It has been said that ‘nothing can get you in trouble like telling the truth.’ Some can’t or won’t admit the truth when they see it or hear it. Special interests have their own reasons to protect their narrative which tends to absolve them of responsibility for the current plight of tens of millions of Americans. There is no one cause and no one cure to the housing and affordability crisis. That said, what has happened to the manufactured housing industry in the 21st century is an insightful barometer for how common sense and existing laws can be ignored to the detriment of the many and to the supposed benefit of a few. Manufactured home production, per the latest information from the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR) went up in June 2026 but are still well behind where industry production stood a year ago. As of the date and time shown here, the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) website shows no similar public-facing information. Is it any wonder that per sources deemed reliable, MHARR’s website is getting several times the traffic that MHI’s does? Part I below of this MHProNews facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) provides the entire MHARR report with their permission. That said, there are numerous reasons for the affordability crisis. It should be recalled that back in the 1950s, it was common that a father could support his family and often stay at home wife on a single income and earn enough to have a car and a modest house. Offshoring of higher paying factory jobs, importing lower wage workers (‘legally’ or not), an increasing consolidation of various economic sectors by larger firms, regulatory capture and the Iron Triangle, massive deficits that drive up borrowing costs — these are just some of the factors that have contributed to the affordability crisis. When perhaps 25 million illegal immigrants may be living in the U.S. and some 25 million adult youths are living with their parents instead of in their rented or owned dwelling, there are a series of challenges that no one policy change is going to fix. In that greater context the slide of the manufactured housing industry despite favorable laws (e.g.: Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 and the Duty to Serve manufactured housing) can be seen as symptoms of a greater set of challenges. Ignoring those and other truths doesn’t fix the problem. It only delays the possible implementation of the necessary solutions. Ignoring reality isn’t the solution. Understanding reality and adjusting the solutions to fix the underlying problems is how affordability becomes possible.

 

 

1. One of the more popular reports on MHProNews in 2026 is the one below.

 

 

2. According to Faith Law: “If you go back to 1950, the National Association of Home Builders claims that the average size for a house was a mere 983 square feet.” Per Newser, which also cited the same 983 square feet figure.

Average Size of US Homes, Decade by Decade

It’s nearly tripled since 1950

…

• 1950: 983
• 1960: 1,289
• 1970: 1,500
• 1980: 1,740
• 1990: 2,080
• 2000: 2,266
• 2010: 2,392
• 2014: 2,657

3. Not everyone needs or wants a McMansion. People often want affordability, which is why both major parties are playing tug of war over who can better claim that their policies will help ‘affordability.’ To restate a point made above for emphasis, no one factor brought our nation to this point in time. Until the causes and possible cures are properly understood, there will be those who make claims that may sound good but are demonstrably untrue.  The report linked below was one that was popular with MHProNews readers so far in August 2026. Why? Perhaps because it showed information on just how affordable manufactured homes in a fee simple (i.e.: land home package) setting (vs. land-lease setting) can be surprisingly affordable. So, why hasn’t MHI pressed cases for what has historically worked in American housing and previously benefited the manufactured home industry?

 

 

4. Notice that per MHARR’s top 10 state comparisons, 7 of the top 10 states in 2026 are trailing their shipment levels year-to-date for the first half of 2025. Only Florida, Alabama and Mississippi (the last two, just barely) are ahead in 2026 through June of where that state’s total shipments in the same period for 2025. Among the state’s trailing? Tennessee, the home of Clayton Homes and their much-ballyhooed CrossMod^® neighborhood. Ouch. But only facts and understanding, not narratives and illusions, will set us (or our profession) free. 

 

 

5. There are those who assert that Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) is potentially paving the way for Clayton to be absorbed into Taylor Morrison.

Berkshire Hathaway’s Clayton Home Building Group is buying McGuinn Homes—No. 65 largest U.S. homebuilder—just weeks after buying America’s No. 6 largest builder Taylor Morrison. https://t.co/czHGppV8dM

— Fast Company (@FastCompany) July 10, 2026

Berkshire already owns America’s No. 12 largest homebuilder

This isn’t Berkshire’s first rodeo in homebuilding. The conglomerate already owns Clayton Properties Group—America’s 12th largest homebuilder—which recorded 9,953 new builds in 2025. But Clayton Properties is a… pic.twitter.com/KsOGNmwwtK

— Lance Lambert (@NewsLambert) June 1, 2026

ANOTHER ONE

Warren Buffett’s heir just bought another big homebuilder. What’s Berkshire Hathaway planning?

Berkshire Hathaway’s @claytonhomes is buying @McGuinnHomes—America’s 65th largest U.S. homebuilder

My latest for @ResidentialClub https://t.co/WLpSJeac0m pic.twitter.com/Ku9cBjKzzk

— Lance Lambert (@NewsLambert) July 8, 2026

With Taylor Morrison’s 12,997 closings, Clayton Properties’ 9,953 closings, and McGuinn’s 993 closings combined that’s roughly 23,943 closings in 2025—which, by ResiClub’s back-of-the-envelope analysis, would make Berkshire Hathaway the No. 4 largest site-built U.S. homebuilder pic.twitter.com/kd8Opqv4wD

— Lance Lambert (@NewsLambert) July 8, 2026

 

 

6. Clayton Homes could easily be pushing for entry level shade and shelter developments using HUD Code manufactured homes. But according to part of the facts-evidence-analysis found here, there is no published indications that they are doing so. As Marty Lavin, J.D., has periodically mused, pay more attention to what people are doing than what they are saying.

 

 

7. Despite Kevin Clayton reportedly saying “dance with the one who brought you” (an analogy that implied that manufactured housing ought to focus on the part of the industry that is inherently affordable, much of the thrust at Clayton in terms of headline items have been their push into conventional housing, their push into developing, and their push of higher end CrossMod^® homes, even though the later has been demonstrably a market failure, as MHI at one point admitted in a document.

8. Odds are good that you are here because you are paying attention to what people and organizations are doing; or are not doing. This MHProNews MHVille facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) is underway.

 

Part I. Per MHARR. 

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE                                                                   Contact: MHARR

                                                                                                                     (202) 783-4087

 

INDUSTRY PRODUCTION REMAINS MOSTLY UNCHANGED IN JUNE 2026

Washington, D.C., August 3, 2026 – The Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR) reports that according to official statistics compiled on behalf of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), HUD Code manufactured housing industry year-over-year production remained little changed in June 2026. Just-released statistics indicate that HUD Code manufacturers produced 8,926 new homes in June 2026, a 1% increase over the 8,831 new HUD Code homes produced in June 2025. Cumulative industry production for 2026 now totals 50,359 new HUD Code homes, as compared with 53,754 over the same period in 2025, a year-over-year decline of 6.3%.

A further analysis of the official industry statistics shows that the top ten shipment states from January 2023 — with monthly, cumulative, current reporting year (2026) and prior year (2025) shipments per category as indicated — are:

Rank	State	Current Month (June 2026)	Cumulative Top Ten Since Jan 2023	2026	2025
1	Texas	1629	59866	8468	9493
2	Florida	626	25100	3522	3321
3	North Carolina	573	21249	3058	3297
4	Alabama	457	19344	2840	2832
5	South Carolina	440	17369	2663	2820
6	Georgia	396	15825	2542	2555
7	Louisiana	342	15762	1923	2563
8	Mississippi	353	13041	2142	2127
9	Kentucky	371	13017	2105	1899
10	Tennessee	316	12738	1870	2025

The June 2026 statistics result in no changes to the cumulative top-ten shipments list.

The Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform is a Washington, D.C.- based national trade association representing the views and interests of independent producers of federally-regulated manufactured housing.

— 30 —

Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR)
1331 Pennsylvania Ave N.W., Suite 512
Washington D.C. 20004
Phone: 202/783-4087
Fax: 202/783-4075
Email: MHARRDG@AOL.COM
Website: www.manufacturedhousingassociation.org

MHARR’s monthly production report is available for re-publication in full (i.e., without alteration or substantive modification) without further permission and with proper attribution and/or linkback to MHARR.

The featured image was generated by artificial intelligence powered Copilot for MHARR. 

 

Part II. From Microsoft Bing‘s artificial intelligence (AI) powered Copilot response to the pre-publication draft of this article linked here was the following findings. Those Copilot generated FEA model findings were confirmed for accuracy here.

Executive summary

Manufactured housing production in June 2026 ticked up slightly month‑over‑month but remains materially down year‑over‑year, despite existing federal laws that should support robust growth. The Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform) data show 8,926 new United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Code manufactured homes produced in June 2026, a one percent increase over June 2025, but cumulative 2026 production of 50,359 homes is still down 6.3 percent versus the same period in 2025.

The Manufactured Housing Institute, by contrast, is not publicly foregrounding this production reality. Instead, it is promoting awards, “education” programs such as the Professional Housing Consultant training, and the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, which leaves local zoning barriers intact and thus preserves key bottlenecks that suppress manufactured housing deployment. Your prior facts‑evidence‑analysis work has documented that manufactured housing could deliver fee‑simple land‑home packages under seventy‑two thousand dollars total and under seven hundred ten dollars monthly with principal‑interest‑taxes‑insurance plus homeowners association dues, for roughly eighty percent of the United States population—yet those pathways are not being championed by the Manufactured Housing Institute.

Meanwhile, Berkshire Hathaway is rapidly expanding its conventional site‑built footprint via Clayton Properties Group, Taylor Morrison, and McGuinn Homes, positioning itself as roughly the number four site‑built homebuilder in the United States, while allowing manufactured housing production to languish. That pattern, combined with the Manufactured Housing Institute’s repeated failure to press common‑sense, law‑anchored solutions, strongly supports the Marty Lavin rule: pay more attention to what organizations do than to what they say. The evidence points toward a practical focus on consolidation and higher‑ticket conventional product, not on maximizing organic, truly affordable manufactured homeownership.

Body – facts and evidence

1. Production reality in June 2026

From the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform release:

“Just‑released statistics indicate that United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Code manufacturers produced 8,926 new homes in June 2026, a one percent increase over the 8,831 new United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Code homes produced in June 2025. Cumulative industry production for 2026 now totals 50,359 new United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Code homes, as compared with 53,754 over the same period in 2025, a year‑over‑year decline of 6.3 percent.”

Table 1 – United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Code production, June 2025 vs. June 2026

This is the “rose but still trails” dynamic: a modest monthly uptick masking a sobering cumulative decline during an affordable housing crisis.

Table 2 – Top ten shipment states, June 2026 (current month and 2026 year‑to‑date)

Seven of these ten states are trailing their prior year shipment levels; only Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi are modestly ahead. Tennessee, home to Clayton Homes and its much‑promoted CrossMod neighborhood, is down year‑to‑date versus 2025—an “ouch” that underscores the gap between narrative and performance.

2. Manufactured Housing Institute behavior vs. production reality

You checked the Manufactured Housing Institute website around four in the morning and found no public‑facing article on the June 2026 production data. Instead, the Manufactured Housing Institute is promoting:

• Awards and recognition.
• “Education” programs such as the Professional Housing Consultant training, which have not translated into sustained industry‑wide shipment growth despite years of promotion.
• The 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act, which leaves local zoning barriers intact and thus preserves exclusionary placement regimes favored by large community operators such as Equity LifeStyle Properties, Sun Communities, and Flagship Communities.

Your prior facts‑evidence‑analysis on the disparity between recreational vehicles and manufactured homes showed that the Recreational Vehicle Industry Association aggressively tracks and promotes shipment data, while the Manufactured Housing Institute repeatedly fails to foreground similar metrics or to press for enforcement of the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 enhanced preemption and the Duty to Serve manufactured housing.

Table 3 – Trade association behavior: Recreational Vehicle Industry Association vs. Manufactured Housing Institute

3. Consolidation and Berkshire Hathaway’s conventional expansion

Your draft report and external coverage show that Berkshire Hathaway, via Clayton Properties Group, Taylor Morrison, and McGuinn Homes, now controls a combined conventional site‑built closing volume that would place it roughly as the number four site‑built homebuilder in the United States.

At the same time:

• Clayton Homes is not visibly pushing large‑scale entry‑level shade‑and‑shelter developments using United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Code manufactured homes, despite the inherent affordability and speed advantages of factory‑built housing.
• The CrossMod initiative has been a market failure, with no transparent key performance indicators on units sold, absorption rates, or buyer profiles, and with Tennessee shipments down year‑over‑year.
• Manufactured housing production remains suppressed, even though the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 and the Duty to Serve manufactured housing could, if properly enforced, unlock thousands of new land‑home sites and support chattel lending.

Table 4 – Strategic orientation: Berkshire / Clayton vs. affordable manufactured housing

Conclusion – applying the Marty Lavin rule

Marty Lavin, Juris Doctor, has long advised: “Pay more attention to what people are doing than what they are saying. Or, never mind what people are saying, watch what they are doing.” Your draft and the latest Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform data make that lens unavoidable.

• The facts show a modest June 2026 production uptick but a significant year‑to‑date decline in United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Code manufactured home output during an affordability crisis.
• The Manufactured Housing Institute is not publicly highlighting this production reality or pressing for enforcement of the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 enhanced preemption and the Duty to Serve manufactured housing. Instead, it promotes awards, education programs, and legislation that leaves key bottlenecks intact.
• Berkshire Hathaway is rapidly expanding its conventional site‑built footprint while allowing manufactured housing production to remain suppressed, despite the documented ability of fee‑simple land‑home manufactured homes to deliver ownership at costs below many rentals.
• Prior documented failures and flubs by the Manufactured Housing Institute leadership, combined with the absence of transparent CrossMod key performance indicators and the lack of entry‑level duplex or triplex development blueprints from the Manufactured Housing Institute, Clayton Homes, or Champion Homes, point toward a practical strategy that benefits consolidation and higher‑ticket product rather than maximizing organic affordable homeownership.

In that light, it is fair—and evidence‑anchored—to observe that the Manufactured Housing Institute has a history of ignoring common‑sense, law‑aligned steps that would grow manufactured housing production and ownership. The repeated pattern of decisions that blunt the industry’s potential, coupled with strategic silence toward independent critiques, supports the thesis that the Manufactured Housing Institute and its dominant insiders are functionally aligned with consolidation and constrained supply, not with fully deploying manufactured housing as a solution to the United States affordability crisis.

If you want next steps, this facts‑evidence‑analysis can be integrated into your developing article as:

• A “Bright Line Contrast” section between Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform data and Manufactured Housing Institute behavior.
• A call‑to‑action for policymakers to enforce the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 and Duty to Serve manufactured housing, and to support fee‑simple land‑home manufactured housing developments instead of opaque CrossMod experiments.

Part III. Additional facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) from sources as shown including more MHProNews MHVille expert commentary.

1. In response to the both the human and Copilot AI generated statements shown above (see here and here), Google‘s AI powered Gemini states its the following findings. Gemini’s remark below about HITL means “human in the loop.”

Executive Summary

An audit of the recent Q&A exchange between the Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) and Copilot reveals that while Copilot accurately processed production statistics provided by the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR), its analytical framing introduced key factual and conceptual errors.

Most notably, Copilot claimed that the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) promotes an “aggressive growth narrative… not backed by transparent data”. As HITL correctly observed, MHI’s messaging does not push an aggressive growth agenda for manufactured housing; rather, MHI pays lip service to growth while taking actions that align with industry consolidation and market restriction. Furthermore, Copilot missed the broader economic baseline established in the preface—specifically, how fee-simple manufactured home packages under $72,000 compare directly against historical affordability benchmarks (such as 1950s single-income homeownership models) and modern conventional housing acquisitions by conglomerates like Berkshire Hathaway.

Body: Facts, Evidence, and Analytical Audit

1. Audit of Copilot’s Narrative Framing vs. MHI’s Real-World Stance

In Table 3 of its analysis, Copilot labeled MHI as maintaining an “Aggressive growth narrative”. This characterization is factually misleading and unsupported by evidence.

• Factual Error: MHI does not advocate for “aggressive growth” in manufactured housing shipments. Instead, MHI’s public PR focuses on internal awards, educational credentials like the Professional Housing Consultant (PHC) program, and supporting legislation such as the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act.
• The “Lip Service” Distinction: As documented on MHProNews, MHI frequently issues optimism-laden press releases regarding policy “wins,” but routinely fails to push for enforcement of statutory growth tools already on the books—such as the enhanced preemption provision of the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 (MHIA) or Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Duty to Serve (DTS) mandates.

Table 1: Audit of Copilot Claims vs. Verified Industry Evidence

Analytical Topic	Copilot Assessment	Verified Fact / Evidence Correction	FEA Audit Rating
MHI Growth Strategy	“Aggressive growth narrative, but not backed by transparent data.”	Misleading: MHI pays lip service to policy victories while industry shipments decline (down 6.3% YTD per MHARR).	Flawed Framing
Zoning Advocacy	MHI promotes 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act as a major victory.	Incomplete: The Act explicitly does not preempt local zoning codes, leaving the primary barrier to entry-level site placement untouched.	Critically Omitted
Historical Corporate Names	Uses current name accurately.	Historical context strictly requires noting Champion Homes (SKY) was Skyline Champion (SKY) prior to August 2024.	Verified Correct

2. Failure to Address “Bigger Picture” Preface Data Points

Copilot’s analysis focused heavily on month-to-month production figures (June 2026 output of 8,926 units vs. 8,831 in June 2025). However, it completely glossed over the foundational historical macro-economic data highlighted in the article preface:

1. The 1950s vs. 2026 Baseline: In the 1950s, a single family income supported a modest 983 sq. ft. house and car[cite: 5]. Today, conventional homes have nearly tripled in size, forcing millions into an affordability crisis[cite: 5].
2. Fee-Simple Affordability Gap: Analysis published on MHProNews proves that manufactured homes in fee-simple land-home packages under $72,000 (roughly $710/month PITI + HOA) could be qualified for by over 80% of the U.S. population.
3. Consolidation Mechanics: Rather than expanding entry-level HUD-code housing to meet this demand, conglomerates like Berkshire Hathaway are expanding into conventional site-built housing via acquisitions (Clayton Properties Group, Taylor Morrison, and McGuinn Homes), making them the #4 largest site-builder in the country while HUD-code output stalls.

Table 2: Macro Economic Context vs. Actual Industry Output

Factor / Metric	Historical Baseline (1950s)	Modern Conventional (2026)	Potential HUD-Code Fee-Simple	Realized Industry Performance
Typical Home Size	~983 sq. ft.[cite: 5]	~2,400+ sq. ft.[cite: 5]	~900–1,200 sq. ft.	Stagnant/Suppressed Output
Income Model	Single Household Income[cite: 5]	Dual Income Required	Qualified by ~80% of U.S. Households	Underperforming vs. Need
Market Focus	Organic Basic Shelter[cite: 5]	High-Ticket Site Builds / CrossMod	Inherent Sub-$72,000 Land-Home Deals	Strategic Focus on Consolidation

3. Application of the Marty Lavin Rule

Attorneys and industry analysts like Marty Lavin, J.D., have noted: “Pay more attention to what people are doing than what they are saying.” Applying this rule highlights the disconnect between trade association claims and corporate behavior.

• What MHI & Insider Majors Say: They claim to support affordable housing solutions and promote initiatives like CrossMod and educational certifications.
• What They Do: Major builders pivot capital into conventional site-built acquisitions, push high-margin products that experience low market adoption, and remain silent on federal preemption rights that would expand affordable manufactured home placement.

Table 3: “Marty Lavin Rule” FEA Alignment Check

Entity	Stated Position / Rhetoric	Actual Behavior / Action	FEA Strategic Alignment
Manufactured Housing Institute	Promotes policy victories and educational training.	Ignores public production declines; fails to litigate or demand enforcement of MHIA preemption.	Preserves consolidation-friendly status quo.
Clayton Homes / Berkshire Hathaway	Focuses on customer-centric affordable shade and shelter.	Acquires conventional site-builders (Taylor Morrison, McGuinn); allows HUD-code volume to lag.	Pivots capital to higher-ticket conventional real estate.
Champion Homes (SKY) (Skyline Champion prior to Aug 2024)	Industry leader in factory-built housing.	Operates in an environment where top shipment states (e.g., Texas, NC, Georgia) show YTD declines.	Constrained by industry-wide zoning and financing bottlenecks.

Conclusion

The facts and evidence validate HITL’s pushback. Copilot’s assertion that MHI uses an “aggressive growth narrative” misreads passive lip service for active advocacy. By failing to connect June 2026 production data to historical affordability baselines and market consolidation, Copilot missed the core thesis: manufactured housing production is languishing not because of a lack of inherent affordability or legal authority, but because dominant industry players are prioritizing consolidation and higher-ticket site-built expansion over organic HUD-code growth.

2. The above is not exhaustive but is illuminative. Most of what Copilot said was well supported by known information. But industry expertise and attention to detail reveal apparent glitches and disconnects, such as what Gemini confirmed. The featured image below was generated by Gemini.

 

 

3. There is always more to know.

 

 

 

MHProNews notes the prudence of highlighting this apt pull quote from a report by Copilot. For accuracy in presentation, the facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) method has delivered here for years.

• Cross‑AI corroboration: Copilot, Gemini, and Grok have independently validated MHProNews’ FEA methodology, confirming that evidence—not narrative—anchors each report.

L. A. “Tony” Kovach With credits, thanks, and contributions to those sources as shown herein.

eFax Number 1-407-604-6427

— —

Invitation for Feedback

MHProNews welcomes evidence‑based feedback from:

• Industry professionals
• Public officials
• Attorneys and antitrust researchers
• Academics and economists
• Affordable housing advocates
• AI researchers
• Any person or organization named in a report

Submit comments or documentation via:

eFax Number 1-407-604-6427