‘Brutal’ – a Tale of Two Industries. Shocking Disparity Between RVs and Manufactured Homes 1995-2024. Plus, May 2026 MHVille 50 United States Shipments and Production Summary Report. FEA
“You’re [i.e.: MHProNews] pulling together a brutal but clarifying contrast here—the numbers tell the story of an industry that should be booming, but isn’t” is a pull quote from Part III. The ratio of manufactured housing (MH) to recreational vehicle (RV) production from 1995 to 2000 is 1.22 to 1 as detailed by an op-ed by L. A. “Tony” Kovach via HousingWire. That specific year-by-year plus cumulative breakdown is shown in Part II below, but the topline math ratio of 1.22 MH to 1 RV is 1 for those years is documented here. From 2001 to 2024 the manufactured housing industry trailed the recreational vehicle (RV) industry by 2,333,714 manufactured homes to 8,618,332 recreational vehicles (MHProNews note: some RVs are motorized, but most are towable). Again, the year-by-year plus cumulative data is presented in Part II below. So, from 2001 to 2024 the ratio dramatically shifted from 1.22 MH to 1 RV from 1995-2000 to 1 MH to 3.69 RVs. Part of the significance is that many RVs are typically not promoted for use for full-time living, but rather are presented as a luxury (meaning, discretionary) item for weekend getaways, vacations or a travel option for some retirees and for certain careers. The ratio of disparity between RVs and MHs in the 21st century is a reasonable key performance indicator (KPI) to use as a yardstick for measuring the performance of the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI), which has long claimed to represent “all segments” of the manufactured home and factory-built housing industry. The reason that the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR) is being left out of that part of this facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) is simple. MHARR makes no similar claim to MHIs. MHARR clearly states in their media releases and on their website that MHARR: “is a Washington, D.C.- based national trade association representing the views and interests of independent producers of federally regulated manufactured housing.” Sometimes, MHARR has been described as also serving a ‘watchdog’ role for manufactured housing independents, shedding light through their industry and regulatory expertise on what MHI is doing, or not doing, and what may be the prudence (or lack thereof) of MHI behavior with respect to the manufactured housing industry’s historic achievements and future potential in a well-documented U.S. affordable housing crisis. Part I of this report will provide the Institute for Building Technology & Safety (IBTS) data for May 2026 for all 50 states, plus Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, and Canada.
Note that IBTS collects this data under contract on behalf of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), making their data effectively “official data.”
Shipments and Production Summary Report 5/01/2026 – 5/31/2026
Shipments
State
SW
MW
Total
Floors
Dest. Pending
7
8
15
23
Alabama
269
230
499
730
Alaska
0
1
1
2
Arizona
59
83
142
226
Arkansas
53
95
148
243
California
38
176
214
396
Colorado
23
22
45
68
Connecticut
16
3
19
22
Delaware
4
19
23
42
District of Columbia
0
0
0
0
Florida
177
411
588
1,000
Georgia
144
286
430
716
Hawaii
0
0
0
0
Idaho
10
35
45
82
Illinois
76
47
123
170
Indiana
83
54
137
191
Iowa
33
20
53
73
Kansas
77
8
85
93
Kentucky
142
221
363
584
Louisiana
176
140
316
457
Maine
37
35
72
107
Maryland
4
2
6
8
Massachusetts
4
9
13
22
Michigan
136
131
267
398
Minnesota
19
34
53
86
Mississippi
168
169
337
511
Missouri
41
78
119
198
Montana
15
17
32
50
Nebraska
6
16
22
38
Nevada
6
26
32
62
New Hampshire
7
17
24
41
New Jersey
4
20
24
44
New Mexico
51
86
137
226
New York
94
78
172
250
North Carolina
168
297
465
763
North Dakota
17
14
31
45
Ohio
88
59
147
207
Oklahoma
71
108
179
288
Oregon
17
64
81
147
Pennsylvania
86
70
156
226
Rhode Island
1
0
1
1
South Carolina
171
284
455
739
South Dakota
8
15
23
38
Tennessee
79
182
261
443
Texas
613
898
1,511
2,415
Utah
6
20
26
47
Vermont
12
10
22
32
Virginia
37
68
105
173
Washington
17
111
128
246
West Virginia
29
67
96
163
Wisconsin
76
37
113
150
Wyoming
18
11
29
40
Canada
0
0
0
0
Puerto Rico
0
0
0
0
Total
3,493
4,892
8,385
13,322
THE ABOVE STATISTICS ARE PROVIDED AS A MONTHLY
SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE. REPRODUCTION IN PART OR
IN TOTAL MUST CARRY AN ATTRIBUTION TO IBTS, INC.
Production
State
SW
MW
Total
Floors
States Shown(*)
360
281
641
925
Alabama
570
805
1,375
2,190
*Alaska
0
0
0
0
Arizona
63
113
176
290
*Arkansas
0
0
0
0
California
40
151
191
348
*Colorado
0
0
0
0
*Connecticut
0
0
0
0
*Delaware
0
0
0
0
*District of Columbia
0
0
0
0
Florida
77
242
319
562
Georgia
151
360
511
871
*Hawaii
0
0
0
0
Idaho
23
86
109
204
*Illinois
0
0
0
0
Indiana
486
269
755
1,026
*Iowa
0
0
0
0
*Kansas
0
0
0
0
*Kentucky
0
0
0
0
*Louisiana
0
0
0
0
*Maine
0
0
0
0
*Maryland
0
0
0
0
*Massachusetts
0
0
0
0
*Michigan
0
0
0
0
Minnesota
42
73
115
188
*Mississippi
0
0
0
0
*Missouri
0
0
0
0
*Montana
0
0
0
0
*Nebraska
0
0
0
0
*Nevada
0
0
0
0
*New Hampshire
0
0
0
0
*New Jersey
0
0
0
0
*New Mexico
0
0
0
0
*New York
0
0
0
0
North Carolina
165
328
493
821
*North Dakota
0
0
0
0
*Ohio
0
0
0
0
*Oklahoma
0
0
0
0
Oregon
37
176
213
397
Pennsylvania
230
256
486
742
*Rhode Island
0
0
0
0
*South Carolina
0
0
0
0
*South Dakota
0
0
0
0
Tennessee
492
698
1,190
1,889
Texas
727
1,016
1,743
2,763
*Utah
0
0
0
0
*Vermont
0
0
0
0
*Virginia
0
0
0
0
*Washington
0
0
0
0
*West Virginia
0
0
0
0
Wisconsin
30
38
68
106
*Wyoming
0
0
0
0
*Canada
0
0
0
0
*Puerto Rico
0
0
0
0
Total
3,493
4,892
8,385
13,322
(*) THESE STATES HAVE FEWER THAN THREE PLANTS.
FIGURES ARE AGGREGATED ON FIRST LINE ABOVE
TOTALS TO PROTECT PROPRIETARY INFORMATION.
Ashok K Goswami, PE, COO, 45207 Research Place, Ashburn, VA
Part II. Various Tables (1-6) Compiled by MHProNews Using RVIA, MHARR, Merchandiser and Other Sources.
Table 1
Table 2
Year
RV Shipments
Year
New MH Production
1995
247,072
1995
344,930
1996
247,533
1996
363,345
1997
254,558
1997
353,686
1998
292,655
1998
373,143
1999
321,201
1999
348,075
2000
300,085
2000
250,366
1,663,104
2,033,545
As was revealed in the opening paragraph above, that is a ratio of 1.22 MH to 1 RV during the 1995 to 2000 time period.
Table 3
Table 4
Year
RV Shipments
Year
New MH Production
2001
256,809
2001
193,120
2002
311,025
2002
165,489
2003
320,851
2003
130,815
2004
370032
2004
130,748
2005
384454
2005
146,881
2006
390,362
2006
117,373
2007
353,588
2007
95,752
2008
237,095
2008
81,457
2009
165,709
2009
49,683
2010
242,284
2010
50,056
2011
252,407
2011
51,618
2012
285,749
2012
54,881
2013
321,127
2013
60,228
2014
356,735
2014
64,334
2015
374,246
2015
70,544
2016
430,691
2016
81,136
2017
504,599
2017
92,902
2018
483,672
2018
96,555
2019
406,070
2019
94,615
2020
430,412
2020
94,390
2021
600,240
2021
105,772
2022
493,268
2022
112,882
2023
313,174
2023
89,169
2024
333,733
2024
103,314
8,618,332
2,333,714
As was noted in the preface at top.
From 2001 to 2024 the manufactured housing industry trailed the recreational vehicle (RV) industry by 2,333,714 manufactured homes to 8,618,332 recreational vehicles (MHProNews note: some RVs are motorized, but most are towable)…So, from 2001 to 2024 the ratio dramatically shifted from 1.22 MH to 1 RV from 1995-2000 to 1 MH to 3.69 RVs.
Because the trend since 2001 has been strongly in favor of RVs, as Tables 3 and 4 above reflected.
Despite cheerleading on the part of dozens of MHI and MHI-linked state association professionals to hundreds of management types working in firms that are consolidation focused and routinely part of the MHI membership and ‘orbit’ who may mimic at some level past MHI chairman and still Cavco Industries (CVCO) President and CEO William C. “Bill” Boor’s claim that the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act was “masterful” work by MHI, the facts-evidence-analysis that follows may reveal an entirely different light on that claim by Boor.
In no particular order of importance are the following points.
1. Part of the analysis of the above should be viewed through the lens of industry potential. Tens of millions of Americans who rent, some 25 to 26 million per Freddie Mac research, have the credit history needed to qualify for a manufactured home purchase. That is a significant market potential.
Additionally, per an FEA model analysis of SimilarWeb data for some of the larger firms involved at MHI, there have been some 9 million individuals shopping for a new manufactured home.
In an email from Mark Weiss, J.D., President and CEO of MHARR to MHProNews. His ‘nothing new’ topic was in relation to the report linked below his comments.
“Nothing new, including the lack of any response from HUD and OMHP. GAO should investigate ALL aspects of the TOTAL FAILURE of the HUD manufactured housing program to comply with the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 — both substantive, such as its failure to implement enhanced preemption with respect to discriminatory zoning exclusion, and procedural, such as its deceitful manipulation of the MHCC process and appointments — and that is just the start.”
You’re pulling together a brutal but clarifying contrast here—the numbers tell the story of an industry that should be booming, but isn’t. Let’s lay out the core facts in clean tables, then hit the crux.
“From 2001 to 2024 the manufactured housing industry trailed the recreational vehicle (RV) industry by 2,333,714 manufactured homes to 8,618,332 recreational vehicles…So, from 2001 to 2024 the ratio dramatically shifted from 1.22 MH to 1 RV from 1995-2000 to 1 MH to 3.69 RVs.”
Table 1 – RV vs MH production, 1995–2000 (pre‑collapse baseline)
Period
RV shipments total
MH production total
MH:RV ratio
1995–2000
1,663,104
2,033,545
1.22 : 1
Key point: In the late 1990s, HUD Code MH outperformed RVs—over 2 million homes vs about 1.66 million RVs.
Table 2 – RV vs MH production, 2001–2024 (post‑MHIA/ROAD era)
Period
RV shipments total
MH production total
MH:RV ratio
2001–2024
8,618,332
2,333,714
1 : 3.69
Key point: After 2000, RVs explode while MH collapses—RVs outproduce MH by more than 3.6 to 1 over 24 years.
Using Tables 5–6 in your draft, which aggregate 1995–2024:
Period
RV shipments total
MH production total
MH:RV ratio
1995–2024
10,281,436
4,367,259
1 : 2.35
Interpretive caution: The 2.35:1 overall ratio masks the structural break—pre‑2000 MH leads, post‑2000 MH lags badly. Your draft rightly warns: “that point could be misleading…Because the trend since 2001 has been strongly in favor of RVs.”
Table 4 – May 2026 IBTS shipments vs production (MHVille snapshot)
From the IBTS section in Part I:
Metric
SW units
MW units
Total homes
Floors
Shipments – U.S.+PR+CA
3,493
4,892
8,385
13,322
Production – U.S.+PR+CA
3,493
4,892
8,385
13,322
Key point: May 2026 shows roughly 8.4k homes produced/shipped—annualized ~100k–105k, i.e., still far below the 1990s 300k+ levels despite a larger population and a deeper affordable housing crisis.
Crux of the FEA – what the disparity actually signals
Regulatory capture / “Upton Sinclair effect”: You’re implicitly arguing that HUD, FHFA, and MHI have allowed or abetted a regime where good laws (MHIA 2000 enhanced preemption, DTS, FHA Title I) exist on paper but are not robustly enforced—benefiting consolidators while throttling volume.
MHI performance KPI: Using RV vs MH output as a KPI is powerful: a discretionary, luxury‑leaning product (RVs) massively outperforms a basic‑needs product (MH) in an affordable housing crisis. That’s not “market preference,” that’s policy and trade‑association failure.
Missed demand: Your own FEA on SimilarWeb and Freddie Mac data—25–26 million renters with qualifying credit, ~9 million annual MH shoppers, only ~100k closings—supports the thesis of artificial bottlenecks (zoning, finance, consolidation strategies) rather than lack of consumer interest.
Narrative frame: The “Blown Away” title is empirically justified: MH went from leading RVs to being blown away by them, precisely during the period when MHIA 2000, HERA 2008, and DTS should have unleashed growth.
…
— MHProNews notes that additional links and an offer for more research followed the ellipsis (…) above and are available via the PDF of the Q&A that yielded the above found at this link here. Copilot confirmed the accuracy of that PDF here and as shown below. Note that the original draft used the term “Blown Away” as part of the headline, but after the response by Copilot above “Brutal” was substituted for the headline hook instead. MHProNews further notes that bulk of the visible response by Copilot was arguably well supported by known information, but part of the edited offer of a follow up (again, found here) included this from Copilot: “MH output would logically converge back toward RV‑like volumes (200k–300k+ annually), not languish near 100k.” is arguably an understatement. When past MHI president and CEO Richard “Dick” Jennison said the industry should be shooting for 500K production annually, and when Cavco CEO and prior MHI chairman Bill Boor and then Harvard JCHS fellow Eric Belsky both said that manufactured housing could “catch” or “do better than site built” conventional construction, the 200k to 300K annual production is arguably too low. The ADU preemption precedent in CA is another reason why 200K to 300K (which would be a welcome way station for organic growth in MHVille production based on current levels) could be much higher if existing laws were rigorously enforced. —
3. Google‘s AI powered Gemini addressed the updated pre-publication draft linked here and cross checked both human and Copilot’s statements with its AI findings as follows.
Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) Report: Evaluating human-in-the-loop (HITL) critique on Copilot’s manufactured housing production potential
Executive Summary & Assessment of the HITL Critique
The Human-In-The-Loop (HITL) critique presented by MHProNews regarding Copilot’s assessment of manufactured housing (MH) production potential is entirely fair, well-supported, and empirically justified based on known industry data, executive statements, and academic research.
When Copilot suggested that fully enforcing statutory mandates would cause MH production to “logically converge back toward RV-like volumes (200k–300k+ annually)”, it understated the true market capacity and latent demand of the manufactured housing sector. A baseline benchmark of 200k–300k units per year represents merely a recovery to late-1990s levels or parity with recreational vehicle (RV) shipments, rather than the full organic potential unlocked by comprehensive statutory enforcement.
Given that:
25 to 26 million renters possess the credit profiles necessary to qualify for manufactured home financing under Freddie Mac research.
~9 million consumers actively shop for manufactured homes online annually (per SimilarWeb traffic analysis of top manufacturers like Clayton Homes, Cavco Industries, and Champion Homes (SKY)).
Prominent industry leadership—including former MHI President/CEO Richard “Dick” Jennison (target: 500k units), Cavco CEO Bill Boor, and former Harvard JCHS Fellow Eric Belsky (target: matching or exceeding site-built single-family construction)—have historically benchmarked potential far above 300k units.
Therefore, capping the projected logical convergence at 200k–300k severely undercounts the market capacity if statutory preemption under the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 (MHIA 2000) and the Duty to Serve (DTS) mandate under HERA 2008 were rigorously enforced.
Key Data & Comparative Tables
Table 1: RV vs. Manufactured Housing Historical Production Disparity (1995–2024)
Source: RVIA, IBTS/HUD, MHARR, and MHProNews Data Aggregation
Source: MHARR Statements, Legal Analysis, and FEA Documentation
Policy / Legal Barrier
Statutory/Regulatory Basis
Impact on Industry Production Volume
Zoning Exclusion & Non-Preemption
HUD non-enforcement of MHIA 2000 Enhanced Preemption
Local authorities block MH placement; restricts land access nationwide.
Lack of Chattel Secondary Market
FHFA / GSE non-compliance with Duty to Serve (DTS)
High interest rates on chattel loans squeeze out credit-qualified renters.
FHA Title I Inactivity
HUD administrative barriers
FHA Title I manufactured housing loan program remains virtually dormant.
Corporate Consolidation Incentives
Boardroom priority on acquisition over organic expansion
Consolidated producers profit on lower-volume, higher-margin operations.
Detailed FEA Unpacking of the Copilot Understatement
1. Facts & Evidence
Data Disparity: Between 1995 and 2000, manufactured housing consistently outpaced RVs (1.22:1). Post-2001, RVs soared to over 600,000 units annually (2021 peak), while manufactured housing collapsed to sub-100k levels before marginally recovering to ~103k in 2024 and ~100k annualized in May 2026.
Consumer Demand: The existence of 25–26 million credit-qualified renters and ~9 million annual web shoppers demonstrates that the bottleneck is not a lack of consumer appetite or eligibility.
Precedent of Zoning Preemption: In jurisdictions where local barriers were legally preempted—such as California’s Accessory Dwelling Unit (ADU) legislation—production and installations rose dramatically without requiring new factory technologies.
2. Analysis of Copilot’s Premise
Copilot’s initial logic calculated convergence strictly against the RV benchmark (200k–300k+). While reaching 200k–300k units would represent a doubling or tripling of current production (~100k), framing 300k as the upper bound ignores two critical systemic realities:
Unmet Affordable Housing Deficit: The United States faces a structural deficit of over 4 to 7 million affordable housing units. RVs, as discretionary recreation products, do not solve a national shelter crisis; manufactured homes directly address it.
Parity with Conventional Construction: Single-family site-built starts routinely average between 800,000 and 1,100,000 units annually. If federal enhanced preemption under the MHIA of 2000 were enforced to strike down discriminatory municipal zoning, and if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fully implemented chattel lending under DTS, HUD Code homes would compete directly with site-built homes across suburban and urban infill markets. Under those condition, matching even 30%–50% of site-built production would put MH volume at 300,000 to 500,000+ units per year.
Conclusion
The MHProNews HITL critique is accurate. Copilot’s suggested target of 200k–300k represents a modest recovery step rather than the full organic ceiling. When evaluating market funnel data, executive targets (Jennison’s 500k), academic assessments (Belsky), and statutory enforcement impacts, the upper potential for HUD Code manufactured housing is substantially higher.
— MHProNews notes that the PDF of the thread above is linked here. Gemini confirmed the accuracy of the thread above at this link here and as posted below. —
4. To be objective, there were tweaks that could have been applied to both of the AI responses in this specific Q&A thread. Some of that was demonstrated above. That said, both AIs have made the key points that a reasonable and “brutal” (Copilot’s term) proxy for MHVille potential (and thus a critique of MHI and their leading board members/brands). For example, the quote by Gemini of Bill Boor is more of a blend of a quote and a paraphrase, but it is directionally accurate and thus supported.
That said, Gemini did an overall fine job of pointing out the following quoted for emphasis.
“…Parity with Conventional Construction: Single-family site-built starts routinely average between 800,000 and 1,100,000 units annually. If federal enhanced preemption under the MHIA of 2000 were enforced to strike down discriminatory municipal zoning, and if Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fully implemented chattel lending under DTS, HUD Code homes would compete directly with site-built homes across suburban and urban infill markets. Under those condition, matching even 30%–50% of site-built production would put MH volume at 300,000 to 500,000+ units per year.
Conclusion
The MHProNews HITL critique is accurate. …”
The graphic generated by ChatGPT based on this article and AI cross checks. The full-sized graphic of the item below can be seen here.
MHProNews, to highlight an apt pull quote from a linked report by Copilot.
Cross‑AI corroboration: Copilot, Gemini, and Grok have independently validated MHProNews’ FEA methodology, confirming that evidence—not narrative—anchors each report.