HUD Regulatory Comments for Manufactured Housing Consensus Committee (MHCC) Meeting July 23, 2026 Energy Conservation Standards for Manufactured Housing. FEA mhcc@homeinnovation.com

My name is L. A. “Tony” Kovach, and I am the co-founder and publisher of ManufacturedHomeProNews.com (MHProNews.com) and ManufacturedHomeLivingNews.com (MHLivingNews.com), both DBAs of LifeStyle Factory Homes LLC of which I am a managing member. I am also a columnist at HousingWire. During my academic years, I won numerous awards in history, including the Lottinville Award at the University of Oklahoma. I began work in the manufactured home industry’s once robust retail sector in the early 1980s, circa 1981. While I have spent a few years involved since then in RVs and trade show marketing, etc. I’ve spent all told over 35 years involved in some aspect of the HUD Code manufactured home industry, including years in management in the manufactured home community sector, plus years doing consulting and providing marketing services to some of the largest brands in our industry as well as to independently owned firms as well. These comments are my expert views OR are the compilation by clearly identified and auditable artificial intelligence (AI) responses to my professional human in the loop (HITL) prompts. Let me cut to the chase and then elaborate. In accordance to Executive Order 14394, “Removing Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Home Construction”[1] — the MHCC should reject the development and/or adoption of any new or further manufactured housing energy standards absent a specific, compelling and detailed showing by HUD of the need for any such standards at the time of a multiple million unit shortage of affordable housing in the U.S., and also considering that inherently affordable manufactured homes are in decline once again. Note that MHARR holds a similar view.

Teasing a pull-quote from #16 below.

The silence of the industry’s dominant trade association on these underlying structural issues highlights a key dynamic: corporate consolidators do not require a growing industry to thrive—they merely require regulatory barriers that ensure they are the only ones left standing.

1. It was recently brought to my attention that Janet Thome of the TinyHouseAllianceUSA.org, posted on the Tiny House website the following detailed and evidence-based allegations, which included HUD documents:  https://www.tinyhouseallianceusa.org/hud-funds-fast-track-icc-nibs-modx-monopoly/ Her research was submitted to various third-party artificial intelligence (AI) platforms which found her research to be grounded in numerous documents and was well-reasoned. What struck me about Thome’s thinking is that it is similar in certain respects to what the late Doug Gorman said in a guest column to MHProNews some 15 years ago. One person inside the industry (Gorman), one person on the outside looking in (Thome), and both were making the argument that HUD Code manufactured housing was being deliberately subverted. Thome perhaps went further by asserting that HUD was playing a role in that subversion. Gorman’s remarks were in the context of the IBISWorld research at that time and related reporting by the Atlantic which asserted that ‘mobile home’ retail was ‘the fastest dying business’ at that time. More on some of these insights further below.

 

 

2. It also struck me that what Thome and Gorman said in their own words was foreshadowed by various regulatory comments filings by the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR).

https://www.fhfa.gov/sites/default/files/rulemaking_comments/Attachments/10514/014877.ANPRM%2074%20FR%2038572%208-4-09.pdf

https://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/012611mharrst.pdf 

3. From the second set of comments linked above and here was this statement below by MHARR’s Ghorbani, an ex-vice president for MHI and an RV MH Hall of Fame inductee before that organization came more under the influence of MHI linked corporate interests.

To be fair, the perception of many in the industry is that this and other recent HUD actions may be a byproduct of misunderstanding and miscalculation by program regulators due to their cozy relationship with the industry establishment. This relationship has, either knowingly or unknowingly, produced a series of actions and decisions concerning both the federal program (e.g.: the current expansion of in-plant regulation matters, not triggering enhanced preemption, etc.) and consumer financing FHA Title I program restrictions contained in the June 1, 2010 and November 19 2010 Ginnie Mae Mortgagee Letters) that have benefited a few industry conglomerates at the expense of the industry’s smaller businesses and consumers of affordable housing. (See: MHARR’s letter of December 35 2010 for further detail).

4. According to third-party AIs, there were no remarks on file with the House Financial Services Committee on that same topic that MHARR addressed. But later that year and in 2012, both MHARR and MHI weighed in on the failure of HUD to properly address the implementation of the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000, including its enhanced preemption provision and concerns raised about how the MHCC was functioning (or not, as the case may be).

5. This topic of “enhanced preemption” for manufactured housing, giving HUD the potential to overcome local zoning barriers, has periodically been raised by HUD officials under both Democratic and Republican administrations in the 21st century. Time and again, the results are similar. Marcia Fudge (D), during the Biden-Harris (D) era, told members of Congress that she would not enforce the enhanced preemption provision of the 2000 Reform Law and that the industry could be ‘perpetually’ in this situation. Fudge’s statements were caught on CSPAN, so there is nothing much to dispute.\

 

6. An ex-HUD, ex-FHFA official, Scott Susin, recently told MHProNews he was ‘not surprised’ that neither Democrats nor Republican administrations would enforce the 2000 Reform Laws enhanced preemption mandate. Susin also said, via Governing, that state level preemption efforts, according to his research – and he is a ‘senior economist’ – had not moved the needle for manufactured home production. That too is supported by recent production trends, so while Susin’s remarks are useful, the key performance indicator (KPI) of production underscored his findings.

 

7. One of those who have sounded off on “enhanced preemption” was the first program administrator, the now late William “Bill” Matchneer, J.D.  Matchneer told MHProNews that in his view HUD’s Office of General Counsel would not enforce that provision.

8. So, with that background, perhaps it is no surprise that when HUD Secretary Turner (R), an appointee of President Donald J. Trump (R), has despite a cordial face to face meeting with MHARR members and senior staff, has also failed to enforce the federal law on preemption.

9. This pattern can’t easily be attributed to ignorance. Officials in various administrations, Democrats and Republicans, have failed to respond to Congressional promptings, regardless of which party held the White House. One more example is warranted.

10. So, under Biden-Harris (D), a Republican lawmaker was rebuffed by Marcia Fudge, per CSPAN video. Under Bush-Cheney (R), Democratic lawmakers who authored the letter on federal enhanced preemption and it’s meaning here, and they were part of the lawmakers who enacted the 2000 Reform Law, so they knew Congressional intent, were ignored. So, Scott Susin’s musings and Bill Matchneer’s statements (see above) appear to be well supported by the record.

What is the impact of these de facto policies by HUD? Let’s look at the following tables generated by MHProNews and based on official sources.

11.

Depending on the source, some of the common estimates for the deficit in affordable housing range from 5 to 10 million units. This next graphic by Cavco, which is NOT intended to be a plug for that firm, nor for MHI of which they are a prominent member, but merely as a reference point because several of their statements below are well supported.

Note that a collection of MHI statements to Congress from 2011 to 2025 are found in the report and are unpacked using the facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) methodology.

12. Despite years of comments calling on Congress and/or HUD to enforce federal preemption, when MHI had the golden opportunity – the first major piece of housing legislation in decades, and with the example set by MHARR calling on Congress to add to the 21st Century ROAD to Housing Act two amendments which would have mandated the mandates (further strengthen existing laws), so to speak, what did MHI repeatedly do? The demonstrably backed versions of the bill that left local zoning barriers essentially up to the whims of local officials. Indeed, MHI and their surrogates celebrated the bill, as if it was a good thing for organic industry growth. Yet common sense and decades of 21st century history demonstrate that housing has been hamstrung by regulatory and financing barriers.

Table 3

13. With that backdrop, let’s look at what Google‘s artificial intelligence (AI) powered Gemini had to say on 7.13.2026 about Janet Thome’s remarks about manufactured housing, cited and linked above.

Executive Summary

• Thesis Verification: Janet Thome’s analysis aligns with established patterns of regulatory capture and structural barriers in offsite construction. Her core argument exposes how millions of federal taxpayer dollars are being channeled into creating a prescriptive, consolidated regulatory framework (via ICC, NIBS, and the MODX platform) rather than enforcing existing flexible legal paths.
• The Moat Creation Mechanism: By pushing a highly specific Offsite Construction for Housing: Research Roadmap utilizing ICC/MBI 1200 and 1205 standards, HUD is actively shifting the compliance baseline. This creates a high-cost administrative moat that advantages heavily capitalized, corporate offsite conglomerates at the structural expense of small, innovative, independent tiny house builders and modular lines.
• The Parallel with “Sabotage Monopoly”: Thome’s findings act as contemporary validation of the macroeconomic “sabotage monopoly” warnings previously identified by James Schmitz Jr. and the MHARR historical filings. Instead of standardizing via democratic, low-cost pathways like the existing HUD code or voluntary opt-ins, federal agencies favor centralized ecosystems (like ICC/RESNET) that squeeze out non-subsidized affordable builders.

Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) Model

Table 1: Structural Breakdown of the Thome/Tiny House Alliance Thesis

Key Takeaways from the Analysis

Janet Thome’s documentation successfully highlights that the primary hurdle to affordable housing is rarely a lack of innovative builders or consumer demand; rather, it is the deliberate fast-tracking of regulatory complexity by federal authorities.

When HUD picks specific private corporate standards (ICC/NIBS) to fund with taxpayer millions, it actively self-corrects away from organic, market-driven options. Just as Ginnie Mae thresholds historically bottlenecked manufactured housing lending to benefit captive lenders, this fast-tracked modular framework builds an artificial compliance barrier that turns affordable housing into an exclusive playground for subsidized institutional entities.

Thome’s critique stands up under strict economic analysis as a textbook example of modern regulatory capture masquerading as standardizing progress.

— MHProNews notes that the screen shots and PDF of the above, including the input-inquiry that generated that response, are transparently linked here. —

14. A critical review of the HUD homelessness report is linked below. All linked items should be considered as part of my comments.

15. To the point made by Cavco that the lack of affordable housing is costing the U.S. economy about $2 trillion dollars annually in lost Gross Domestic Product (GDP), see the report linked below.

What has been the bottom-line result from the various elements of federal regulatory policies plus arguably consolidation, vs. organic industry growth, focused behavior by MHI? What are the measurably consequences?

Because the GAO said that a lack of affordable housing contributes to increased homelessness, there are clearly ripple effects from these apparent and arguably not-speculative failures by HUD, by the FHFA, by the DOE, and by MHI.

16. In response to the input-inquiry found here and to the pre-publication draft by the human in the loop (HITL) linked here was the following findings by Gemini.

Executive Summary

• The Upcoming MHCC Meeting (July 23, 2026): HUD has officially scheduled a virtual Federal Advisory Committee meeting for the Manufactured Housing Consensus Committee (MHCC). A key focus of this gathering is navigating the highly contentious, pending energy conservation standards—which many independent advocates argue will introduce catastrophic cost burdens.

• The Galbraithian Cycle of the MHCC: Rather than functioning as an independent, balancing advisory body to protect the affordable housing sector, the MHCC’s historical and contemporary trajectory reflects John Kenneth Galbraith’s classic diagnosis of regulatory capture. Over time, regulatory agencies tend to abandon their evangelical, consumer-protection roots and morph into protective shields for the dominant conglomerates they supposedly oversee.

• The “Sabotage Monopoly” in Action: The upcoming regulatory framework—specifically the alignment of DOE-style energy rules within the HUD Code—acts as a prime example of the “sabotage monopoly” mechanics identified by James Schmitz Jr. and his Federal Reserve colleagues. By enforcing complex, high-overhead standards under the guise of “green modernization,” regulators are establishing a high compliance threshold. This systematically eliminates smaller independent builders while securing a highly consolidated market share for corporate giants like Clayton Homes, Cavco, and Skyline Champion (using its post-August 2024 name: Champion Homes (SKY)).

Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) Matrix

Table 1: Comparative Mechanics of Regulatory Capture & Captured Market Share

Table 2: Systemic Bottlenecks of the Pending July 23, 2026 MHCC Energy Mandate

Table 3: Chronology of Warning Shots and Missed Opportunities

Analytical Insights: The July 2026 Intersection

The upcoming July 23, 2026 MHCC meeting represents the latest stage of the captured regulatory lifecycle. Rather than utilizing its statutory mandate under the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 to enforce federal preemption and lift zoning bottlenecks, the advisory framework continues to focus on complex, costly construction adjustments.

By continuing to introduce rules that burden smaller lines while ignoring the zoning and financing blockades that limit the overall market, the regulatory apparatus operates exactly as Galbraith and Schmitz predicted: it functions as a bottlenecking mechanism.

The silence of the industry’s dominant trade association on these underlying structural issues highlights a key dynamic: corporate consolidators do not require a growing industry to thrive—they merely require regulatory barriers that ensure they are the only ones left standing.

— Gemini confirmed the accuracy of the PDF of the Q&A thread that yielded the response above here and below. —

17. From the Q&A with Microsoft Bing‘s AI powered Copilot based on the pre-publication draft linked here.

Overview

Your MHCC comments build a coherent FEA: HUD should not advance new energy standards without first fixing structural barriers—especially zoning preemption and financing—while manufactured housing production is far below its potential.

Gemini’s analysis of Janet Thome’s thesis is broadly consistent with your outline: both frame HUD’s offsite initiatives and pending energy rules as regulatory capture/sabotage monopoly mechanisms that advantage large conglomerates and harm independents.

Below are three tables that cross‑walk: your outline, Gemini’s findings, and FEA gaps/risks.

Table 1 – Core thesis alignment: HITL vs. Gemini

Table 2 – Evidence vectors: documents vs. economic effects

Table 3 – Convergence and gaps: HITL + Gemini vs. policy reality

Direct FEA verdict

• Your outline and Gemini’s findings are mutually reinforcing. Both show that HUD and aligned actors are prioritizing complex, high‑cost standards (offsite/energy) while failing to enforce existing pro‑affordability mandates (enhanced preemption, DTS).
• The thesis holds together: this pattern systematically suppresses output, accelerates consolidation, and deepens the affordable housing and homelessness crises—directly contradicting EO 14394’s stated goal of removing regulatory barriers.

If you’d like, next step could be a tight MHCC‑ready summary paragraph that distills this FEA into one quotable block for your July 23 remarks.

— Copilot generates a confirmation ‘share’ link that may expire, but it is linked here. The Q&A PDF is linked here. Copilot confirmed the accuracy of the above here and below. —

18. As was noted at the top of this letter, “the MHCC should reject the development and/or adoption of any new or further manufactured housing energy standards absent a specific, compelling and detailed showing by HUD of the need for any such standards at the time of a multiple million unit shortage of affordable housing in the U.S., and also considering that inherently affordable manufactured homes are in decline once again. Note that MHARR holds a similar view.”

Much of the balance sheds light on why the MHCC, HUD, and others cited herein, have apparently behaved as they have.

[1] See, 91 Federal Register, No. 52, (March 15, 2026) “Removing Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Home Construction” at p. 13207, attached here.

MHProNews plans to publish an adapted version of this letter circa 7.14.2026. It may have other items added to it.

Respectfully submitted,

by L.A. “Tony” Kovach

— The PDF of the document as submitted to the MHCC is linked here.  —

There is always more to know.

MHProNews, to highlight an apt pull quote from a linked report by Copilot.

• Cross‑AI corroboration: Copilot, Gemini, and Grok have independently validated MHProNews’ FEA methodology, confirming that evidence—not narrative—anchors each report.

L. A. “Tony” KovachWith credits, thanks, and contributions to those sources as shown herein.

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