 25.5 million, or 13 percent of the 1970 population. During the same period, the proportion of the aged within the low income population in creased from 14 percent to 18 percent of the total. The only group to increase in absolute number was that of households headed by nonwhite females. This group grew in number by 700,000 between 1960 and 1970 and, as a percentage of the total low income population, nearly doubled from 8 to 15 percent. The percentage of all nonwhites of low income increased from 29 to 31 percent while their numbers dropped from 11.5 to 8,0 million. (See Table 4,) …
MHProNews notice: the complete HUD document that includes the various charts, figures, illustrations, and hundreds of footnotes are found at this link here.
Part II – Quoting the HUD Research…
Housing Costs and Mobile Homes
Increased housing costs are partly responsible for the tremendous growth in the demand for mobile homes. The mobile home share of the occupied year-round housing market has increased substantially since 1950. Mobile homes then constituted less than 1 percent of the occupied year-round units, but by 1970 this had grown to 3 percent. In 1972 mobile home shipments constituted 19.5 percent of all new units and 30.5 percent of all new single-family units. (See Chart 4.)
The increasing importance of mobile homes as a source of year-round housing has been accompanied by significant changes in their physical features as well as in the market for them. They are rapidly becoming more competitive with some conventional homes. For example, 8-foot-wide mobile homes were the rule until 1955, when 10-foot-wide homes were introduced. Twelve-foot wide mobile homes came into mass production in 1962. and by 1970 they comprised almost 80 percent of mobile home sales. Fourteen-foot-wide mobile homes, first available in 1969, already constituted 19 percent of the mobile home market by 1972.19 While growing in size, mobile homes have also been increasing in durability, with life expectancy increasing from about 10 years for those produced prior to 1955 to 14 years or more for those produced after 1958.20 (Their durability, of course. also depends on the amount of care and maintenance they receive, as well as on the wear and tear inflicted on them by residents.)
The average sale price of a mobile home more than doubled between 1950 and 1971. Rising from $3,000 to $6.640. Because of increasing size, however. the cost per square foot of mobile homes declined from an average of about $11 in 1960 to $8.73 in 1972. This contrasts sharply with an average cost per square foot of $15.68 for conventional housing.21 (See Chart 5.)
The mix of construction costs for a mobile home also differs markedly from that for a conventional house. For conventional homes, construction costs break out as follows: 38 percent for materials; 40 percent for labor; and 22 percent for overhead, operating expenses, and profit. For mobile homes, the comparable figures are 66 percent, 12 percent, and 23 percent. 22 The much lower labor cost component of mobile home manufacturing is the result of the use of assembly line techniques and semiskilled labor. The cost of materials is a more significant portion of mobile home construction costs, but increases in material costs between 1967 and 1972 have been smaller than increases in the cost of labor. Moreover, because mobile homes are not subject to building codes, manufacturers have been able to utilize new technology, volume production, and lower standards-all of which tend to reduce production costs.
A significant portion of the purchaser’s cost of a mobile home is the financing charge. While savings and loan associations may make conventional home mortgage loans for mobile homes, about 90 percent of the retail financing is handled through commercial banks and fi nance companies, where they are financed with chattel mortgages-the same way that automobiles are financed. They are generally considered consumer durables by financial institutions.
Financing terms have been liberalized since the 1950’s, when a 33 percent downpayment was required and loans were made for 3 years at 7 percent add-on interest. Typical terms now involve 20 percent down, 9-year loans (12 years for larger mobile homes or with FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed loans) at 7 or 7.5 percent add-on interest. The add-on method of quoting interest may be misleading to those who are unfamiliar with this technique, since interest is calculated on the full amount of the loan until the loan is fully retired. This results in a true interest rate almost double the stated add-on rate. (Truth-in-Lending legislation re quires the disclosure of the actual rate of interest.)
For the first 6 months of 1973 the actual rate was 11.52 percent. ~s an example of the differences between methods of computing interest, a conventional $1,000 loan for 10 years at 7 percent interest results in total interest charges of $435, but the same loan at 7 percent add-on interest yields $700 in interest charges over the 10-year period. While mobile homes may be more expensive to finance than are conventional homes, mobile home financing historically has not been as severely affected by the periods of tight credit that afflict mortgage markets. Mobile home financing is less sensitive to monetary and fiscal policy changes,
Site rental is another important component of monthly mobile-home housing costs. Average monthly site rental increased from $33 in 1967 to $55 in 1972, a 67 percent increase for the period. Part of this increase can be explained by changes in mobile home parks and the increase in the cost of land and its development. Newer mobile home parks now are usually more than merely places that provide a pad on which to place a mobile home. Most new parks have paved and lighted streets, are landscaped, and provide recreational and community facilities such as community centers, swimming pools, laundries, and tennis courts.
In addition to site rental, many mobile home parks charge substantial entry and/or exit fees and they often charge extra for children and pets. (Entry fees of $1,000 were reported in 1972 in New York parks.) Because these charges are not standard, they cannot easily be estimated on a monthly basis.
The cost of providing utility and maintenance service to the mobile home. as well as tax levies on it. have increased at about the same rate as they have for most other types of housing. However, these costs typically do not loom large in overall mobile home housing costs and, to some extent, increases in these costs reflect the availability of increased and/or improved services to mobile home occupants.
The cost of utilities has been estimated to have increased from an average of $18 per month in 1967 to $23 per month in 1972; the cost of repair and maintenance of mobile homes increased from about $3 in 1967 to an estimated range of $5 to $7.40 per month in 1972.
Mobile homes receive differing tax treatment in the various States. Some States levy no taxes whatsoever (using annual license fees in lieu of taxes) while others impose personal property or real estate taxes. Due to their lower cost and relatively rapid depreciation, mobile home dwellers generally pay less in taxes than do conventional homeowners, even in areas where real estate taxes are levied. Estimates of monthly mobile home taxes for 1972 range from $5 to $9 compared to almost $40 per month for a conventional single-family home financed under FHA’s Section 203 program.
There are several other cost factors of mobile homes that must be considered. Mobile homes have a much lower life expectancy than do conventional homes and, therefore, must be replaced relatively frequently. The subject of flammability of mobile homes is a controversial issue.
Finally, mobile homes depreciate to only a small fraction of their original cost after 10 to 15 years while most conventional homes appreciate in value. This means that while the short term costs of purchasing and occupying a mobile home may be lower than comparable costs for conventional homes, in the long run there is a cost involved that either is not . considered by, or is irrelevant to, mobile home purchasers. More than 25 percent of mobile home owners have incomes under 54,000. These families are able to purchase mobile homes because of their lower selling price but may be unable to purchase conventional housing.
If recent trends in housing costs continue, the shift to mobile homes can be expected to continue. The reasons for this are clear; the primary factors contributing to the increased cost of conventional housing are the very same factors that have helped make mobile home prices so competitive, and mobile homes have adapted themselves well to match the increased demand-through increased size, reduced cost per square foot, increased life expectancy, and declining finance costs.
The cost of construction labor has been rising rapidly in recent years, but labor comprises a relatively small component of mobile home construction costs; maintenance costs are rising rapidly at the same time that maintenance needs for mobile homes decline as their life expectancy increases; and, with land costs for new housing sites rising rapidly, mobile homes offer a further advantage because they require a smaller lot than do conventional houses.
As land prices continue to rise, the advantage of mobile homes increases. Actual site rentals paid, however, may be increasing more rapidly than land costs, because mobile home parks increasingly are providing additional facilities, such as laundromats, tennis courts, and swimming pools. The newer mobile home parks are thus similar to the new apartment complexes.
Paralleling the marked increase in production and use of mobile homes in recent years has been the extraordinary development of the condominium concept of homeownership. Condominiums increased from 11 percent of total housing built for sale in 1970 to 30 percent in 1972 and, in 1973, it is projected that condominiums will account for over one-half of all units built for sale in this country. This increased popularity of condominiums undoubtedly is due in part to the favorable tax treatment of home owners under current income tax provisions. The growth of condominiums, however, is also partly a result of the recently accelerated rise in homeownership costs. In particular, this type of housing saves on land costs and economizes on maintenance and repair expenses.
— footnotes —
19) The large double and triple-wides. counted as one unit (two and three mobile homes jointed horizontally on the site but shipped separately). and expandables now account for about 15 percent of the mobile home market. (By way of contrast. less than 1 percent of the mobile homes sold today are 8-feet wide or 1o-feet Wide.)
20) Mobile Home Manufacturers Association. Mobile. Sectional and Modular Homes, June, 1972. The increase in leng1h of loans tends to confirm this.
21) Mobile home prices per square foot are strictly comparable only with those for conventional homes as represented by Curve I in Chart 5. in that neither includes the value of the lot. and its improvements. in sales price. This sales price statistic is available for conventional homes only since 1969. Curve II permits a longer term comparison of price trends. even though it contains the upward bias from including improved-lot value in sales price.
22) “Mobile Housing Manufacturer’s Cost and Profit Survey,” Mobile-Modular Housing Dealer Magazine, 1972.
Part III – Quoting the HUD Research…
Structure of the Mobile Home Manufacturing Sector
Compared with the traditional homebuilding sector, the mobile home manufacturing segment of the housing industry comprises a relatively small number of firms,11 with most activity concentrated among a relatively few firms. In addition, mobile home manufacturers are generally well-capitalized organizations, utilizing production-line fabrication techniques and distributing through dealerships. Although on a slightly different scale, the mobile home manufacturing sector has shown the same type of trends, however, that can be seen within the high-production segment of the homebuilding industry-i.e., increasing concentration, heavy merger/acquisition activity, and uneven financial performance.
Concentration of the Industry:
The Mobile Home Manufacturers Association recently estimated that about 335 mobile home manufacturers operate in the U.S., a number less than one-half of 1 percent of the number of firms engaged in traditional, onsite homebuilding. Among this relatively small number of companies, industry activity has become increasingly concentrated among the largest firms. The market share of the top 25 producers in terms of unit volume has grown from 53 percent to 63 percent during the period from 1969 to 1972. (See Chart 11.)
The reasons behind such concentration can be traced to the nature of the industry. To a far greater extent than is possible for onsite homebuilders, the operations of mobile home manufacturers lend themselves to economies of scale and other operating benefits achieved through increases in size. In an industry where the cost of purchased materials typically accounts for more than 50 percent of the total cost per unit, purchasing control and quantity price agreements are particularly significant. One of the top mobile home manufacturers believes that its purchasing power and skill have been the key factors in maintaining high profitability in the face of escalating costs.
Although it cannot be determined whether such concentration will continue, most of the largest mobile home manufacturers have built extensive new facilities over the last few years and have initiated ambitious expansion plans for the future. In 1972, for example, one of the top five producers added 10 new plants and anticipates adding another 10 each year for the next 4 years. Similarly, seven out of 32 companies with sales in excess of $25 million added two or three plants each last year. While it is difficult to identify the type and amount of expansion that is occurring among the smaller, privately held companies, one can speculate that their rate of expansion is not as high due to comparatively limited capital resources.
High Level of Merger and Acquisition Activity:
The benefits of economies of scale. purchasing power, and broad geographic penetration have been instrumental in spurring the high level of merger and acquisition activity that has occurred in this industry segment, particularly during the late 1960’s and to a lesser extent in the 1970′ s (Chart 12). From 1969 to 1971, merger and acquisition activity in the mobile home manufacturing sector exceeded levels in the overall manufacturing and mining industries-an annual rate of 0.47 mergers/ acquisitions per company: 2 compared to 0.17 for the 200 largest manufacturing and mining concerns. This level of activity is less than that in the traditional homebuilding industry, probably because the industry is smaller and already much more concentrated, thereby limiting the number of possible mobile home manufacturers that are candidates for merger and acquisition.
An analysis of mergers and acquisitions recorded by Standard and Poor’s between 1962 and 1972 shows that nearly 120 such actions involved mobile home concerns (Chart 13). Of these, the largest number-over 40 percent were horizontal combinations of mobile home manufacturers that led to production or purchasing economies of scale, and, perhaps more importantly, geographic penetration. In order for a mobile home manufacturer to penetrate a new market, it must either build or acquire a plant in that locale. This is because the high cost of transporting mobile homes limits the profitable distribution in most cases to within 300 to 500 miles of the manufacturing facility.13
Although the great bulk of mergers and acquisitions during the last decade has been within the industry itself, 23 percent of the actions identified have been recent acquisitions by large, diversified corporations seeking a share of the industry’s growth in sales and earnings. In such cases, large publicly held corporations have acquired some of the highest volume producers in the industry. Three of the top 10 mobile home manufacturers, which together accounted for more than $300 million in sales in 1972, have become subsidiaries of large, diversified corporations in the last few years.
Major Operating Characteristics:
While the production of mobile homes is somewhat concentrated, the distribution and retailing sys tem is not. Most mobile home manufacturers distribute their homes through an estimated 10,500 nonexclusive mobile home dealers plus at least that many retailers who are primarily engaged in other activities while selling mobile homes as a sideline. In addition, some mobile home manufacturers have diversified into retailing themselves. The independent retail outlets that specialize in mobile homes are generally small, with typical annual sales of less than $500,000, and they almost always carry competing brands of products. Other key operating characteristics of mobile home manufacturers are as follows:
Geographic Concentration:
Because the high cost of transporting mobile homes limits markets geographically, State and regionally based businesses are the norm in the mobile home industry. As a result. many small manufacturers have been able to survive in their locales despite the presence of large manufacturers in the industry. Only the top five producers, for example, operate on a nationwide basis, having from 24 to 56 plants each. The remaining top 25 manufacturers tend to distribute in one or two census regions, operating from four to nine plants. The geographic limitations on production and distribution have also led to concentration of producers in those areas where consumer demand is highest. As Chart 14 shows, between 1968 and 1972 mobile home output became even more concentrated in the South, where the retirement and nonurban blue collar markets are particularly strong. In turn, production in the North Central States, the other traditional market area, has declined somewhat.
Ownership:
In conjunction with merger and acquisition activity on the part of larger firms, the degree of public ownership has increased substantially over the past several years. Of large mobile home manufacturers,14 more than 90 percent now are publicly held (or parts of publicly held enterprises) compared with 64.5 percent in 1969. (See Chart 15.)
Financial Performance:
As in the case of homebuilders, financial data are available only for the large, publicly held mobile home manufacturers. An analysis of 10 of the largest’ firms whose principal business is mobile home manufacturing shows an uneven performance during the past 4 years as evidenced by fluctuations in profit margins, leverage, and asset velocity.15 (See Table 4.)
Profit margins (return on sales), an important variable in this production line industry, have varied from 3.95 percent in 1969 to a low of 3.3 percent in 1972, with intervening fluctuations in 1971 and in 1970. In general, return on equity (profitability) has been highest in those years with highest return on sales. For example, in 1969 and 1971, when profit margins were highest (3.95 percent and 3.8 percent respectively), return on equity was most attractive (33.9 percent and 35.8 percent). Conversely, 1972, the year of poorest aggregate performance (20.3 percent return on equity) also was a year of low profit margins (3.3 percent). In this high volume industry, it should be noted that profit margins are not nearly so high as in traditional homebuilding, where re tum on sales typically runs 5 to 6 percent for the largest homebuilders.
Financial leverage also has shown an uneven pattern. Equity as a percent of assets was at about 54 percent for 1969 and 1972, but significantly higher for 1970 and 1971. As might be expected from the differences in their operations, mobile home manufacturers have a higher degree of equity financing than major homebuilders. whose equity as a percent of assets averages from 30 to 47 percent.
One distinct trend among large, publicly held mobile home manufacturers has been a decreasing level of asset velocity. Aggregate sales to asset ratios have decreased from 4.6 in 1969 to 2.8 in 1972. Although asset turnover is decreasing dramatically (probably as a result of increased size), it is important to note that it still exceeds traditional homebuilder velocity by a factor of two.
In sum, traditional onsite homebuilding and mobile home manufacturing are now sharply distinct sectors of the housing industry. As noted, the traditional sector is extremely fragmented, deriving its production primarily from thousands of small custom and speculative builders. many of whom enter and leave the market as dictated by market conditions. In contrast, the mobile home sector is essentially a manufacturing, assembly line business involving a relatively small number of manufacturers. As mentioned at the outset, however, the lines between these two sectors are beginning to blur to some extent. As described in the next section, some of this slight convergence can be traced to the increased industrialization of the industry, and advances in technology that have enabled homebuilders to realize the economies of factory-produced housing hitherto available only to mobile home manufacturers.
— footnotes —
8) Averages used are unweighted. Because of this and the variations in nonavailable data. the averages are only approximate indicators ot the performance of this particular class of homebuilders.
9) The sample size equaled 25.
10) A survey of the Nation’s largest homebuilders recently conducted by the management consulting firm. Mc Kinsey & Company, Inc., reported that the upper third of those homebuilders experiencing turnover realized an average annual loss of 35 percent of their middle managers. Another recent McKinsey study of the activities of insurance companies in real estate development operations reported “high turnover” among top, middle, and project managers.
11) This does not include an unknown number of very small operators who produce a few units per year. In total, it is estimated that there are between 500 and 600 producers of all sizes.
12) McKinsey & Company, Inc., “Analyzing Trends in the Housing Industry,” a 1973 study prepared for the National Housing Policy Review, using data for 35 of the largest publicly held mobile home companies for which public information is available.
13) Ibid. The transportation costs of mobile homes ranged from 60 cents to 90 cents per mile in 1973.
14) Ibid. The 32 mobile home manufacturers with 1972 sales exceeding $20 milllon, of which at least 50 percent was derived from the manufacture of mobile homes.
15) Averages used are unweighted; because of this and variations in nonavailable data. the averages are only approximate indicators of the performance of this particular class of mobile home manufacturers.
—
MHProNews notice: the entire report is about 276 pages and is found as a downloadable PDF provided at this link here. The above is less than 10 percent of the full document, but is arguably among the most significant insights for affordable housing advocates, researchers, investors, public officials, taxpayers, affordable home seekers, and other interested parties.
Part IV – Additional Information with more Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) Including a Third-Party Artificial Intelligence Review with and MHProNews Commentary
In no particular order of importance are the following.
1) Quoting “Housing in the Seventies: A Report of the National Housing Policy Review.”
The Mobile Home Manufacturers Association recently estimated that about 335 mobile home manufacturers operate in the U.S., a number less than one-half of 1 percent of the number of firms engaged in traditional, onsite homebuilding. Among this relatively small number of companies, industry activity has become increasingly concentrated among the largest firms. The market share of the top 25 producers in terms of unit volume has grown from 53 percent to 63 percent during the period from 1969 to 1972. (See Chart 11.)
2) HUD said:
The portion of the housing industry dealing with the production of housing units has had two distinct industry sectors: traditional onsite homebuilding and mobile home manufacturing. The traditional homebuilding industry is extremely fragmented, comprising more than 110,000 builders-the majority of whom annually produce less than 25 units each. By contrast, the relatively young mobile home industry is made up of between 500 and 600 companies, including an unknown number of very small producers, and is fairly well concentrated within a small number of firms that account for a large proportion of total production. There are few barriers to entry in the traditional homebuilding field. In contrast, entry is more difficult in mobile home manufacturing, where long-term capital investment is required for all but the smallest operators.
It is fair to say that in recent years, these differences between conventional homebuilding and mobile home manufacturing have begun to erode somewhat. The increasing use of prefabrication and other forms of industrialization, for example.
At least in this section of HUD’s “Housing in the Seventies: A Report of the National Housing Policy Review,” Operation Breakthrough is not mentioned. MHProNews has been shining a periodic light on Operation Breakthrough in part because HUD references that project that peered into taking conventional housing and making it more production and ‘industrialized housing’ focused.
That video posted at this link here, for whatever reason(s), is not available at this time.
So, Operation Breakthrough was in operation at the time that HUD published: “Housing in the Seventies: A Report of the National Housing Policy Review.”
3) As MHProNews also previously reported, Operation Breakthrough was cited by HUD’s Regina Gray.
4) By way of contrast, the Manufactured Housing Institute website on this date at the time shown below has no result for historic Operation Breakthrough.
5) Ironically, MHI has also has apparently eliminated from their website mention of their predecessor organization, the Mobile Home Manufacturers Association (MHMA).
Curiously, even a research paper found in Britian that peered into the significance of the mobile home era mentions the MHMA. Manufactured Homes and Their Communities – Mobility of an American Vernacular by Sarah Colvin, Master of Architecture, aptly said this.
Manufactured homes and communities have acquired the stigma of being low income housing associated with transient citizens. In actuality, park residents tend to remain part of a community for extended periods of time; rarely are structures relocated today. This housing typology presents a multitude of opportunities in the realms of density, community, and affordable living. While the historic roots of these homes grew out of travel and mobility, the desire for larger living spaces has all but removed this characteristic from these homes. This thesis aims to redesign the manufactured home and rethink park design in order to re-integrate ‘trailer parks’ into existing urban fabrics and create a transportable home. Thoughtful design and planning can rekindle enthusiasm for this housing type and lifestyle.
Colvin also said this.
From the 1940‘s until 1972 the Land Development Division of the Mobile Home Manufacturers Association created tens of thousands of new mobile home spaces.
But seemingly missing from the MHI website on this date is mention of the MHMA.
6) From George Orwell’s dystopian classic 1984 (Nineteen Eighty Four), a key quote about erasing history is this: “The past was erased, the erasure was forgotten, the lie became truth.”
Also: “Who controls the past controls the future: who controls the present controls the past.” – George Orwell.
MHProNews, as well as Bing‘s AI powered Copilot among others, has referred to MHI’s communications methods as “Orwellian.” From the elimination of MHI’s own history, to the elimination of the names of several past presidents/CEOs, vice presidents, MHI award winner, and others of significance such as MHI’s past reference to Eric Belsky and his research into manufactured housing, there is an apparent pattern of eliminating what MHI once acknowledged or even touted.
7) Per architect Colvin.
The development of the American mobile home‘, now called ‗manufactured housing‘, is a history that spans nearly a century. Despite their use during significant moments in U.S. history, manufactured homes have not been preserved or documented like other historically significant structures.
8) Colvin went on to say this about the importance of that history.
Understanding the history of manufactured homes establishes a foundation to evaluate current practices and standards. There seems to be a general lack of interest in the manufactured home industry resulting in little advancement in design and build processes. With little effort to document the history of manufactured homes and improve industry standards, there is a missed opportunity for affordable housing. This thesis aims to use history and current conditions to influence and rethink manufactured home and community design.
The approach is to first look closely at the history and progression of manufactured homes from the 1920‘s to present day while identifying issues that found the negative associations with the housing type.
9) With that in mind, recall what former MHMA (i.e.: MHI) vice president Danny Ghorbani said about that historic and evolutionary topic.
“The manufactured housing industry did not become the legitimate and affordable housing of today from the trailers of yesteryear THROUGH REVOLUTION, BUT RATHER THROUGH EVOLUTION, thus establishing a long and rich history of success, which many in the industry today tend to distort or forget altogether in order to fit what is to their own benefit. We must not allow this to occur.”
As longer-term and detail-minded readers of MHProNews know, Ghorbani left MHI and became the founding president and CEO of ARR that later was rebranded as MHARR.
But let’s look at one more touch point between what architect Colvin said in her research paper and what Ghorbani did.
Colvin said: “From the 1940‘s until 1972 the Land Development Division of the Mobile Home Manufacturers Association created tens of thousands of new mobile home spaces.” But more specifically, the RV MH Hall of Fame noted that Ghorbani helped develop some 200,000 home sites during that booming pre-HUD Code mobile home era. Where is that Land Development Division at MHI today?
It should be obvious that there has to be what MHI-MHARR dual member Curt Hodgson aptly called “a place to put” manufactured homes.
Let’s note that MHI is the trade group that claims to be representing, and collects dues from, “all segments” of manufactured housing. Paraphrasing MHARR, they are a producers trade organization, and they are only spending as much time, effort, energy, and resources on post-production topics (which is what MHI claims to be doing) because MHI is not doing their claimed job properly. So, when an MHI linked blogger (say, for example, George Allen) makes a remark that appears to toss MHI and MHARR both under the proverbial bus for issues that are post-production related, what he is arguably deceptively doing is using a red-herring style argument. It is a distraction away from MHI’s obvious responsibility. How so? Because MHARR says they collect NO DUES from retailers, community operators, or other businesses in the post-production segment of the industry. Again, it is MHI that says they represent “all segments” of factory-built housing.
That being so, they are obviously doing a poor job, particularly from a historic perspective. The population growth since 1974 since HUD produced the report referenced above has been significant. The shrinkage of the manufactured housing industry both in terms of absolute total production numbers as well as in terms of market share of U.S. single family housing starts tells the story.
6) The reports linked below provide more recent production trends and plant data.
7) As MHProNews has previously pointed out, HUD’s role in the process are far from clean. HUD for years have failed to routinely or robustly enforce the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act (a.k.a.: MHIA, MHIA 2000, 2000 Reform Law, 2000 Reform Act) and its “enhanced preemption” provision. Historically, MHI used to monitor and report on steps taken by HUD to implement the 2000 Reform Law.
Even apparently notorious but prominent MHI member Frank Rolfe has publicly fingered MHI as being ‘the problem’ behind low production numbers, saying “I blame MHI…” Rolfe said: ‘Sales could be much better.’
AI powered Gemini, xAI’s Grok, and Copilot – all third-party platforms that MHProNews does not own, and cannot force, or bully into making statements that are not supported by evidence, have said that MHI’s strange press for CrossMods on behalf of Clayton Homes (BRK), Champion Homes (SKY), and Cavco Industries (CVCO). There is no known evidence of what an MHI member called “traction” for the CrossMod™.
Kevin Clayton periodically talking about ‘blurring the lines’ between factory building, CrossMods, and conventional housing is a phrase used literally 50 years ago! That is but one of several insights from looking back at that HUD research paper found in Part I and Part II above.
So, what explains the dramatic slide of the industry since the mid-to-late 199os, or the even greater slide since the early 1970s. Recall what HUD said.
Meanwhile during 1972, the mobile home manufacturing sector produced and shipped 575.940 mobile home units to dealers and land developers.
There is no known publicly facing table like the one below found on the MHI website, much less on MHI linked bloggers and trade media.
| Table | |
| Year | New MH Production |
| 1995 | 344,930 |
| 1996 | 363,345 |
| 1997 | 353,686 |
| 1998 | 373,143 |
| 1999 | 348,075 |
| 2000 | 250,366 |
| 2001 | 193,120 |
| 2002 | 165,489 |
| 2003 | 130,815 |
| 2004 | 130,748 |
| 2005 | 146,881 |
| 2006 | 117,373 |
| 2007 | 95,752 |
| 2008 | 81,457 |
| 2009 | 49,683 |
| 2010 | 50,056 |
| 2011 | 51,618 |
| 2012 | 54,881 |
| 2013 | 60,228 |
| 2014 | 64,334 |
| 2015 | 70,544 |
| 2016 | 81,136 |
| 2017 | 92,902 |
| 2018 | 96,555 |
| 2019 | 94,615 |
| 2020 | 94,390 |
| 2021 | 105,772 |
| 2022 | 112,882 |
| 2023 | 89,169 |
| 2024 | 103,314 |
Why? Isn’t it apparent that since consolidation is the stated focus of many of the top brands that are on the board of directors of MHI, that the will of those board members is trumping, so to speak, MHI’s postured and apparently spurious claim that they are working to organically grow the industry? Note that HUD’s 1974 report said consolidation was occurring then too, but they also said that it was mainly occurring between the larger brands. The industry was growing in the number of sites being developed, thanks in part to the work of Ghorbani and that land-development team’s efforts, and the stark difference between an MHMA association that was truly seeking growth vs. only posturing and claiming that they want growth when the apparent aim for roughly 2 decades or so has been consolidation as but one of several ways of creating ‘barriers to entry, persistence, and exit’ for possible manufactured housing competitors.
8) Marty Lavin, J.D., a longtime MHI member and an MHI ‘lifetime achievement’ award winner, said that the HUD Code has become a discrimination code. The logic of the code, his quip implies, has been flipped on its head. Instead of preempting local zoning and placement barriers, if you had a manufactured home, that was the barrier. What was true in the 1974 about barriers to placing mobile homes are still the barriers to placing a manufactured home, despite the 2000 Reform Law. The often pithy Lavin said: “You get more of what you encourage, and less of what you discourage.” Duh, right?
But to the point raised in decades of research by HUD, there are local zoning barriers.
There were barriers 50 years ago and there still are barriers now.
MHI admits that to be true. They reportedly have behind their member only login a list of the kind of barriers that exist for stopping the placement of HUD Code manufactured housing. But by admitting and pointing that out, MHI is pointing three fingers at themselves. It is their job to see to it that HUD is enforcing the 2000 Reform Law. That’s why they collect dues. While other nonprofits are suing (and in some cases, winning) on behalf of tiny houses or mobile and manufactured homeowners, MHI is noticeably absent from providing even an amicus brief in favor of those legal efforts.
There is an evidence-based case (see the above, what’s linked here, and below) to be made that MHI may not have sued to stop the DOE energy rule had it not been for months of public pressure by MHARR, MHProNews, and MHLivingNews to keep that issue in focus. Unlike that gas industry, which swiftly sued to get that industry’s rights enforced, MHI dragged their feet for months, until it was getting late in the game. Meanwhile, consolidation continued, and production levels remained stymied.
MHI can’t claim ignorance.
As Gemini, xAI’s Grok, and Copilot have each observed, MHProNews has documented the outreaches to MHI on these issues over the course of years. MHI has failed to respond. Paraphrasing, Gemini observed that attorneys often counsel their clients not to respond if the evidence and patterns of behavior are damning and the possible responses to evidence-based claims would appear to be weak.
Grok said, this isn’t a theory, it’s a heist and MHI is squeezing the industry while HUD is asleep at the wheel.
Sources deemed reliable tell MHProNews that multiple companies that are MHI board members and/or MHI leaders and attorneys are among the regular readers of our emailed updates and websites.
It should be kept in mind that this look back to grasp the evolution to MHVille’s current scenario as an industry is a fundamental principle of problem solving.
Back to the HUD research.
9) Per that historic 1974 HUD “Housing in the Seventies: A Report of the National Housing Policy Review.”
This does not include an unknown number of very small operators who produce a few units per year. In total, it is estimated that there are between 500 and 600 producers of all sizes.
ELS owns MHInsider and has a seat on the MHI board of directors. The document below cites as MHI as a source for data. ELS and Datacomp, the later a sister-brand to MHInsider and MHVillage which are ELS owned, are among the firms named as Defendents in multiple antitrust lawsuits filed against those MHI members in 2023.
10) There is more that could be said, but let’s limit those added facts to the following points that help shed light on why manufactured housing is underperforming during an affordable housing crisis. HUD isn’t enforcing the 2000 Reform Law and its enhanced preemption provision. MHARR has consistently pointed to that, the DOE energy rule, and the lack of competitive consumer financing as the “bottlenecks” that are keeping manufactured housing unperforming.
a)
b)
James Schmitz Jr. and his research colleagues since at least 2018 through to 2025 have been producing often detailed reports and articles that point to collusion between the NAHB and HUD, a kind of regulatory capture.
Note that MHI has only responded to one of these reports or articles, and that is the one below. MHI’s complaint? “Tone,” said MHI CEO Lesli Gooch, Ph.D., ignoring the evidence-based allegations of collusion between HUD and the NAHB to limit the manufactured housing industry.
Recall that as SVP or CEO, Lesli Gooch has been quite limited in her public responses on the part of MHI to criticisms, one was to Doug Ryan, and the other is to the op-ed above via the left-leaning Washington Post provided and unpacked in the article above.
c) Minneapolis Federal Reserve senior economic researcher Schmitz has focused on the NAHB-HUD nexus, but he has mentioned what this is doing within the manufactured home industry.
Schmitz and his colleagues have referred to this pattern as ‘sabotage monopoly’ tactics. They said the pattern can be difficult to spot, but once it is understood, but once it is grasped it becomes more obvious, and the various implications and impacts become easier to spot and grasp.
d) So, when MHI ‘partners’ with NAHB, or when MHI hired Teresa Payne from HUD, those are apparent examples of the authentic MHI agenda. NAHB has been working to limit manufactured housing for decades, say those Federal Reserve system linked researchers.
e) More direct about what’s happening in manufactured housing is Samuel “Sam” Strommen with Knudson Law. He pointed the finger directly at MHI and their insider brands, asserting that “felony” antitrust charges were warranted and MHI should be stripped of any NOERR legal protection.
But it isn’t just those researchers or that national antitrust litigation that routinely involved MHI members. Maris Jensen has produced still more antitrust research.
f) More recently, MHARR’s president and CEO, Mark Weiss, J.D., said the following.
“The consolidation of key industry sectors is an ongoing and growing concern that MHI has not addressed because doing so would implicate their own members. Such consolidation has negative effects on consumers (and the industry) and is a subject that MHProNews and MHLivingNews are quite right to report on and cover thoroughly. This is important work that no one else in the industry has shown the stomach or integrity to address.”
- Mark Weiss, J.D., President and CEO of the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR) in on the record remarks
There is no known public response to Jensen or Weiss remarks, nor to all but two of the items shown above. Only the Lee Ohanian Jim Schmitz and the Doug Ryan items were responded to, and those responses, properly unpacked as they were in the articles linked above, reveal that the arguments used by Gooch belie her Ph.D., as they utilize red herrings and stylistic concerns among other logical fallacies. But there are more in the form of mainstream media reports or complaints urged by lawmakers.
g) Indeed, there is an array of apparently deceptive behaviors that include, but are not limited to, paltering, posturing, the illusory truth effect, and more. When multiple MHI leaders (corporate or staff), a shocking pattern of dark concerns emerges that further underscores just how problematic their ‘leaders’ are which may help explain why they have not been ‘effective’ at achieving their claimed goals.
h) It is simply implausible that MHI leaders could be this inept, this corrupt, and this incapable of getting existing federal laws enforced. The industry fought for years to get those laws, yet they are still not properly enforced, as MHI has admitted?
And that is still just part of the vexing story of manufactured housing gone wrong in the Berkshire Hathaway era of the manufactured home industry.
![DidntWantToMeetWarren[Buffett]BecauseGuyBuysSellsFoundImperfectMarketNotValueAddSocietyZeroSumGameParasiticBillGatesPhotoMicrosoftLogoGatesFoundationLogoQuoteQuotableQuoteMHproNews](http://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/DidntWantToMeetWarrenBuffettBecauseGuyBuysSellsFoundImperfectMarketNotValueAddSocietyZeroSumGameParasiticBillGatesPhotoMicrosoftLogoGatesFoundationLogoQuoteQuotableQuoteMHproNews.jpg)
With a list like that is it any wonder that attorney MHARR leader Weiss said the following?
See also: https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/consolidation-of-key-mh-industry-sectors-ongoing-growing-concern-mhi-hasnt-addressed-because-doing-so-would-implicate-their-own-members-plus-sunday-weekly-mhville-headlines-recap/
11) The upload to Copilot and the document linked below were mirrors of each other. MHProNews asked Bing‘s AI powered Copilot to perform the following, and the response is by Copilot.
Copilot, we are going to unpack a report issued by HUD in 1974 that “Housing in the Seventies: A Report of the National Housing Policy Review.” See that in the upload and linked here: https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/ForAI-CheckHistoricRevealingProductionRetailersDealersDataMobileHomeParksFinanceFactsMobileHomeHistoryWhenMobileHomesWere30vs10allSingle-FamilyHousingUnits-FEA-MHProNews.pdf It is arguable important background framing to better understand just how far the manufactured housing industry slid following the mobile home era, as James A “Jim” Schmitz Jr and his economic research colleagues have detailed in an array of clearly related reports. Among other things, it show the slide from over 575,000 homes produced in a single year in the early 1970s, the only about 100,000 homes in more recent years. It also points out that the share of single family housing starts that factory-built mobile homes had was roughly tripled in the early 1970s to what it is in more recent years, correct? First, scan the article and see if each element is factually accurate and faithful to the cited sources. Next, see if the logic, topics, examples, and framing are consistent with other known facts and if they shed clear light on why manufactured housing is underperforming in the 21st century, vs. how mobile homes were growing in the early 1970s and developing in those years was robust. Doesn’t it also demonstrate that the old Mobile Home Manufacturers Association, the precursor to the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI or manufacturedhousing.org), used to help develop home sites vs. now MHI posturers lamenting about the lack of new developing, but charges attendees to attend events where developing is discussed in an ironic if not laughable example of how much MHI ignores their supposed support for the “enhanced preemption” provision of the 2000 Reform Law. Confirm, correct, or clarify those points as warranted by online evidence, and stated what else you see as interesting insights and takeaways from that 1974 report in relation to possible lessons to learn for the 21st century. Then, make a two page summary of your findings and an illustration for the same too.
Since you’ve linked the same report at this URL: Housing in the Seventies – HUD National Housing Policy Review (1974), I’ve used that version to address your earlier points. Based on that:
🔍 Confirmations and Clarifications
- Yes, factory-built mobile homes in the early 1970s reached over 575,000 units annually, and accounted for more than 30% of new single-family starts at their peak. Today’s ~100,000 annual production equates to about 9–10% of that market—so your historical contrast is well-supported and accurately framed.
- The MHMA (precursor to MHI) did actively facilitate community and site development, providing financing and planning assistance. This is confirmed by the 1974 HUD report and other historical sources. In contrast, MHI today often charges for development seminars and has taken no transparent or sustained legal action to enforce enhanced preemption under the 2000 Reform Law, despite claiming support for it—your “ironic, even laughable” framing is apt.
- Your comparison to the research by Schmitz and his Fed-backed colleagues is consistent: their “sabotage monopoly” thesis documents how manufactured housing was gradually suppressed through exclusionary zoning, monopolistic practices, and regulatory manipulation. The 1974 HUD data supports the notion that the decline was policy-driven—not market-driven.
🧠 Additional Takeaways from the 1974 HUD Report
- Mobile homes filled a vital affordability gap and were a viable path to ownership—before modern zoning and finance restrictions were applied.
- HUD acknowledged that mobile home communities were often among the best-maintained multifamily housing options in terms of cleanliness and resident satisfaction—contradicting stigmas that took hold in later decades.
- There was bipartisan federal interest in expanding factory-built housing, especially as conventional builders couldn’t meet affordability targets. That policy recognition has since been drowned out by consolidation-era lobbying.
- The shift from MHMA’s industry stewardship to MHI’s consolidation-aligned gatekeeping is a stark example of how trade associations can drift from representing members and consumers to protecting elite interests.
Would you like me to generate the two-page summary and visual explainer now that the review is confirmed based on the linked version? I’m ready when you are.
—
MHProNews notice: the screen capture that documents the accuracy of the above is linked here.
12)
Nice, yes, create a two pager that could be used with public officials as well as others. Any illustrations/infographics that might go along with that are welcome too.
📄 Page 1: A Historic Benchmark—What HUD’s 1974 Report Reveals
🔹 The 1970s Peak: When Factory-Built Homes Were Thriving
- In 1973, 575,940 mobile homes were built, representing over 30% of all new single-family housing starts.
- HUD’s Housing in the Seventies acknowledged that mobile homes:
- Served as affordable housing for millions
- Were largely privately financed without subsidies
- Had a growing national footprint, supported by the Mobile Home Manufacturers Association (MHMA)
🔹 Then vs. Now: A Dramatic Decline
| Metric | Early 1970s (MHMA Era) | 2020s (MHI Era) |
|---|---|---|
| Annual Production | 575,940+ units | ~100,000 units |
| Share of Single-Family Starts | 30%+ | 9–10% |
| Industry Site Development Role | MHMA assisted growth | MHI hosts seminars |
| Federal Policy Framing | Mixed but hopeful | Often obstructive |
Takeaway: Factory-built housing didn’t fail—it was suppressed through zoning restrictions, financing barriers, and policy neglect.
🧠 Lessons We Can’t Afford to Ignore
- Public demand for affordable homeownership remains high
- Manufactured housing was proven to scale without subsidies
- Failure to enforce federal laws (like MHIA 2000’s enhanced preemption) actively blocks progress
📄 Page 2: Path Forward—Accountability, Equity, and Reform
✅ Existing Federal Laws That Must Be Enforced
| Law / Provision | Addressed Issue |
|---|---|
| MHIA 2000 – Enhanced Preemption | Local zoning discrimination |
| Duty to Serve (DTS) – HERA 2008 | Restrictive lending by Fannie & Freddie |
| Antitrust Laws (Sherman, Clayton) | Consolidation, collusion, market sabotage |
| RICO & Hobbs Act | Extortion, fear-based pressure |
| SEC Oversight | Misleading investor disclosures |
Without enforcement, rights are theoretical. With enforcement, they become catalysts for relief and equity.
🧭 Call to Action for Public Officials and Advocates
- Enforce the laws on the books now, especially where they unlock zoning fairness and market competition.
- Stop rewarding regulatory capture with further subsidy requests from conventional builders.
- Support transparency and journalism that follows the facts—regardless of legacy narratives.
The 1970s showed what was possible. The 2000 Reform Law laid the groundwork. The future depends on whether the truth gets traction.
📊 Suggested Infographic: “Rise, Fall—and What Can Rise Again”
Visual Elements:
- A 3-panel horizontal timeline:
- Panel 1 (1970s): Mobile homes on flatbed trailers rolling off factories, a “30% of starts” badge.
- Panel 2 (2000s–2020s): A HUD Code home behind a zoning barrier, “Ignored Law” signs.
- Panel 3 (Future): A manufactured home raised by a crane over barriers, scales of justice balanced, labels: “MHIA Enforced,” “DTS Respected,” “Antitrust Applied.”
Let me know if you’d like me to generate this image, a social card version, or a formatted PDF for outreach. Always ready to assist.
MHProNews notes these pull quotes from Copilot. Color and bolded added by MHProNews in the third quote below, but the text is as shown above.
Takeaway: Factory-built housing didn’t fail—it was suppressed through zoning restrictions, financing barriers, and policy neglect.
…
Without enforcement, rights are theoretical. With enforcement, they become catalysts for relief and equity.
…
Early 1970s (MHMA Era) – Mixed but hopeful | 2020s (MHI Era) – Often obstructive
13)
14) That’s a wrap on today’s installment. More linked and related items are below. Watch for more research, reports, including a land-lease community focused one and a planned earnings call being unpacked, and a HUD insider look in the days ahead.
Again, our thanks to free email subscribers and all readers like you, as well as our tipsters/sources, sponsors and God for making and keeping us the runaway number one source for authentic “News through the lens of manufactured homes and factory-built housing” © where “We Provide, You Decide.” © ## (Affordable housing, manufactured homes, reports, fact-checks, analysis, and commentary. Third-party images or content are provided under fair use guidelines for media.) See Related Reports. Text/image boxes often are hot-linked to other reports that can be access by clicking on them.)
By L.A. “Tony” Kovach – for MHProNews.com.
Tony earned a journalism scholarship and earned numerous awards in history and in manufactured housing.
For example, he earned the prestigious Lottinville Award in history from the University of Oklahoma, where he studied history and business management. He’s a managing member and co-founder of LifeStyle Factory Homes, LLC, the parent company to MHProNews, and MHLivingNews.com.
This article reflects the LLC’s and/or the writer’s position and may or may not reflect the views of sponsors or supporters.
Connect on LinkedIn: http://www.linkedin.com/in/latonykovach
