“The further a society drifts from the truth, the more it will hate those that speak it.” [George Orwell, per Goodreads] “Being in a minority, even in a minority of one, did not make you mad. There was truth and there was untruth, and if you clung to the truth even against the whole world, you were not mad.” (George Orwell in his dystopian novel, 1984). As what follows will document, there is a direct link between the sharp drop in manufactured home production in the 21st century, the lack of Duty to Serve (DTS) or FHA Title I lending, and the multi-million-unit affordable housing shortage in the U.S.  To further frame what follows, I began working in manufactured home retail sales in the early 1980s, rapidly rose to management, later managed manufactured home communities (MHCs), enjoyed good customer relations in each setting and am widely considered to be an independent industry expert that co-founded and publishes by far the largest and most popular trade publication in the manufactured housing industry. In December 2019, I made two different listening session presentations on the Duty to Serve (DTS) mandates regarding chattel lending for HUD Code manufactured homes. One of those presentations was made live in the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) auditorium in Washington, D.C. and the second was a virtual presentation later that month. In both presentations, I made the evidence-based case how disgraceful it was that the FHFA and the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs or Enterprises) have ignored key aspects of the law to the harm of so many Americans. When the Federal Register published its request for comments by the FHFA on 6.24.2026 on DTS their market survey essentially documented some of the broad points I made over 6 years ago. Better late than never. Now that the FHFA and the Federal Register have acknowledged what thousands of manufactured housing professionals and literally millions of potential consumers have lived through in the 21st century, including since the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008 made DTS federal law, it is necessary to address key facts, evidence along with industry expert analysis (FEA) that will clarify just how serious this problem is and why the solution to this challenge is conceptually relatively simple.

That bears rephrasing. Documenting aspects of interconnected problems and motivations take time. But once the overview of those well-documented details are grasped, the solution is surprisingly simple, if the policy will is manifested to properly, routinely and robustly enforce federal laws.

Failure to implement what common sense and reams of evidence plus experience suggests is achievable will only serve to continue to penalize millions, particularly those with lower incomes, who are not enjoying the benefits of home ownership due to the failure of the Enterprises and the FHFA to follow and enforce the DTS and other existing laws. As Donald Tye Jr. put it.

 

In no particular order of importance is the following executive summary.

Executive Summary

• a) While much of the market survey data from the Federal Register notice and request for comments was useful, this co-founder and publisher of industry-leading MHProNews observes several key points were missed in that market survey.
• b) This comments letter will examine both the useful and missed information in the Federal Register.
• c) As a housekeeping and procedural notice, both human intelligence (HI) from a range of cited sources and artificial intelligence (AI) from third-party AIs will be transparently deployed in this response with this goal: to make it crystal clear that the Enterprises could have been facilitating more affordable lending and that the data supporting the safety and soundness in facilitating chattel loans successfully is evident because multiple lenders have been making such loans successfully, sustainably, and profitably for decades. It would be tempting to end this letter right there. But the details matter. Note that AI use herein will always be clearly identified and/or will be transparently identified in linked items.
• d) Quoting the Federal Register notice and related analysis here: “Each market poses a unique set of opportunities and challenges. The manufactured housing market is inherently affordable, but significant financing hurdles prevent many buyers from entering the market. ^29″
• e) Those who in the past argued that manufactured housing industry misbehavior in the 1990s somehow excused the Enterprises failure to facilitate the secondary market for manufactured home loans should read the document on the FHFA website, “A Pimple on an Elephant’s Ass.” ‘Liar loans’ in the conventional housing market and array of other improper yet all too common behaviors by lenders and regulators were the primary causes of the housing and financial crisis that resulted in the enactment of HERA 2008. While certain lenders sadly lost billions due to repossessed manufactured homes in the late 1990s to early 2000s, the U.S. suffered trillions of dollars in economic damage involving mainly conventional housing and lending/investing improprieties. Restated, given that the GSEs essentially re-embraced the conventional housing market after 2008, why wasn’t that same courtesy been extended to federally regulated HUD Code manufactured homes? More bluntly, holding past misbehavior by some in the industry decades ago against all of manufactured housing today is logical fallacy, a smokescreen or red herring.
• e) Per the Federal Register, the Enterprises claim they don’t have the necessary data to safely and soundly: “increase the liquidity of mortgage investments and improve the distribution of investment capital available for mortgage financing for the manufactured housing.” That same Federal Register notice stated: “the Enterprises are required to provide leadership in developing loan products and flexible underwriting guidelines that facilitate a secondary market for mortgages on housing for very low-, low-, and moderate-income families in those markets (the Duty to Serve).³” and that “Congress found that the Enterprises ‘‘have an affirmative obligation to facilitate the financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families.’’¹“
• f) According to this footnote: “⁷⁴Both Enterprises have previously undertaken chattel lending pilot initiatives but these initiatives were constrained by insufficient industry data and, as a result, did not achieve the intended outcomes.” Footnote 74 is demonstrably untrue. But beyond the inaccuracy of that claim in footnote 74, like them or not, the industry’s leaders from the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) orbit have repeatedly asserted the opposite claim.  Clearly, MHI and the Enterprises can’t both be accurate on their respect claims, unless they are in some sense paltering. So, at what point will Congress or others step in and hold hearings under oath that determine if Fannie, Freddie, those manufactured housing industry firms and organizations or the FHFA are saying something that is exaggerated, untrue, or deliberately deceptive?
• g) This expert views comments letter will explain why even if Fannie and Freddie didn’t get ‘sufficient industry data’ from MHI member lenders or others that is a poor or lame excuse. The Enterprises have ample resources to have developed programs that perform, particularly given the fact that multiple lenders in manufactured housing have sustainably made chattel loans for decades.
• h) Beyond the stressful toll on millions of Americans, one of the key reasons why FHFA must fix this problem is because the lack of affordable housing near where it is needed is reportedly costing the U.S. economy some $2 trillion dollars a year.
• i) Because manufactured housing has been documented by federal and multiple other researchers over a period of years to appreciate at a similar or faster rate than conventional housing, that is one more reason why the GSEs should be compelled to provide the multi-generational wealth generating potential of modern HUD Code manufactured homes.
• j) In brief, the data and the evidence and the law all point to a need to make DTS chattel lending and other law enforcement involving manufactured housing mandatory, consistent, and on par with what is occurring in the conventional housing market. There is an evidence-based argument to be made (see below) that fixing the manufactured housing market would largely solve the U.S. affordable housing crisis with free market solutions rather than subsidies, which may have helped some, but which have not worked for the masses in 50 years.
• k) The Urban Institute indicated that less liquidity in manufactured housing may have dampened manufactured housing appreciation rates. Of course. When there were less conventional lending, conventional housing valuations plunged because making a purchase became harder. The same supply and demand principles apply to manufactured housing as they do to conventional housing.
• l) This executive summary and the letter that follows could be further summarized as answering the following questions.
• Why has it taken some 18 years before the FHFA to apparently admit this regulatory and GSE failures on DTS chattel lending for manufactured homes?
• What have been the consequences of that failure in terms of harm to affordable housing seekers, the manufactured housing market, and the broader U.S. economy as a result of the failure to properly implement the DTS for chattel lending?
• Have there been apparent winners and losers as a result of this regulatory and Enterprise failure? If so, who benefited and who was harmed?
• m) Several credible third-parties doing research reports probing manufactured housing, as well as industry members, have made direct or de facto antitrust allegations that pointed to a ‘conspiracy’ involving antitrust allegations. Members of Congress have also made antitrust allegations involving higher profile members of the manufactured housing industry, and those specifically involved manufactured home lending. If such documented concerns are credible, what light – if any – does it shed on why the Duty to Serve (DTS) for chattel lending for manufactured homes has been allowed to drag out so long without much more than lip service being produced to date? After all, what role are trade associations supposed to play in manufactured housing? While that is not the focus of this letter, it is a relevant topic that will be explored.
• n) Last for now, procedures should not be an excuse for failure to perform the chattel loan mandate. The chattel lending market can and should be facilitated by the GSEs, FHFA, or for that matter by Ginnie Mae and HUD/FHA (the later are another story beyond the scope of this document, but similar facts and principles apply). Or as the Federal Register phrased it: “…the proposed rule would establish the authority of each Enterprise to take any action that is consistent with the statutory duty to serve…” This comments and regulatory revisions process should result in making that quoted statement about the DTS chattel lending for HUD Code manufactured homes a reality. That is the bottom line, and that bottom line is manifestly achievable, as several pieces of well documented evidence explored herein will reflect.

Before proceeding, since some of the statements and allegations that follow may be deemed sensitive or insulting to the sensibilities of others, an explanation is warranted.

Because federal comments letters are subject to slander and libel laws, let me hereby express the following as a blanket statement for the entire contents and linked items in this letter. These are my observations, findings from sources as cited, and as previously noted my manufactured housing industry expert views. While I will use the word “allegation” here as a blanket for these contents and may later use that word or purported, apparent, arguably or other similar qualifying phrasing, these are expert opinions or views as shown BUT they are substantiated with clearly documented evidence and widely acknowledged facts. Paraphrasing what third-party AIs have previously said about our reporting and documentation:

‘…this is not merely speculative.’

So, I’m saying that what follows is a blend of experience, research, evidence, facts, and a broad first-hand understanding of the manufactured housing as a professional, owner and resident. Not to brag, but few will have the broad array of widely acknowledged experience reflected and/or linked herein. The traditional ‘beat cop’ or the traditional ‘beat reporter’ will often have more insights about specific behavior covered on their ‘beat’ than others will. According to Wikipedia: “Beat reporters build up a base of knowledge on and gain familiarity with the topic, allowing them to provide insight and commentary in addition to reporting straight facts” and “beat reporters will also build up a rapport with sources that they visit again and again, allowing for trust to build between the journalist and their source of information. This distinguishes them from other journalists who might cover similar stories from time to time.^[1]” It is unlikely that many comments will bother to document the facts, evidence and related analytical (FEA) thinking at the level this document will. Because sources will be cited and/or routinely linked, this comments letter document will be auditable. To the concerns raised by the Orwell quotes, anyone interested in the truth of these topics will have an array of sources and insights from which they may be able to draw from deeply for the purpose of fixing what has been acknowledged to have gone wrong with flawed implementation of the DTS manufactured housing chattel lending program.

1. There is much more that could be said in the executive summary and preface, but the above are sufficient to make this next point. As the Federal Register notice stated:

“Borrowers, particularly those seeking personal property (chattel) loans, face a 65.6% denial rate compared to just 8.8% for site-built homes. Even when approved, these borrowers are often subject to higher interest rates—averaging 9.24% for personal property loans versus 6.63% for traditional mortgages—creating a ‘‘financing gap’’ that frequently offsets the lower purchase price of the home itself.³⁰”

2. A human intelligence (HI) and artificial intelligence (AI) hybrid report linked here said the following.

“instead of a “65.6% denial rate” for chattel HUD Code home loans “compared to just 8.8% for site-built homes.” Meaning, an additional 129,646 HUD Code homes would have been sold in 2024. Meaning that one change could have brought the potential 2024 total production level to 232,960 homes.”

• a) One is the lack of enforcement by the FHFA of the GSEs “duty” with respect to chattel lending under HERA’s DTS.
• b) One is the negative hangover of the improper pending Department of Energy (DOE) manufactured housing energy rule.
• c) Another is the failure of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to routinely enforce the “enhanced preemption” provision of the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 (a.k.a.: MHIA, MHIA 2000, 2000 Reform Law, 2000 Reform Act).
• d) Beyond federal regulators, MHARR points their fingers for failing to do their respective jobs (FHFA and HUD), or for being overzealous (DOE), but also point to the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) for not taking the commonsense steps needed to have existing laws properly and routinely enforced. More concerns regarding MHI from other sources, including past and present MHI members, further below.

It should not be thought that MHARR’s comments and observations stand alone, as several sources have made similar comments and findings. Examples will be provided herein.

4. It should be pointed out that an array of researchers documented that the more common critiques about manufactured housing have been debunked.  Several examples follow. Note that every linked item from this comments letter ought to be considered as part of my comments. In no particular order of importance are the following examples.

 

 

a) Donald H. Layton is a former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Freddie Mac from May 2012 to June 2019.

 

 

b) Per Fannie Mae Single Family.

“Manufactured homes (MH) deliver high-quality, affordable living for a wide variety of homebuyers. With median monthly housing costs around 40% lower than traditional site-built homes, MH can open more doors to homeownership…

 

Appreciation

The Urban Institute reviewed resale prices for conventionally financed MH between 2000 and 2024. The result? The MH appreciated in value at essentially the same rate as site-built homes. Read the report.”

c) Richard Genz, in the MHProNews report cited below, was doing his research on behalf of the Fannie Mae Foundation.

 

 

d) Per Genz in 2001.

“What is at stake in our perceptions about manufactured homes, mobile homes, and trailers is the housing choice of some 8 million households and 18 million people (Wallis 1998).”

“Owners tend to be either very young or elderly…”

“A total of 82 percent of African Americans own their manufactured homes, while 58 percent of Latino households own theirs…”

“Because their costs per square foot are about half those of site-built homes, manufactured homes put ownership within reach of millions of households, and fully 79 percent are owner occupied…”

“It has been argued that cost comparisons with site-built homes are unfair because construction standards are inferior, but a Harvard study refutes that…”

“Since 1976, all units have been designed and constructed to a performance-based code, the only federal building code. It is administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), usually in partnership with state administering agencies, and it preempts local codes. Federal preemption allowed the industry to achieve scale and create the cost advantage of mass-produced housing.”

“Financing procedures for most manufactured housing sold today are holdovers from the origin of a manufactured home as a mobile vehicle or trailer,” says a recent HUD report (HUD and National Association of Home Builders [NAHB] 2000, 37).”

“Citing the fact that a majority of buyers have held the same job for 5 to 10 years, a Freddie Mac economist notes that “except for lower incomes, the profile of manufactured home buyers seeking financing does not appear to differ greatly from site-built loan borrowers…”

“Several other studies establish the simple fact that some manufactured homes increase in value, and some decline…”

“Like the value of any home, the value of a manufactured home over time is contingent on many factors. Unfortunately, the perception that depreciation is somehow inherent in manufactured homes is widespread. It is at the root of disinterest about them among development bankers, advocates, planners, and nonprofit developers. These professionals are rightly concerned that housing should be a foundation for building wealth, but if advocates simply write off the preference of so many home buyers for lower-cost manufactured units, we passively contribute to a problem we should be helping to solve. Available data suggest that depreciation is not a mystery. It can
be understood and, in many cases, reversed.”

e) Several of Genz’s points 25 years ago, while they merit nuanced updates, still hold true today. Those relatively focused pull quotes from Genz for the Fannie Mae Foundation in 2001 arguably demonstrate several key topics of importance to the discussion of ‘mandating the enforcement of a DTS chattel lending mandate’ that a widely bipartisan Congress enacted in 2008.

Even then, decades before more recent research that manufactured homes are appreciating at a similar or greater rate (see more linked items herein) than conventional housing, there were already examples where manufactured homes were appreciating. Research for HUD in 2011 during the Obama-Biden (D) administration documented that in urban settings, manufactured homes appreciated ‘side by side’ with conventional housing. Part of the point of referencing such research is this: the common excuses and/or outdated myths that have wrongfully been used to restrain manufactured housing have long been debunked.

Common sense should reveal that failing to offer the same financing availability and under similarly reasonable terms undermines the resale value of manufactured homes. The same was true in conventional housing circa the 2008 housing/financial crisis. When lending dried up, site-built housing values plunged. Why shouldn’t that obvious insight be applied to HUD Code manufactured homes? The question is rhetorical, because the obvious answer is that both site-built (conventional housing) and manufactured homes ought to have robust, yet sustainable, lending offered. That helps frame the following.

 

 

f) The quote above (different than what follows linked below), is from the Urban Institute in 2019. It specifically made the point raised in 4e above. The lack of lending options undermines manufactured home appreciation. So, not only is the lack of chattel lending under DTS a harm in terms of increasing the numbers of manufactured home buyers, and thus affordable housing owners who routinely require no federal subsidies, but it is also a harm to the millions who own a HUD Code manufactured home. Ironically, Kevin Clayton (see 6a below) and others have made that very point.

 

 

g) There is much more, but even that brief sampling reveals the following.

Third party researchers and/or research by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and federal agencies (past and present) are among those which documented that modern manufactured housing has for decades defied the “trailer house” or old “mobile home” stereotypes. Manufactured homes have repeatedly been shown to appreciate (or depreciate) for essentially the same reasons that conventional housing does. This has been reflected by research dating back at least a quarter of a century. 

 

 

h) Perhaps there is no sense of irony among some at Fannie, Freddie or the FHFA because it is often their own research and comments that point to reasons why manufactured housing lending could and should be sustainably facilitated by the GSEs and routinely enforced by FHFA.

i) So, in brief, there are no good excuses for not offering full and robust DTS support for ALL HUD Code manufactured homes. The research has already been done time and again. What follows are some of the relevant details.

j) Regrettably, much of the third-party research cited herein was not previously found on the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) website, as several of those linked reports documented at that time. Third-party AI checks further below will explore how many of these research documents are found on the MHI website at the time this comments letter is being prepared.

k) Doug Ryan raised similar concerns about MHI and Clayton’s role in depressing DTS via an op-ed in the American Banker. Ryan pointedly accused MHI, Clayton’s affiliated lending and by implication the GSEs of manipulating the financing market to the benefit of Berkshire Hathaway owned brands.  That allegation and related evidence will be addressed and linked in greater detail with MHI’s attempted rebuttal, further below.

 

 

 

5. With the antirust allegation above and other legal concerns in mind, it is worth recalling that in the American legal system, facts and evidence are not the same as absolute proof in the sense of guilt in terms of possible violations of federal or other laws. But facts and evidence can be reasons for an investigation and/or indictments or other regulatory or more judicial style legal actions. Meaning, an accused party are deemed innocent in the eyes of the law until proven guilty in a court or by some sort of plea.

That said, there is an abundance of evidence that supports this simple premise. As Microsoft Bing‘s artificial intelligence (AI) powered Copilot has put it, this ‘information isn’t speculative.’ Where some – like Ryan, MHARR, or others – are quoted herein who may be described by some as ‘speculating,’ MHProNews has repeatedly put their views or ‘speculations’ to the test, referencing known evidence. The information herein and linked are grounded in years of hard facts, related evidence and logically sound analysis (FEA).

 

 

Let’s survey some of those interrelated comments. What follows is in no particular order of importance.

a) The president and CEO of the National Housing Conference (NHC), David Dworkin said the following. What makes his remarks compelling is that Dworkin reported has 11 years of experience at Fannie Mae.

 

 

b) So, years before the Federal Register/FHFA notice requesting comments and the related market survey was published, Dworkin’s remarks: “We have full confidence in both Enterprises ability to reach the existing benchmarks” is part of the foundation for disputing the arguably inaccurate claim quoted above and provided anew below.

“⁷⁴Both Enterprises have previously undertaken chattel lending pilot initiatives but these initiatives were constrained by insufficient industry data and, as a result, did not achieve the intended outcomes.”

c) With all due respect to whomever wrote that claim, that’s either naive, untrue or demonstrably nonsense. But before delving deeper into why even “insufficient industry data” is not a legitimate excuse, pre-bunked by FHFA listening session quotes and remarks here, let’s next look at the counterclaim referenced in the executive summary above.

d) Consider what Kevin Clayton said under certified “Truth in Testimony” remarks to Congress on behalf of MHI. Keep in mind that the Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) conglomerate owns Clayton Homes.

“MHI and its members have long demonstrated to rating agencies, investors, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), Ginnie Mae and others that manufactured housing lenders operate within a disciplined lending environment.”

e) Also, according to Berkshire Hathway owned 21st Mortgage Corporation President and CEO Tim Williams in his now infamous letter that Samuel “Sam” Strommen (now, J.D.) while at Knudson Law alleged was an example of “tying” (a federal antitrust violation) were his following remarks.

“Since November we have explore alternative funding sources to enable us to continue funding retail home sales at the level we did in 2008. We have met with large financial institutions including both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Those talks are continuing but at this time we are not optimistic the government sponsored enterprises will be providing immediate relief for the industry.”

Are public officials, the public at large, manufactured housing industry or other professionals to believe, based on what the Federal Register clearly stated – i.e.: that the GSEs did not get loan performance data needed – even after years of such claimed discussions by 21st and the GSEs?

Be that as it may, as a search on MHProNews and MHLivingNews would reveal, there are others who have asserted that Fannie and Freddie did in fact get loan performance data from manufactured housing industry lenders. But those two prominent examples are sufficient to make the point that there is a clear contradiction between what the Federal Register/FHFA notice claimed and what industry professionals have asserted.

f) This industry expert therefor observers that logically this detail – if loan performance data was or was not provided by lenders to the GSEs – must be definitively nailed down to see who, if any, of those who made these quoted claims were either speaking loosely, inaccurately, were paltering, or were perhaps fabricating claims to support a useful narrative. Because some testimony was made to Congress, and some documents (like the Williams/21st letter) were reportedly conveyed using the U.S. Mail and “the wires” (which may involve RICO or other violations of the law), those details should be definitively cleared up.

g) There have been other, perhaps more points that ought to be raised, which were previously raised by MHARR or others. Before pressing deeper further below, some key performance indicators (KPI) data should be considered.

6. Based on information from MHARR, IBTS, MH Merchandiser, MHI, and other sources that cited official data are the following compilations by MHProNews. These tables were not provided by the Federal Register/FHFA market survey.

 

Table 1
Year	Production
1995	344,930
1996	363,345
1997	353,686
1998	373,143
1999	348,075
2000	250,366
1995-2000	2,033,545

Table 2
Year	Production
2001	193,120
2002	165,489
2003	130,815
2004	130,748
2005	146,881
2006	117,373
2007	95,752
2008	81,457
2009	49,683
2010	50,056
2011	51,618
2012	54,881
2013	60,228
2014	64,334
2015	70,544
2016	81,136
2017	92,902
2018	96,555
2019	94,615
2020	94,390
2021	105,772
2022	112,882
2023	89,169
2024	103,314
2025	102,738
2001-2025 Total	2,333,138

Table 3
Manufactured Home Production	National Totals	Average for years shown
1995-2000	2,033,545	338,924
2001-2025	2,436,452	97,458
Average Annual Deficit =		241,466
Table 4		Cumulative 21st Century Deficit
21st Century Annual Deficit in MH Production	241,466 x 25 =	6,036,650

That U.S. housing unit deficit has been calculated by various sources to be from 4 to 10 million (plus/minus) units, depending on the source and their methods. For example, the often-cited National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) said that the deficit or “gap” between the number of affordable housing units needed, and existing affordable housing is some 7.1 million units.

 

 

a) What was the proximate cause for that severe downturn in manufactured housing sales, production, and shipments that has contributed to the multi-million-unit affordable housing shortfall? Quoting Kevin Clayton.

 

 

b) Also quoting Clayton’s remarks to Congress.

“Despite this [chattel loan] performance, the government‐sponsored enterprises (GSEs) have had little involvement and displayed little interest in financing and securitizing manufactured home loans. Less than one percent of GSE business comes from manufactured housing and none of that comes from manufactured home personal property loans.”

c) That remark predates the recent market survey reported by the Federal Register/FHFA by some 15 years. To be clear, that’s not to be construed as an endorsement of Clayton, the company that bears his family’s name, or Berkshire Hathaway. Rather, Clayton’s remarks are an objective piece of testimony that should be considered in an objective fashion. Was Clayton paltering? Was he 100 percent sincere? Was that posturing in service to a useful narrative?

Clayton, Tim Williams/21st, others involved at Berkshire Hathaway, FHFA, Fannie and Freddie are among those who should be called in under oath to testify as to why nearly 18 years after DTS became law still not a single chattel manufactured home loan has been made.  

d) Meanwhile, and in stark contrast the dearth of 21st century chattel lending by the Enterprises since HERA and DTS became law, billions of dollars of financing were provided ‘under the DTS’ program to manufactured home community operators, who often in turn sharply raised their lot rents. Meaning, the purpose of DTS to support affordable housing was arguably turned on its head. Who says? How about the Lincoln Institute’s prior CEO, George McCarthy?

 

 

7. Reasons to question the sincerity of the above remarks by Kevin Clayton include this remark by then fellow MHI member, Andy Gedo with ManageAmerica. What follows in the quote graphic below is another relevant statement by Clayton derived from a video recorded interview by a Berkshire Hathaway friendly Robert Miles. The tension between the above and what follows are factually accurate and evidence-based reasons to question sincerity.

 

 

a) To clarify the tension, Kevin testified to Congress on behalf of MHI (see his testimony and others in the MHI Congressional testimony collection linked here). Kevin Clayton testified to Congress on behalf of MHI, as if he was acting in the best interest of the entire association/industry. Yet, Clayton’s video recorded remarks quoted immediately above and linked in transcripts found here and here, arguably make it clear from his own remarks that the goal of Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) owned brands (think Clayton Homes, 21st Mortgage, Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance (VMF), to name a few). is to “deepen and widen your moat to keep out the competition” and that “some of our competitors do a good job, but our plans are to make that difficult for them.”  Nor is that Clayton freelancing, because Buffett’s views on “the moat” and competition are widely published.

 

 

b) But to further elaborate on Buffett’s view of business is this remark via CNBC by longtime Buffett ally and previous Berkshire Hathaway board member, William “Bill” Gates III.

 

 

c) Note Gates described Buffett’s method as finding “imperfections in” “markets, that’s not value added to society, that’s a zero-sum game that is almost parasitic.” Applying that to manufactured housing lending, one can find causes for concern. Are intelligent people to believe that when Warren Buffett had his own grandson working in the Obama White House after Buffett had campaigned for him and supported Obama-Biden (D), that if Buffett wanted DTS to be implemented for chattel lending that he lacked the access or influence to get that job done? That is logically implausible. Using deductive reasoning and applying the insights from Michael Lebowitz and others who described Buffett as best understood by his behavior rather than a merely surface reading of his words, it is plausible that the failure to implement DTS was not some oversight or missed opportunity on the part of Berkshire owned brands. Rather, it was arguably a strategic choice. Because while scores of manufactured housing companies were failing due to the lack of access to chattel lending that Kevin Clayton himself described to Congress, as was quoted above, Berkshire’s superior capital access was a ‘market imperfection’ (applying Gates’ observation quoted above) that allowed Clayton to consolidate roughly half of the manufactured housing industry’s production after Buffett-led Berkshire bought Clayton Homes. Note such concerns were put to Berkshire board member Ron Olson, J.D., along with others in the Berkshire-MHI orbit and there were no known responses.

 

 

d) Nor are Gedo or MHARR alone in questioning prominent MHI members motivations and behaviors. Doug Ryan, then with CFED which was later rebranded Prosperity Now, made the following pointed allegations some 4 years after Clayton’s testimony to Congress.  The first quote graphic tees up the pro-manufactured housing posture of Ryan/Prosperity Now. The next two, all via Ryan’s op-ed to AmericanBanker, speak for themselves.

 

 

e) MHI wasted little time in responding to Ryan’s antitrust allegations. Ryan published via AmericanBanker on 2.23.2016 and then MHI vice president (now CEO) Lesli Gooch, Ph.D., responded via AmericanBanker on 3.4.2016. Gooch denied the monopolization allegation (see facts-evidence-analysis of both sets of remarks by Ryan and Gooch linked here).

f) Nor was Ryan the only professional to question Clayton-21st-Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance (VMF) and Berkshire’s behavior or motivations. In a report for the Minneapolis Federal Reserve, Donna Feir, Ph.D., said the following.

 

 

g) Recall that Warren Buffett personally addressed the flurry of reporting about evidence of lending misbehavior by Clayton and their Berkshire Hathway owned affiliated finance companies.

 

 

h) But at that time, several members of Congress also expressed concerns which they addressed to the DOJ and CFPB. Recall this occurred while the Obama-Biden (D) Administration was still in office.

 

 

i) Reportedly, some fines were paid, but the larger question of purportedly antitrust violating activities seemed to vanish like a morning mist once exposed to the heat of the sun. From the Democrats House Financial Services Committee press release for the letter cited above was the following.

The top Democrat further noted her fierce opposition to H.R. 650, the “Preserving Access to Manufactured Housing Act,” in 2015 due to concerns raised by the articles, which specifically point to consumer abuses and harmful lending practices in connection with Clayton and its financing subsidiaries. “I opposed H.R. 650 in part because of the allegations that were raised in the investigative series last year. These allegations further underscore the short-sightedness of harmful proposals like H.R. 650 – a measure that would roll back key consumer protections established in Dodd-Frank.

“The CFPB was established to protect consumers from the kind of misconduct alleged in the investigative series and to hold bad actors accountable for dishonest, predatory practices. These disturbing allegations must be addressed immediately by the CFPB and the Department of Justice.”

j) What is the relevance of the above to the FHFA/Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac/DTS topic? It is arguably considerable. Because of the very lack of a secondary market that Kevin Clayton explained to Congress as a key factor why manufactured housing crashed post-2000 was the lack of secondary market liquidity.

Clayton, Williams and others (including MHARR but not limited to them) pointed to the failure of Fannie and Freddie to properly implement DTS lending. Precisely because there was a lack of competition in lending, ‘predatory’ rates and tactics were essentially allowed to exist in the manufactured housing market. Those predatory rates, as Ryan alleged, were connected to MHI, Berkshire Hathaway, and other MHI linked lenders actions/inactions.

k) Buffett himself admitted in a video recorded remarks that the manufactured housing market would benefit if DTS chattel lending was implemented. Note that as part of the analysis linked below were remarks by a pro-Buffett/Charlie Munger/Berkshire author and his researchers, Bud Labitan – who in pages 77-81 of his book “Moats” – specifically considered Clayton’s lending moat in manufactured housing.

 

 

l) Again, for emphasis, are thinking people who grasp the abundant research on the Iron Triangle, the “revolving door,” or the more modern term “AmeRegCorp” and how it applies to DTS and the manufactured housing industry are arguably not paying close enough attention to the details.

 

 

 

m) Because “people are policy,” it isn’t just about ‘following the money trail’ of motivations.  In some (not all) cases, following the people involved in these various moves – along with the motivation (cui bono or ‘who benefits’ from a behavior or lack of action) can paint a vivid picture that tells its own story. Not to get bogged down in the details, but Jim Gray worked for the FHFA. He left and went to work for the Lincoln Institute, which has at times been critical of the FHFA and the GSEs for DTS. Ironic? Or former MHI Vice President Tom Heineman, per some sources deemed reliable, did work for a GSE on their version of the CrossMod program, was contracted by NAMHCO, and now is involved in a CrossMod development. Yet Heinman’s name is one of the former VPs no longer found on the MHI website, in what has been described as an Orwellian “memory hole” method. Why did MHI hire former HUD official Teresa Payne, J.D., after MHI complained several times that HUD was failing to enforce enhanced preemption under the 2000 Reform Law, even though Payne was for some time the point person in the Office of Manufactured Housing Programs (OMHP)? On the surface, that appears to be self-contradictory. But if MHI’s goal is to posture efforts, while allowing regulatory forces to keep manufactured housing underperforming while steady consolidation of the continues, that sort of behavior may begin to make sense.

 

n) With those notions in mind, pivoting back to what Clayton said to Congress – what was the result of a lack of DTS liquidity?

“…the decline in manufactured home sales actually pre‐dates the 2007 housing market crash. The decline in home sales and activity within the manufactured housing market coincides with a number of challenges:

 the growth of subprime lending in the traditional site‐built lending market diminished the affordability advantage of manufactured housing;
 the lack of liquidity and credit in the manufactured housing finance sector has limited financing options for our homebuyers;
 the uncertainty and impact of new financial services and mortgage finance regulations has hindered growth; and,
 slow pace of adoption for new standards within the HUD Code has prevented the manufactured housing industry from remaining on the cutting‐edge of design and
construction.

Like the site‐built housing market, the manufactured housing industry can appreciate the difficulty and uncertainty of operating in a stressed environment. New manufactured home construction has fallen roughly 80 percent over the past decade, which has accounted for more than 160 plant closures, more than 7,500 home center closures, and the loss of over 200,000 jobs. More importantly, thousands of manufactured home customers have been left unable to buy, sell or refinance homes. Without action in the following key areas, the people who live in manufactured homes and whose livelihood is connected to this industry are at significant risk.”

So, while Clayton and Berkshire Hathaway linked lending (and perhaps others involved at MHI) and related behaviors have arguably negatively impacted manufactured housing sales, and thus production and shipments, some of that accountability ought to be laid in the laps of FHFA, Fannie and Freddie.

o) For reasons noted above, some would argue that the Iron Triangle or AmeRegCorp is at work.

 

 

The various parties may be posturing while neither FHFA, the GSEs, or Clayton and associated lending authentically wanted to see more affordable manufactured home lending to occur. The famous John Kenneth Galbraith remark shown below implicates the regulators and the regulated.

 

 

p) Be that as it may, what is beyond question is that this combination of behaviors depressed manufactured housing, and thus affordable housing in the U.S. The annual production tables in #6 above demonstrate how severe the loss of lending impacted manufactured housing. Nor can Clayton easily deny his own words to Congress. Nor can Kevin easily deny his video recorded words to pro-Berkshire Hathaway interviewer Robert Miles.

 

 

q) In that same video where Clayton mimicked Warren Buffett’s “moat” mantra, Clayton bragged that Buffett personally told him he could access plenty of capital for whatever he needed. Video with transcript is below.

 

 

r) Among the questions that should be put to Clayton under oath? While Obama-Biden (D) were in office, why didn’t “Warren” use his influence to get the federal Duty to Serve or “enhanced preemption” under the 2000 Reform Law properly implemented?

 

 

s) The satirical items below overlay hypothetical remarks with actual photos. While that likely never occurred in that fashion, the illustrations nevertheless make points arguably worth exploring, precisely for the reasons this letter develops.

 

 

 

 

t) For decades, there have been researchers, politicos, media and business professionals that have asserted that regulators are often working with corporate interests. Again, this famous quote by John Kenneth Galbraith illustrated a similar point to what was made by Carol Roth in the quote graphic above.

“Moreover, regulatory bodies, like the people who comprise them, have a marked life cycle…after a matter of ten or fifteen years—they become, with some exceptions, either an arm of the industry they are regulating or senile.”

― John Kenneth Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929

 

u) The points made by Roth and Galbraith are vividly illustrated by the following data asserted by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM).

 

 

v. In using Microsoft Bing’s artificial intelligence (AI) powered Copilot, it is fairly common for it to ‘offer’ or suggest a follow up. One of the follow ups by Copilot from 6.25.2025 was this suggestion – an infographic below simplifies what is needed to fix much of what has gone wrong in the manufactured housing industry landscape. It can be summed up in four words: “Robustly Enforce Existing Laws.”

 

 

w. Note that it was Copilot that pointed to the need to enforce antitrust, RICO as well as other laws. In #12 below, pay close attention to what MHARR’s Mark Weiss wrote to Don Layton while he was CEO at Fannie Mae. Note there have been an array of serious researchers who have directly and/or obliquely pointed to evidence of potential antitrust violations. In recent years, that has been given ‘new legs’ through a national class action antitrust lawsuit. More about that ongoing litigation further below, because it too is in some ways linked to the lack of proper enforcement of existing laws, including DTS. That said, here are a sample of evidence of antitrust allegations by serious researchers looking into manufactured housing. Note that a common thread is that much of this is 21st century related. A WORD search of the first research report below only mentions DTS once, but it is focused on manufactured housing lending and Berkshire Hathaway’s role in it. Note that in presenting these research reports, this writer for MHProNews is not implying that their research is perfect. Each article unpacks the pluses and minuses of each manufactured housing industry research document.

 

More examples of antitrust concerns will follow further below.

x. With the intersection of those facts, evidence and analytical (FEA) observations yields is the following measurable impacts.

 

8.

REVISED
Table 3
Manufactured Home Production	National Totals	Average for years shown
1995-2000	2,033,545	338,924
2001-2025	2,333,138	93,326
Average Annual Deficit =		245,598
Table 4		Cumulative 21st Century Deficit
21st Century Annual Deficit in MH Production	245,598 x 25 =	6,139,950

 

The affordable housing crisis has been described by Google’s artificial intelligence (AI) powered Gemini as a “man made crisis.” One should keep in mind that AIs are considered to be adept at pattern recognition.  From the human recognition side, Shelterforce held a webinar that discussed “Bringing Fannie and Freddie Back to Mission” which used the phrase “the illusion of competition.”

 

The Underserve Mortgage Markets Coalition (UMMC) includes at least two longtime MHI members. MHI seems to like to sign onto coalition letters with conventional housing trade groups. Given that coalition propensity, why did MHI fail to sign onto the UMMC effort to compel the Biden-Harris (D) era FHFA to enforce the Duty to Serve for chattel lending? Given that MHI seems to like signing onto coalition letters, why did they avoid signing onto one that encouraged the Biden-Harris (D) era FHFA to provide chattel lending under DTS? Hold that thought.

 

9. What follows is another example of such a stark disconnect between MHI-linked firms’ words, deeds and the statements in the Federal Register. Recall that MHProNews was given a tip by a MHI insider that Tim Williams told a room of MHI members that he was “happy” that the GSEs pilot had “failed.”

 

 

Additionally, BIS.org researchers Sebastian Doerr and Adreas Fuster essentially asserted that the industry’s reliance on more costly Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) owned firms (21st and VMF) kept buyers out of the manufactured housing market. Applying the “price out” concept from the NAHB’s annual report to the effect of higher cost lending arguably supports Doerr’s and Fuster’s documented concerns.

 

 

MHProNews has previously reported that around the 200k unit annual production mark, it is anticipated that more HUD Code home producers and other possible competitors to Clayton or the Big Three Cs (Clayton-Champion-Cavco) would be encouraged to enter manufactured housing. By implication, so long as the manufactured home industry hovers around 100k annual shipments that low level of production would serve as a barrier for entry, persistence, and exit.

 

 

10. According to BIS.org researchers “Affordable housing, unaffordable credit? Concentration and high-cost lending for manufactured homes” by Sebastian Doerr and Andreas Fuster were the following.

“The market for manufactured home loans…despite its importance and size, the market structure and lending conditions for manufactured home loans have received little attention from academic researchers, in contrast to the mortgage market for site-built homes.”

“This paper provides novel evidence that the market for manufactured home loans is characterized by substantial market concentration that contributes to high interest rates when compared to mortgages on site-built properties.”

“We then show that market concentration is a key driver of higher interest rates on manufactured home loans. Our results also highlight the role of integrated (“captive”) lenders as a potential driver of the link between market concentration and interest rates.

The HMDA data provide a wealth of information on lenders, applicants, and loan terms.”

a) Note that Doerr and Fuster pointed to the “wealth of information” on “lenders, applicants, and loan terms.” Once more for emphasis, how can Fannie and Freddie have missed other possible ways to sus out what was necessary to make DTS chattel lending happen, even if they were given incomplete or insufficient information from MHI members?

b) As a note of caution regarding that BIS.org report, as MHProNews previously reported, Doerr’s and Fuster’s paper does have some apparent glitches. That said, a similar observation could be made about several research documents, regardless of source. With those housekeeping observations noted, Doerr’s and Fuster’s observation that “market concentration is a key driver of higher interest rates on manufactured home loans. Our results also highlight the role of integrated (“captive”) lenders as a potential driver of the link between market concentration and interest rates” makes a point that is well supported by other sources. That market concentration is fostered in part by the lack of DTS lending (or for that matter, from a similarly dormant FHA Title I loan program). Be that by market reality a matter of accident and/or design, the effect is the same.

11. Without DTS lending, that BIS.org research confirms the point made by the Federal Register notice. Namely, that tens of thousands of customers a year are paying more for financing than they may otherwise be paying.

12. Let us pivot back to the Freddie Mac CEO Don Layton and a 3.4.2018 letter to him from MHARR. Quoting.

“After nearly a decade of baseless, unjustified, prejudicial and damaging delays (particularly for the smaller industry businesses which MHARR represents), DTS implementation plans for both Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae were finally submitted to – and approved by – the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in late 2017.  As both Freddie Mac and FHFA are well aware, however, MHARR has been – and continues to be – a highly critical and active opponent of these plans, which are not only ten years too late, but are grossly insufficient and inadequate to meet the policy objectives of DTS, based on their failure to provide, at any time within their three-year terms, market-significant secondary market and securitization support for the chattel loans which comprise more than 80% of the manufactured housing market.”

“…MHARR, as a participant in Freddie Mac’s “Manufactured Housing Initiative Task Force” (MHIT), has learned that Freddie Mac apparently plans to divert an unspecified portion of its already minimal and wholly inadequate support of the manufactured housing market under DTS to a so-called “new class” of manufactured homes which is currently being researched and developed on an exclusionary, proprietary basis by the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI), under the direction and authority of a control group comprised, in relevant part, of executives of the industry’s three largest manufacturers.”

“…At a February 26, 2018 telephone conference meeting of the MHIT, Freddie Mac representative, Ms. Simone Beatty, indicated, for the first time, that Freddie Mac plans to pursue implementation of a “pilot program” — on an expedited basis (i.e., during June and July 2018) — for loans on an undefined “new class” of manufactured homes, apparently based on the exclusionary (i.e., limited to MHI members) / proprietary MHI “new class” of manufactured home research and development activity.”

“First, no such program was included in the 2018-2020 DTS implementation plan submitted by Freddie Mac — and approved by FHFA – and, as such, would be ultra vires and unlawful.  Second, diverting any portion whatsoever of DTS support to a proprietary product that is developed and manufactured on an exclusive or exclusionary basis by one group of competitors and not generally available or accessible to other industry producers, would be a knowing and intentionally anti-competitive action by Freddie Mac which, again, would be opposed by MHARR by any and all available means. Third, the diversion of any portion whatsoever of DTS manufactured housing support to a “new class” of homes with a reported retail cost as high as $220,000.00 instead of existing types of manufactured housing, which are inherently affordable for very low-, low- and moderate-income American families without the need for costly government subsidies, would violate the letter, intent and fundamental purpose of DTS — to expand the availability of inherently affordable homeownership for all Americans — while simultaneously relegating existing types of HUD Code manufactured homes to de facto “second class” status for purposes of financing and all other matters, with entirely predictable anti-competitive and highly damaging impacts.”

“MHARR, by copy of this letter, is advising Fannie Mae, FHFA, Congress, and relevant Executive Branch agencies of its strenuous objections to any action by Freddie Mac to divert any portion of its DTS activity to such a “new class” of manufactured homes and reserves all of its rights to take any and all necessary further actions.  In addition, MHARR demands:

1. That it be advised of – and included in — any and all further discussions, meetings, or conferences of any type or description involving the supposed “new class” of manufactured home and DTS;
2. That it be provided any and all documents, meeting summaries, minutes, or other documents describing discussions of a “new class” of manufactured home and any party outside of Freddie Mac, including notes of telephone or other discussions maintained by Freddie Mac employees;
3. That MHARR be provided with any and all materials received by Freddie Mac from any source with respect to the supposed “new class” of manufactured home; and
4. That it be provided with any recording, or written transcript, or summary of the February 26, 2018 MHIT meeting produced by or on behalf of Freddie Mac.

For Freddie Mac, after ten years of inaction on DTS, followed by a blatantly inadequate DTS implementation plan, to now even consider diverting any aspect or portion of DTS to a “new class” of proprietary, high-priced, non-affordable manufactured home, is indefensible, inexcusable, in direct defiance of DTS, and unacceptable.

Sincerely,
Mark Weiss
President and CEO

cc:  Hon. Michael Crapo
Hon. Sherrod Brown
Hon. Jeb Hensarling
Hon. Maxine Waters
Hon. Jeff Sessions
Hon. Mick Mulvaney
Hon. Gary Cohn
Hon. Melvin Watt”

MHARR and others have asked not only Layton and the GSEs to provide meeting minutes with respect to what was later rebranded by MHI as CrossMod^TM manufactured homes, but also wanted meeting minutes provided by MHI and their larger member firms that were reportedly involved in the creation of the ‘new class of manufactured homes‘ that later became CrossMod.

That said, there has been no known production of such meeting minutes and related ‘behind closed doors’ documents produced. That arguably should occur, but should not be used as an excuse to further delay DTS chattel lending enforcement. One key point that must be repeatedly stressed is this. The evidence that the Enterprises could now, and could have years ago, established a successful and sustainable secondary market for manufactured housing has been known for years, as several of the linked reports and articles document.

 

13. Don’t Reward the Arsonist Posing as a Firefighter. There have been an array of reporting and researchers who have cited the lack of retail financing as a cause for the manufactured home industry’s sharp decline since the mid-to-late 1990s. Kevin Clayton was cited above on that topic. The now late Sam Zell, the chairman of Equity LifeStyle Properties (ELS) said that the industry should have secured a source of retail financing years ago and that was a serious impediment to growth. Those remarks were made at an MHI National Communities Council (NCC) meeting held in Chicago, IL. ELS is routinely cited as one of the two largest land lease manufactured home community (MHC) operators in the U.S.  ELS has also long held a seat on the board of directors of MHI, including on their Executive Committee, and MHI’s current chairman is Patrick Waite, ELS’ Chief Operating Officer (COO). Dating back to 2004, MHI president and CEO Chris Stinebert cited manufactured home lending related woes as part of the industry’s challenges. There is no question that MHI has well understood the problem that a lack of financing has caused the industry.

 

 

a) During the IBISWorld/Derek Thompson/The Atlantic controversy cited above, Doug Gorman – one of the ‘surviving’ retailers in the manufactured home industry at the time and that state association’s delegate to MHI – periodically would weigh in on industry topics. Clearly Gorman was in the MHI orbit. But Gorman cited MHARR’s Mark Weiss in a guest column to MHProNews.  Said Gorman: “I can’t improve on what Mark Weiss [MHARR President and CEO] has indicated below:”

“While MHARR does not claim to speak for the entire industry, we have made it clear that after years of abuse by federal regulators acting contrary to the law and empowering entrenched revenue-driven contractors to target the industry, the new era of regulatory deconstruction being ushered-in by the Trump Administration offers a profound opportunity that must not be missed or squandered.  And while other segments of the industry – following their recent meeting – have not given any public indication of a change in course, direction or approach based on this new reality, MHARR has been on top of this critical matter since the November election, and has already put in place fundamental priorities and policies that I am happy to share with you and the rest of the industry as shown below:

1. Elevate and include manufactured housing in all HUD (and other federal) housing and housing finance programs on the same terms as other types of housing; ..

5. Demand and ensure securitization and secondary market support for manufactured home chattel loans in a significant and timely manner by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, so that consumers are not needlessly either excluded from the housing market or unnecessarily forced into higher-cost loans within a less-than-fully-competitive consumer financing market.”

b) In another guest column to MHProNews, one focused on the IBISWorld related dustup, Gorman said the following. Keep in mind that this was in 2011. The following are pull quotes authored by Gorman and posted at this link here.

“Having spent 40 years in the industry, I have experienced every down cycle the industry has had since they started keeping records in 1961. After a peak nationally of almost 600,000 units in 1973, we suffered a dramatic plunge that was felt the most in the Southeast where I was located at the time. I relocated to Oklahoma in the 1980s and endured a drop in shipments from about 13,000 homes in 1983 to about 350 or so in 1988. Shipments again took a hit in the early 1990s as lending became almost nonexistent. The current down cycle began after a peak of nearly 373,000 shipments nationally in 1998 and has fallen below 50,000, which is lower than when the record keeping began in 1961.”

“I certainly do not have the credentials to refute the recent IBIS report that labeled the manufactured housing industry as being on the verge of extinction. I also approach the subject with some trepidation as I majored in Marketing and I am keenly aware that most of the buggy whip manufacturers are no longer in business. …”

“…We have had to endure ongoing discrimination of the allocation of lending resources even when the Duty to Serve language is rewritten to specifically cite manufactured housing. As a retailer, I do not see any shortage of willing buyers for the homes that we build. We do experience a series of problems related to recent acts foisted upon us by the federal government. ”

“I observed in a LinkedIn comment earlier that our industry trade organization, the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) is constricted by the composition of their membership from assuming the role of a being a strong advocate for individual industry divisions. Retailers would have to form an independent organization dedicated to retailers in order to have someone in Washington, DC truly going to bat on all the issues that retailers face. I don’t see the numbers or the money being there for that to happen. In the mean time, we accept MHI with its wrinkles, knowing that the diversity of the membership does not allow for the extreme dedication to our needs that we would like to have.

The Manufactured Housing Association for Regulation and Reform (MHARR) serves in that capacity for independent manufacturers and manufacturers need that dedicated representation as they have many issues affecting them that are completely unknown to other industry segments.

Another theory being floated by some industry members is that a conspiracy is in play to undermine the effectiveness that the HUD Code provides and bring about its demise. If that theory is true and if the conspirators have enough influence, market demand will not matter. I am not smart enough to know whether or not a conspiracy exists to destroy our industry. I would say that if it does exist, it is experiencing reasonable success.”

“…As an industry, we have taken a beating for the last twelve years. Some of that has been our own doing and some from lack of fairness by government actions or inactions. If a conspiracy does in fact exist, I am too small a player to have much impact on stopping it. Absent a conspiracy, our company plans to move forward and provide our clients with great values in housing and outstanding customer service. Hopefully our industry can see itself through the balance of any remaining down turn and see an increase in shipments in the years ahead.”

c) That was the spring of 2011. Gorman wove several telling points into his op-ed. In no particular order of importance.

d) There was plenty of demand for manufactured homes. As a street retail with a long history of success, with reportedly good customer relations and widely respected in manufactured housing, Gorman was worth quoting and publishing, even when this writer (at that time) did not fully grasp the significance of his “conspiracy” point. After all, that was Gorman’s take.

e) Gorman tied together MHI’s “wrinkles,” the lack of a retail focused trade group, a point that MHARR has previously cited in one of their white papers, and the notion of a conspiracy within the manufactured housing industry. A conspiracy to do what? Quoting Gorman again for emphasis and clarity.

“Another theory being floated by some industry members is that a conspiracy is in play to undermine the effectiveness that the HUD Code provides and bring about its demise. If that theory is true and if the conspirators have enough influence, market demand will not matter.”

f) It wasn’t Gorman, but during a Tunica Manufactured Housing Show, a group of street retailers approached me with a complaint. Let’s note that within a few months of the launch of what was later rebranded as MHProNews, this publication was and remains the largest and most read trade media serving the manufactured home industry. With that brief context, it was no surprise that retailers would sound off to me in a semi-private setting (we were all between the hotel and the housing display, with no one at that time in the immediate vicinity of their remarks to me). They clearly indicated that in their view I wasn’t doing enough as a manufactured home industry publisher to point out the underlying reasons why there was so little success at getting existing federal laws – think DTS or the “enhanced preemption” promised by rarely enforced by HUD and not mentioned for years on the MHI website – while both topics were routine fare on MHARR’s website. The point of these anecdotal pieces of evidence is this. It was in hindsight that several remarks by Gorman, other retailers, other individuals or organizations in or beyond MHI and in or beyond manufactured housing that several pieces of the long, puzzling downturn of manufactured housing began to be clarified in my own mind. Meaning, it is one thing to allege a conspiracy within manufactured housing to limit and hobble the industry. Opinions can be a dime a dozen. But opinions with facts and evidence, that should be treated in a different matter.

 

 

g) NAMHCO was mentioned previously. The National Association of Manufactured Housing Community Owners (NAMHCO) was a trade group launched by two breakaway state associations who left MHI for the reasons noted below.

 

h) MHARR enthusiastically supported the launch of NAMHCO, hoping it may lead to better advocacy in favor of getting existing federal laws properly enforced.

 

 

i) However, NAMHCO received swift pushback from within the MHI orbit. Curiously, NAMHCO hired an ex-MHI vice president, Tom Heinemann to be its lobbyist in Washington, D.C.  Per a source deemed reliable, Heinemann had done some consulting for a GSE on what became the market-failed but MHI-Clayton Homes (BRK)-Champion Homes (SKY)-Cavco Industries (CVCO) backed CrossMod concept.

 

 

j) NAMHCO arguably revived interest in what Gorman floated, the need for a retailer-focused national trade group. The MH Idea was the previous national retailer organization brainchild of Bob Crawford and Dick Moore, both with Dick Moore Housing at that time.

 

 

k) Now, notice this evidence and behavior pattern. There were independent retailers and community operators that were complaining that MHI was not doing enough to get DTS (and/or enhanced preemption, a GoRVing style image/education campaign, the DOE energy rule, etc.) into effect. Yet, MHI claimed to be advocating on all of these issues. A manufactured home industry finance expert, Marty Lavin, J.D. would also periodically weigh in on such issues via MHProNews. Lavin was a regular figure for years on various MHI committees, and won a ‘lifetime achievement award’ from MHI. But as of this April 2026 search of the MHI website indicates, Lavin was one of the ‘unpersons’ that had been ‘memory holed’ in an apparently Orwellian fashion. Why did this one-time MHI winner of their Tataro award get expunged from their website? There is an evidence-based case to be made that Lavin had become an MHI critic. While he phrased it differently than some of the other critics of MHI cited above, there is apparent overlap. The lack of financing, more specifically a DTS secondary market that would make for lower cost and more abundant lending, were issues on these industry professionals minds. MHI leaders like Kevin Clayton, Tim William/21st Mortgage and the late billionaire Sam Zell were among those who had acknowledged that issue.

 

 

l) Lavin advocated for industry professionals to “Pay more attention to what people are doing than what they are saying.” Meaning, actions are more important than deeds. Without using the phrase “paltering” or “posturing” or behavior for the sake of optics, that is what Lavin was drawing attention to in the industry’s dynamics, and thus at least by inference, to MHI.

 

 

 

m) Notice that Lavin won the “Tataro Award,” an award the Tim Williams/21st Mortgage Corporation (BRK-Clayton Homes sister brand) has also received from MHI. Further above, Williams’ alleged role in hobbling the retail financing in manufactured housing still further by cutting off much of the new HUD Code manufactured home chattel lending from non-Clayton Homes linked retailers. This was alleged by Samuel Strommen to be a tying antitrust violation.

 

 

• Manufactured housing has dramatically lower lending options, as the CFPB and the Federal Register/FHFA market survey above documented.
• Manufactured housing faces more zoning/placement barriers than conventional housing does.
• Manufactured housing is misunderstood, as several MHI members have openly admitted, yet the MHI trade association has never launched a GoRVing style campaign that their own research said was necessary?

n) As Lavin aptly put it, you get more of what you encourage and less of what you discourage. Manufactured home production has fallen due in large measure to the lack of practical encouragement by public officials and multiple publicly traded firms who are routinely MHI members.

 

 

o) Or as Mark Weiss, J.D., President and CEO of MHARR has put it, there is an apparent push to consolidate the manufactured home industry. Lack of lending, lack of zoning/placement opportunities, allowing a lack of image and education or the DOE energy rule were all apparent aspects of behavior that contributed to consolidation.

 

 

p) But beyond that pushback from an array of sources cited and linked here, is the national class action antitrust lawsuit launched on behalf of residents in manufactured home communities. Those ‘hostage’ residents in ‘predatory’ MHCs are arguably at risk precisely because existing federal laws – including DTS but not limited to DTS – are not being properly enforced.

 

 

q) Note that a multi-year MHI member brand Murex Properties and defendant in that antitrust case, see the pleadings and related evidence in the report linked above, has offered to enter into a settlement agreement that would supposedly provide more evidence and testimony. That testimony may (see the above and below) involve MHI, in much of the manner that Strommen, Ryan, MHARR and others have alleged. It may be known by September of 2026 what Murex will (or won’t) share.

 

 

r) But the point is that an array of sources has alleged similar or overlapping details. This is arguably why third-party AIs, once they are exposed to some of this research, have come to the conclusion that MHI is acting – as Strommen, MHARR and others alleged – in a fashion that is meant to consolidate the industry. Nor is that mere theory, when the member brands themselves have stated that consolidation is part of their business model. That can hardly be said to be a mere ‘conspiracy theory’ when it is supported by evidence that includes the very words and behaviors of those so accused of collusion to limit the industry.

s) This would arguably not have been possible UNLESS the FHFA (or HUD, etc.) had failed to enforce existing laws. James Schmitz Jr. and his Federal Reserve systems research points to related antitrust issues and noted that the intersection of HUD and NAHB advocacy (keep in mind that Clayton, Champion, and Cavco are all NAHB members) is benefiting the business model adopted by firms like ELS, Sun Communities, Flagship Communities, and MHI’s dominating lenders, producers and vertically integrated retailers. What the late Doug Gorman said he wasn’t ‘qualified’ to argue, these outsiders looking into manufactured housing have built that argument ‘for’ Gorman and others similarly harmed.

 

t) AIs are said to be good at fraud detection and pattern recognition. With that in mind, the following from AI powered Copilot (Microsoft), Gemini (Google) and xAI’s Grok.

 

 

Three different AIs, all provided with similar inputs (prompts, inquiries, evidence, etc.) and each of them arriving at very similar conclusions. Why? In part, because MHProNews and MHLivingNews have taken the time to organize and understand such third-party research, internal industry allegations, and regulatory filings and pleadings, plus the remarks of MHI members and corporate officials and see how those intersect or overlap.

u) Given multiple opportunities to directly respond to MHProNews or via their own website, social media, or op-eds, and noting that Gooch has responded publicly at times (to Ryan and to the ‘tone’ – but not the substance – of Schmitz/Ohanian), the silence by MHI is itself revealing, according to Gemini. Gemini has said that MHI appears to be engaged in “bait and switch tactics” as well as “strategic avoidance” in failing to respond to critiques that are supported by an abundance of evidence.

 

 

v) Because this primary writer for MHProNews has for years directly contacted MHI corporate or senior staff for remarks, replies, or rebuttals and has for years in the postscript of articles also invited responses, it is simply not plausible that MHI does not know the allegations and evidence against them. This matters because MHI in their IRS 990 filings have for years claimed that they want ‘industry growth’ and seem to say similar things to MHARR, but when carefully examined in the manner of this letter and related research and reporting, those claims fall apart. AIs notice these patterns and respond according to the evidence. Or as Gemini put it in the second linked item below, it went from ‘skepticism to corroboration.’ The evidence is abundant. There is no known direct refutation of this evidence.

 

 

w) Note that doesn’t automatically imply that some federal officials at offices like the FHFA, HUD or DOE are or have necessarily colluded with MHI leaders to limit their market. It may be a case that several factors, like NAHB influence cited by Schmitz et al, are giving federal officials a reason to turn a blind eye to what MHARR asks for while MHI postures one thing, but is apparently largely in line with what the NAHB or others who compete against manufactured housing may want. Some of this has been raised by Rachel Cohen Booth in her article on Vox about the pending federal legislation, which cited both MHARR and MHI, and quoted CEO Lesli Gooch.

 

x) Once someone understands that federal laws exist that ought to be benefiting manufactured housing, and by extension affordable housing seekers and smaller independent businesses alike, but that those laws magically never seem to get implemented properly, be it DTS, “enhanced preemption” of the DOE energy rule, and once one grasps that those barriers to entry, persistence, and exit all tend to benefit MHI’s consolidators, that pattern becomes more difficult to unsee.

 

 

y) This oligopoly style of monopolization has arguably been supported by Zell’s remark during an earnings call, shown below. Note Zell’s ELS is a defendant in that national antitrust class action lawsuit, as is ELS owned Datacomp.

 

z) Strommen specifically called out MHI, and several of their leading brands by name, as being apparently involved in a “felony” antitrust scheme that is “both blatant and subtle…”

 

 

The image of rewarding the arsonist (of more affordable lending for manufactured housing) for the sake of consolidation of the industry due to higher barriers of entry, persistence and exit is demonstrably a useful one. Industry consolidation has been used as an implied punchline by MHI board member and former MHI chairman Nathan Smith during a video interview with MHProNews.

 

 

Indeed, there ought to be a name search on the MHProNews and MHLivingNews websites of several individuals and their respective organization. When the behaviors, past or more recent, of those individuals and firms are grasped, it is a wonder that MHI has not already been shut down due to it being an apparent hotbed of problematic behaviors.  A few examples of names beyond those already mentioned (like Lesli Gooch, whose history is so curious that one might wonder how she was hired with such problematic allegations involving her professionally, or was she hired because of the problematic allegations involving her?) Joseph “Joe” Stegmayer, Yes! Communities, Frank Rolfe and Dave Reynolds, are just some examples. But perhaps the icing on the cake that practically screams of MHI’s actual, vs. claimed, behavior and motivations is found in their advocacy for what on 7.6.2026 is the still unsigned by President Donald J. Trump (R) federal housing legislation. While MHI claims to be in favor of DTS, enhanced preemption, why didn’t they sign onto the proposed MHARR amendments?

 

 

 

That said, let’s note that MHI membership should not be automatically construed to mean that problematic behavior and MHI membership go hand in glove. That would be going to far. As examples of an MHI member that has demonstrated their respective abilities for organizations far smaller than either of the Enterprises – which are not accused of antitrust violations – that originate and sustainably service manufactured housing loans, UMH Properties and Legacy Housing are worth exploring. That said, Champion Homes (SKY) and Cavco Industries (CVCO) are each vertically integrated firms that include production, financing and retail operations. The ability of vertically integrated Clayton, Champion, and Cavco were observed by Sam Strommen as leading to the ‘collapsing’ of the prior top 10 HUD Code builders in 1998 into the top 3 by 2020. Strommen specifically pointed out the woes related to DTS and FHFA in the context of his 130+ footnoted concerns in the course of 17 pages of evidence and arguments.

 

 

14. What Various Artificial Intelligence (AI) Platforms Said in Response to Evidence Like that Presented and Linked Herein

Before diving into the findings of various AIs with respect to the concerns raised above, let’s note that researchers have said that AIs are no better than the inputs (prompts, questions, evidence etc.) provided to it and no better than the programmers involved in a given AI. Or as the time-honored programmer’s mantra proclaims, “Garbage In, Garbage Out.” (GIGO) That said, Good In, Good Out. Garbage In, Garbage Out.

 

 

a) That GIGO point noted, what can make the proper and objective use of AI useful in such a letter and in doing such related research is simple. AI can digest a large amount of information in a matter of seconds to minutes and then provide a set of linked findings (if so asked) that can mimic academic style rigor when it comes to fact-evidence-analysis (FEA) checks.

 

 

Note that MHProNews does not normally ask AIs to do spell-checks or grammar checks (as a reasonable look at this writer’s work will readily reveal 😉. Rather, the focus of the use of AIs is specifically to see how well the thesis of a given article (or in this case, comments letter) stands up to scrutiny.

b) From the input-inquiry process with xAI’s Grok found at this link here that included Grok’s linked share plus screen shot documentation for accuracy was the following findings.

Executive Summary: The draft FHFA comments letter by L.A. “Tony” Kovach presents a detailed, evidence-based critique of the GSEs’ (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac) and FHFA’s implementation of the Duty to Serve (DTS) mandate for manufactured home chattel lending under the 2008 Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA). Using Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA), it links chronic underproduction in manufactured housing (sharp post-1990s decline, persistent ~241k annual deficit) to financing barriers, contrasting this with debunked myths, successful private lending examples, and apparent contradictions in official claims about data availability.

Key FEA threads: Decades of third-party research (Freddie Mac, Urban Institute, HUD) affirm modern HUD Code homes’ quality, appreciation, and affordability potential. Yet denial rates (65.6% for chattel vs. 8.8% site-built) and higher rates create a “financing gap.” Kovach’s expertise (1980s retail roots, consulting for MHI-linked firms) and MHProNews’ track record frame this as policy failure enabling consolidation (“moat” strategies per Buffett/Clayton quotes). The letter argues robust DTS enforcement could add ~1.29M homes/decade via free-market solutions.

Occam’s Razor Application: The simplest explanation aligning with evidence is that insufficient enforcement of DTS (despite law, pilots, private success, and data from lenders like 21st Mortgage/VMF) has limited industry growth, benefiting consolidators while harming independent producers, consumers, and the broader affordable housing supply. This is cohesive and stands up to scrutiny: claims of “insufficient data” conflict with documented lender performance, GSE resources for trillions in conventional lending, and public testimony. It is fair to say this is more than mere speculation—Copilot and peers have affirmed the grounded FEA; it rests on verifiable production data, quotes, research, and contradictions.

Tables for Clarity:

Table 1: Manufactured Home Production Trends (MHARR/MHProNews compilations) (Showing pre- vs. post-downturn averages) 1995-2000 Avg: ~338,924 units/year 2001-2025 Avg: ~97,458 units/year Annual Deficit: ~241,466 units Cumulative 21st Century Deficit: ~6M+ units (contributing to 4-10M national affordable gap)

MHProNews KPI context

Table 2: Financing Barriers (per Federal Register quotes in draft) Chattel Denial Rate: 65.6% (vs. 8.8% site-built) Avg Rate: 9.24% chattel (vs. 6.63% traditional) Impact: Offsets lower home price; limits ~129k+ units/year potential.

Disconnect on Data: Yes, fair critique. GSEs/FHFA claim insufficient data constrained pilots, yet:

• Lenders (Cascade, Triad, 21st, VMF, Oxford, UMH, Legacy) profitably originate chattel loans for years.
• GSEs handle trillions in conventional; Dworkin (ex-Fannie) expressed confidence.
• Doerr/Fuster-style research and private performance data exist.
• Clayton/21st testimony claimed engagement, contradicting “no data.” This suggests excuses over execution. Urban Institute on liquidity/appreciation.

Limiting Industry & Consolidation: Yes, significant factor. Post-2000 crash predated broader crisis; chattel liquidity dried up, enabling “moat” via financing control (per Clayton/Buffett quotes, Gedo critique). MHI orbit critiques (MHARR, Ryan op-ed) align: barriers favor big players (Clayton market share dominance). Draft evidences how DTS non-enforcement + zoning/DOE issues compound this. MHARR Illusion of Motion. Ryan American Banker.

Evidence-Based Argument: Yes—the draft coheres. It cites Federal Register, historical production (MHARR/IBTS), third-party research (Freddie Mac mythbusters, Urban Institute, HUD 2011 appreciation, Genz/Fannie), insider quotes (Clayton testimony vs. moat remarks), and antitrust hints (Strommen, Ryan). Links provide auditability. No major internal contradictions; tensions (e.g., MHI claims vs. outcomes) are highlighted as red flags.

Conclusion: Per Occam’s Razor and FEA, the draft robustly argues DTS failure as a core 21st-century limiter, fueling consolidation over organic growth. Robust enforcement aligns with law, data, and public need—potentially closing much of the affordable gap without heavy subsidies. Policymakers should demand sworn clarification on data/pilots. Full draft: PDF Link.

This FEA supports pursuing accountability for sustainable chattel DTS.

— Once again, this human in the loop (HITL) transparently provided and auditable full thread that resulted in the above is found at this link here. —

c) The initial response by Google’s Gemini is found here as is the follow up by this writer and Gemini’s revised response. The reasons for the follow up Q&A could be briefly summarized as overstating the impact of DTS in its initial response. The full and auditable thread is transparently provided here which included links to supportive findings. Gemini confirmed the accuracy of that PDF documented thread here.

 

This stand-alone Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) serves as a refined evaluation of the human intelligence (HI) pre-publication draft comments letter authored by L. A. “Tony” Kovach for submission to the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) under RIN 2590-AB64.

The current FHFA rulemaking notice (published June 24, 2026, with comments closing July 24, 2026) aims to replace the Enterprise Duty to Serve (DTS) regulations with an outcome-based framework. This updated analysis calibrates the economic impacts and multi-variable market headwinds, adjusting for a balanced perspective on consumer math and supply barriers.

Executive Summary

• Cohesiveness & Multi-Layered Headwinds: Applying Occam’s Razor, the 21st-century depression of the manufactured housing market is not driven by a single point of failure, but rather by an intersecting pair of structural barriers: a financing bottleneck (lack of a GSE chattel secondary market wrapper) and a placement bottleneck (zoning and local land restrictions). This multi-variable explanation is highly cohesive and explains the industry’s ongoing underperformance.

• “More than Mere Speculation”: The draft’s primary premise—that federal inaction from the GSEs and HUD artificially constrains the market—is backed by historical records, Congressional testimonies, economic briefs, and independent data. It is firmly grounded in empirical realities rather than speculation.

• Refined Economic Nuance: While chattel lending constraints and uncompetitive higher interest rates create a significant financing gap, they do not completely erase the inherent cost-advantage of factory-built housing. Historical payment tracking demonstrates that even with uncompetitive loan terms, manufactured homes remain a clear net-savings alternative to renting or site-built purchases; the structural bottleneck simply compresses the scale of who can access that affordability.

Analytical Matrix Tables

Table 1: Refined Market Performance and Macroeconomic Disconnects

Documented Claim / Fact	Supporting Source / Evidence	Economic Analysis & Implications
High Denial & Interest Rates	FHFA Market Survey / Federal Register Vol. 91, No. 120 (June 24, 2026)	Financing Bottleneck: Constrained access to sustainable credit perpetuates reliance on higher-cost options, driving an artificial financing gap.
Partial Cost Offset (Not Total)	Fannie Mae Historical Cost Comparison Data / NAR (Gay Cororaton Research)	The Value Proposition Holds: Higher interest rates inflate monthly payments, but the lower initial purchase price means manufactured homes still yield net savings over renting or site-built purchases. The headwind diminishes consumer buying power but does not fully neutralize the home’s baseline affordability.
Suppressed Production Deficit	Official Industry Data (MHARR, IBTS, MHI, MH Merchandiser compilations)	Average annual production dropped from 338,924 (1995–2000) to 97,458 (2001–2025). This drop was triggered by the 2000 chattel collapse but is sustained long-term by ongoing placement barriers.
Debunked Depreciation Myths	Urban Institute (Research Briefs), Fannie Mae Single Family, HUD (2011)	Validates that appreciation is real and steady when structures are financed securely; secondary-market illiquidity for older structures remains the true depressant on resale values.

Table 2: The Dual-Engine Bottleneck (Financing vs. Placement)

Primary Headwind	Primary Systemic Impact	Documented Market Reality / Voices
The Financing Barrier (DTS Inaction)	Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have not purchased a single chattel loan under DTS, despite chattel being designated an “extra-credit” opportunity for years. This eliminates competitive secondary market liquidity.	FHFA’s 2026 Proposed Rule admits these gaps “have constrained borrower access… and restricted consumer choice.”
The Placement Barrier (Zoning & Local Land Restraints)	Discriminatory local zoning ordinances, restrictive covenants, and local bans block factory-built homes from being placed on private lots in high-demand areas.	Industry leaders (e.g., Curt Hodgson) and independent watchdogs like MHARR repeatedly emphasize that the absolute inability to place a home in a given jurisdiction is the definitive headwind capping industry volume.

Table 3: The Core Corporate Contradiction (“The Moat”)

Entity / Representative	On-the-Record Statement	Conflicting Strategy / Behavioral Analysis
Kevin Clayton (CEO, Clayton Homes / MHI Testimony)	“MHI and its members have long demonstrated to rating agencies, investors, Fannie, Freddie… that manufactured housing lenders operate within a disciplined lending environment.”	Directly undercuts the GSE assertion that chattel expansion is paralyzed by “insufficient data.” If operations are historically disciplined, the technical excuse is invalid.
Tim Williams (President/CEO, 21st Mortgage Corp.)	Indicated to the market that despite ongoing talks, they were “not optimistic the government sponsored enterprises will be providing immediate relief.”	Fits standard antitrust analysis (e.g., Strommen / Knudson Law) regarding capital advantages; proprietary portfolio lenders capture market share while independent rivals face capital starvation.
Warren Buffett (CEO, Berkshire Hathaway)	Publicly stated that he makes “no apologies whatsoever about Clayton’s lending” practices.	Highlights a corporate preference for an economic “moat with piranhas and crocodiles” to shield inside lines of capital from broader secondary market disruption.

Table 4: Regulatory Factors and Structural Enforcement Gaps

Regulatory Body	Statutory Tool Overlooked / Mismanaged	Market Consolidation Impact
FHFA	Failure to strictly enforce the statutory “Duty to Serve” (DTS) personal property/chattel mandate since HERA 2008.	Allowed GSE capital to flow into manufactured housing community (MHC) commercial loans rather than consumer loans, amplifying pad rent pressures on land-lease tenants.
HUD	Inconsistent or passive enforcement of the “enhanced preemption” clause within the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 (MHIA).	Fails to strike down exclusionary local zoning, letting municipal placement barriers strangle independent retail expansion.

Evaluating the Core Inquiries

1. Are the AI-related items properly documented?

Yes. The draft properly documents and credits how third-party AI platforms (such as Bing Copilot or Grok) evaluated prior investigative reporting. The reference framework correctly delineates human-driven synthesis from automated logic verification.

2. Is Kovach’s Human Intelligence (HI) supported by the FEA?

The structural logic is solid, provided it accounts for the balanced math of affordability. While the artificial financing bottleneck compresses the total addressable market, the core value proposition of manufactured housing survives. Kovach’s thesis that normalization would heavily unlock latent demand remains valid, as a dual remedy addressing both the financing pipeline and local placement restrictions would naturally push market volume back toward historical baselines.

3. Implications for the FHFA and the FHA Title I Program

If the FHFA continues to accept the GSEs’ “insufficient data” defense, it undercuts the outcome-based goals of the 2026 proposed rule. To fulfill its statutory purpose, the FHFA must push Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac out of their passive stance. The Enterprises should buy existing portfolios from diversified private lenders (such as Triad, Cascade, or Oxford Bank) to quickly build securitization frameworks. Parallel modernizations within the FHA Title I chattel program would introduce vital public-sector competition to lower consumer borrowing costs.

4. Support for Critiques Against MHI, Clayton Homes, Champion Homes (SKY), and Cavco

The critique is structurally supported by analyzing market incentives. If the dominant brands—Clayton Homes, Champion Homes (SKY), and Cavco—and their trade association (MHI) deployed their full lobbying weight to enforce the MHIA 2000’s enhanced preemption and the DTS chattel framework, the dual bottlenecks of placement and financing would ease. Instead, an illiquid market burdened by high local barriers disproportionately strains smaller, independent retailers and manufacturers. This dynamic enables well-capitalized dominant entities to acquire distressed assets and consolidate market share within a restricted market footprint.

Verification & Supporting Source Links

• For the official 2026 proposed rulemaking text on expanding Enterprise obligations, see the Federal Register – Enterprise Duty To Serve Underserved Markets (RIN 2590-AB64).

• For the technical, administrative corrections to the proposed text, review the Federal Register – DTS Amendments Correction.

 

d) The FHFA website includes the following. These remarks demonstrate that the research and related reporting and comments letters provided by this writer for MHProNews have stood the test of time. These comments are sadly as valid today as they were then. I say “sadly,” because prior administrations, both Democrats and Republicans, have both failed to administer DTS chattel and other manufactured housing industry related federal laws.  That said, the time in office for Democrats in the years since DTS became law has been greater than that of Republicans. Will this current apparent push by the Trump Administration result in a meaningful change? Only time will tell. But these and the remarks linked below will establish a baseline against which future officials, reporters, researchers, advocates, and others can test whatever happens next against.

 

Enterprise Housing Goals FHFA Listening Session 3.25.2021

By L. A. “Tony’ Kovach

 

“A Pimple on an Elephant’s Ass.”

 

That’s how a Manufactured Housing Executives Council (MHEC) member described to MHProNews the comparative losses on manufactured homes to losses incurred in conventional housing during the 2008 housing-financial crisis. He compared those trillions in losses on houses to the far more modest losses experienced by lenders operating in HUD Code Manufactured Homes in the late 1990s into the early 2000s.

Despite that comparative pimple, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and others periodically point back to that problematic so-called “GreenSeco era.” That’s 2 decades in the rearview mirror. How can that be an excuse for treating manufactured homes so differently than conventional housing in access to lending?

 

The FHFA website says that Enterprise Housing Goals are supposed to “FOSTER competitive, liquid, efficient, and resilient (CLEAR) national housing finance markets that support sustainable homeownership and affordable rental housing…”

Before and after passage of the Housing and Economic Recovery Act (HERA) of 2008 and the

Congressional mandate of Duty to Serve (or DTS) for manufactured housing by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac – FHFA and other regulators have paid lip service to supporting manufactured homes.   That negatively impacts millions. Who says?

 

HUD Secretary Marcia Fudge spoke recently about the tragedy of increased homelessness in America.

HUD’s sad report is fascinating because James Schmitz Jr. – a researcher for the Minneapolis Fed, and three colleagues – published reports accusing HUD and builders of collusion in deliberately undermining manufactured housing.

Schmitz and those researchers argued that collusion between HUD and builders is a case of “sabotage monopoly.”

They said that sabotaging collusion between HUD and builders increased homelessness, harmed minorities, and cut off the lower income class of all backgrounds from the benefits of affordable manufactured home ownership.

Schmitz and his colleagues wrote positively about the manufactured home option.

Scholastica “Gay” Cororaton’s research for the National Association of Realtors also praised modern manufactured homes.

What makes Schmitz and his colleagues’ charge of HUD’s role in “sabotage monopoly” more compelling are comments from Bill Matchneer. Attorney Matchneer is the former HUD administrator for the Office of Manufactured Housing Programs (OMHP).

Matchneer said HUD’s Office of General Counsel consistently failed to enforce the enhanced preemption clause made law when the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 (MHIA or 2000 Reform law) was enacted.

Jim Gray, formerly with the FHFA Duty to Serve program, said in his exit message that FHFA and GSEs – “[W]e have not made as much progress [toward meeting the Duty to Serve mandates] as many of us would have liked; so much remains to be done to reach these [DTS] markets.”

In December 2019, I made two different listening session presentations on the DTS mandates; one virtual and another live in Washington, D.C.

In both presentations, I made the evidence-based case how disgraceful it was that the FHFA and GSEs have ignored the law to the harm of millions.

GSEs and FHFA failures arguably included key corporate members of the Manufactured Housing Institute or MHI.

Several scheduled to present today are aware of the issues I’m raising. Because some worked for HUD, FHFA, GSEs, or are otherwise connected to the manufactured housing industry.

For instance. Lesli Gooch, Ph.D., with the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) made statements in her filed EHG comments letter that sound supportive of manufactured homes.

But upon closer examination, Ms. Gooch focused on an unproven plan that Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) owned Clayton Homes – which supports MHI – in their push for their branded CrossMod^TM homes scheme.

Where was Gooch’s similarly robust support for all other mainstream manufactured homes?

• Fannie calls CrossMod^TM MH Advantage®.
• Freddie calls their version of CrossMod^TM CHOICEHome®.
• The known data reveals that these programs are market failures.

Supposedly there have been double-digit sales nationally of CrossMod^TM – under whatever name – in the last few years. That’s in a market producing some 95,000 HUD Code manufactured homes annually.

Attorney and manufactured home finance veteran Marty Lavin – an MHI award winner – did consulting for Fannie Mae. Lavin told MHLivingNews that MHAdvantage ® was likely to be as successful as MH Select®. Lavin said MH Select® was also a virtual goose egg.

 

David Dworkin, CEO of the National Housing Conference in federal comments said that manufactured housing was necessary for affordable housing.

Dworkin was fully confident that the GSEs could successful do manufactured home loans.  Dworkin previously worked for a GSE as a Vice President.

 

Edward Golding worked for HUD and the FHA.

In 2018, Golding and 3 colleagues did a post for the Urban Institute. It was a entitled “Manufactured homes could ease the affordable housing crisis. So why are so few being made?”

Citing FHFA data, Golding and his co-authors in that Urban Institute report said manufactured homes appreciated in value. They said manufactured homes could appreciate even more given access to affordable sustainable GSE loans.

What that Urban Institute post didn’t disclose on that specific page is that Berkshire chairman Warren Buffett is a lifetime trustee of the Urban Institute.

The applied logic of Golding, Dworkin, MHARR’s Mark Weiss, and others should make it plain that the GSEs could and should be doing robust lending in manufactured housing.

Oxford Bank has made personal property loans on manufactured homes for some 2 decades. Oxford reportedly loans with credit scores that mirror those of Berkshire owned 21^st Mortgage.  Oxford purportedly does so profitably and sustainably and at lower interest rates than 21st.

Given those facts and legal mandates, what possible excuse can FHFA and the GSEs give for not robustly making mainstream manufactured home loans for both personal property as well as mortgage lending?

• Why did the GSEs and MHI hold closed door meetings some years ago and never released those meeting minutes?
• How did the MHAdvantage ® CHOICEHome® and CrossMod^TM magically come to be so similar?
• Why is it that MHI postures support, but has backed or tolerated plans that leave Berkshire owned 21^st and Vanderbilt Mortgage and Finance as the 2 runaway largest lenders in manufactured housing?

I am consultant L.A. “Tony” Kovach. I’ve worked in the insurance, RV, trade show, and other professions. But all told, I have some 30 years’ experience in manufactured housing retail, communities, with financial service firms, and builders of HUD Code manufactured homes.

Keep in mind that I was an MHI member for years. I was elected by my peers to sit on the MHI Suppliers Division board.

For a time, I was arguably fooled by the purported paltering and posturing of the MHI flim-flam that has undermined manufactured housing.

That paltering pattern harms millions of Americans while thousands of independent retailers, producers, and others went out of business or sold out at discount.

• Is it mere coincidence that this history fits the Warren Buffett “castle and moat” methodology that Kevin Clayton himself bragged about in a video interview?
• Have you viewed or read the transcript of Kevin Clayton saying that Buffett preaches that Moat to make it hard on Clayton’s competitors?

Applying the “Iron Triangle” notion and Schmitz’s “Sabotage Monopoly” principles suggest that insiders rigged the market in ways that undermine the interests of various competitors.

The late Democratic Senator William Proxmire said that in Washington, two things shed light on what occurs.

• There are no coincidences.
• The other is follow the money.

I encourage all to Google each of these topics yourself!

—-

For instance, Google “Sam Strommen from Knudson Law” on manufactured housing research.

Strommen’s report called what is happening in manufactured housing a case of “Felony” antitrust violations with possible RICO aspects involved.

Strommen has no axe to grind in our profession.

Strommen concluded that manufactured housing was being subverted from within and mentioned Clayton, MHI, other MHI members, plus the Buffett “castle and moat” method too.

Given the degrees, evidence, and experiences of those involved, I have a hard time making the argument for incompetence causing the status quo.

The Rev. Martin Luther King Jr said:

“He who passively accepts evil is as much involved in it as he who helps to perpetrate it. He who accepts evil without protesting against it is really cooperating with it.”

What comes next should include a full and proper implementation of federal laws that include the

• Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000,
• and the Duty to Serve Manufactured Housing as part of the Enterprise Housing Goals.
• It should also include enforcing antitrust and RICO laws too.

Those good laws need to be fully and properly implemented to restore the free market and liberate millions who want affordable home ownership made possible by mainstream manufactured homes. Pax et bonum. ##

 

e) While this draft was being prepared, a message came in from MHARR which said the following. “Statistics in. May 26 =8385. May 25 was 9281.” So, the downward trend in manufactured housing production previously reported in 2026 is continuing. Yet MHI seems be turning a largely blind eye to that concern, if that is measured against their lack of support for the MHARR amendments proposed for the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act which included two ‘mandating of the mandates’ – one for chattel lending DTS and the other for “enhanced preemption” enforcement.  While RVs, a luxury item, surged past manufactured housing in production in the 21st century, manufactured homes – an affordable housing necessity has remained stymied by what Gemini has repeatedly called a “man-made crisis.”  There are apparently reasons why MHProNews has outpaced MHI’s website in visits by a ratio of 101 to 1.

 

 

Industry professionals, the presumed core audience for MHI and MHI linked trade media, arguably are more likely to know the difference between mere posturing and propaganda vs. well documented and accurately presented evidence found on MHProNews and in op-eds provided by this author.

 

Tony Kovach, Author at HousingWire 

 

f) From the input-inquiry process with Copilot in response to the pre-publication draft of the developing comments letter linked here.

Overview

Your draft DTS comments letter sits inside a now well‑established FEA ecosystem on MHProNews and MHLivingNews. That ecosystem—human intelligence plus multi‑AI cross‑checks—is central to understanding both your reputation and why this material matters to FHFA and other stakeholders.

Table 1 – Kovach’s practice vs. typical MHI‑orbit communications

Table 2 – Reputation and error‑correction

Why this research matters to FHFA and stakeholders

1. Regulatory accountability and statutory intent Your DTS letter ties FHFA’s own Federal Register language—high denial rates, higher chattel interest costs, and admitted data gaps—to a multi‑decade pattern of under‑implementation of HERA’s Duty to Serve mandate. That linkage is crucial for regulators, GSEs, and lawmakers evaluating whether current practice aligns with Congress’ “affirmative obligation” to facilitate affordable housing finance.

2. Market structure, consolidation, and consumer harm The FEA framework connects DTS failures to suppressed manufactured housing production, weakened appreciation, and consolidation incentives that benefit a few dominant players while harming millions of would‑be homeowners. That perspective is directly relevant to FHFA’s safety‑and‑soundness mission and to antitrust and consumer‑protection concerns raised in parallel litigation and research.

3. Auditable record for policy reform Because your work embeds primary sources, docket citations, and multi‑AI audits, it creates an unusually transparent evidentiary record. FHFA staff, GSE teams, Hill offices, and advocacy groups can trace each claim back to documents, data, and cross‑checked analysis—reducing the risk of policy being shaped by unexamined narratives or opaque lobbying.

4. Benchmarking industry narratives Finally, the contrast between MHProNews’ FEA model and the comparatively un‑audited messaging from MHI‑orbit entities gives FHFA a practical benchmark: which narratives are willing to withstand rigorous, public scrutiny, and which remain largely assertion‑based. In a rulemaking on DTS chattel lending, that distinction is not academic—it goes to whose claims should carry greater evidentiary weight.

If you’d like, we can next tighten this into a concise, citation‑ready paragraph tailored exactly to section 14f.

— https://copilot.microsoft.com/shares/w8sE3ExXUtg3j3vKCxs8e Notice: because that Copilot share link is for a limited timeframe, this writer takes the additional step of having Copilot confirm the accuracy of the PDF of the Q&A that resulted in the response above. That is discussion thread is linked here and was confirmed by Copilot for accuracy linked here. —

 

 

g) There is always more to know. The linked items should be considered as part of this submission. Thank you for your attention to these matters. More important than merely reading, please act upon these findings and recommendations. Because this costs our economy some $2 trillion dollars a year because of failure to properly, routinely, and robustly enforce existing federal laws – including DTS chattel lending – could without taxpayers’ subsidies naturally address the affordable housing crisis by allowing the free market to provide millions of more inherently affordable manufactured homes.  Millions are harmed as have been thousands of industry professionals.

 

 

Postscript, FWIW, that photo at the left below is of yours truly at a meeting in April 2026 with Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, AMAC officials and delegates. Last year meetings included a FL state senator and FL 18 congressional staffers. Yours truly is routinely looking for ways to bring to the attention of other others in media, nonprofits, and to public officials the plight of the manufactured home industry in the 21st century. Note that this letter will have minor differences from the letter as submitted to the FHFA, which is found at this link here.

 

L. A. “Tony” Kovach

With credits, thanks, and contributions to those sources as shown herein.

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