2 Former Manufactured Housing Institute Presidents-CEOs Claims Undermine Arlington-VA based Manufactured Home Assoc Narrative. What Chris Stinebert-Richard “Dick” Jennison said. RV vs MH. FEA.

Housing is commonly viewed as a necessity. Both towable and motorized Recreational Vehicles (RVs), which are typically used for getaways rather than full time living, are routinely viewed as luxury items. More on that in Parts I and II of MHProNews facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) segment of this mashup which will compare RV production and shipment performance data with that of manufactured housing (MH). Next, in an interview with The Wall Street Transcript (TWST) the following question was asked of then Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) president and CEO, Chris Stinebert. “Are all these issues [that depressed manufactured housing sales] pretty much behind you?” Stinebert said the following on behalf of MHI. “I would have to say yes. Inventory levels are very good and back to balanced levels. The high level repossessions from loans made during the 1990s, which have plagued the industry, have returned to manageable levels. The performance of loans made over the last several years continues to improve. The underwriting guidelines and terms for financing the homes has been vastly improved to the extent that some feel that there has been an over-reaction and an over-tightening and that some credit-worthy purchasers or customers do not have the ability to purchase a manufactured home but easily qualify for a site-built home. But there are other positive factors as well.” Then, fast-forward to MHI President and CEO Richard “Dick” Jennison who said the following to dozens of industry professionals in video recorded remarks at the Louisville Manufactured Housing Show. “Why not half-a-million” new manufactured homes sold annually? “We can get there.”

1) Keep those two goals expressed by Stinebert and Jennison, to return to mid-to-late 1990s production levels and higher.

 

Year	MH Production
1995	344,930
1996	363,345
1997	353,686
1998	373,143
1999	348,075
2000	250,366
	2,033,545

 

2) Jennison’s and Stinebert’s remarks will be tested against the statistical record. That historical record is provided herein, including graphical and other key performance indicators (KPIs) data from the RV industry and the manufactured housing (MH) industry.

3) When the years 1995-2000 total national statistical data for the manufactured housing (#1 above) is viewed, the industry produced 2,033,545 total HUD Code manufactured homes. Dividing that 2,033,545 by 6 yields an average production for those years of 338,924.166667.

• When Stinebert made his statement to TWST in 2004, the manufactured home industry produced 130,748 (see Table 1 in Part I).
• The next year (2005), production rose to 146,881 (see Part I). So, Stinebert had a point.
• But in 2006, production slid again to 117,373 homes. The following year, manufactured housing dipped below 100,000 units for the first time ever during the HUD Code manufactured home era, finishing the year at 95,752 (see Part I).
• It was not until 2021 that the industry would top 100k units, finishing that year with 105,772. That’s 15 years to recover to a level that still trailed what Stinebert indicated should have been the industry’s bottom in 2004.
• By contrast, in the twelve years from 2009 to 2021, the RV industry rose by 434,531. 600240 (2021)-165709 (2009)=434531. Here is the math on that rate of increase in RVs: 600,240/165,709=3.62225346843.
• If that same rate of growth had occurred in the manufactured housing industry as occurred in that 12 years in the RV industry, here is that math: 3.62225346843×49,683=179964.419072. Meaning, the industry would need to be producing 179,964 homes if that same rate of growth was achieved.

3) In 2015 when Jennison made his claim that the industry could achieve 500,000 new manufactured homes a year, the industry produced 70,544. That half-a-million unit goal would be three times the average for the past 4 years. In the four years from 2021 to 2024, the manufactured home industry produced 411,137 HUD Code units of all sizes. That is an average of 102,784.25 per year. It seems unlikely that manufactured housing will achieve that 102,784 total when the final statistics for December 2025 are released in early February. Yet, past indicators in MHVille as well as the history of the RV industry (see #5 and Parts I and II) clearly indicate what is possible because it has already been achieved. Anything that has happened before can happen again.

 

 

4) When the RV industry dips, it demonstrably has the ability to recover in reasonably robust fashion. While the manufactured home industry had a downturn before 2000, MH also had a demonstrable ability to achieve a rapid recovery (see the bottom half of the graphic below).

5) In 2019, then Skyline Champion (now Champion Homes (SKY)) produced a graphic for their investor relations (IR) presentation that said that the long-term average of the industry was 222k units a year through 2018.

 

 

6) Now, compare the Recreational Vehicle Industry Association (RVIA) graphic below to the MHI member Champion’s (SKY) graphic above.

 

 

7) As the above RVIA graphic illustrates, industries beyond manufactured housing have ups and downs, growth and slides, for a variety of reasons. But many if not most other industries demonstrably make an effort at recovery and then they strive to go even higher. Note that while the manufactured home (MH) industry was sliding in much of the post-2000 to 2009 years, the RV industry was growing during much (not all) of that same timeframe. As MHProNews has frequently noted, the RV industry trailed manufactured housing in 1998. That year, manufactured housing produced 373, 143. Per the RVIA graphic above, in 1998 the RV shipments hit 292,655. But in 2021, RVs 600,240. That year MH only hit 105,772. Meaning, the MH industry went from outperforming RVs by 3 to 2 in 1998. By 2021, RVs outpaced MH by well over 5.6 to 1 (600240/105772=5.6748477858).

8) It is the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) that boldly claims to represent “all segments” of the MH industry. From the exclusive MHVille legal expert interview linked here is the following.

It is noteworthy that in the face of an ongoing housing crisis, with the industry building its best homes ever – homes that could help to significantly alleviate that crisis and help expand the supply of genuinely affordable homes and homeownership — the utilization of affordable, mainstream HUD Code homes continues to be needlessly suppressed by problems specific to the time and environment after these homes leave the factory in which they are produced. And these problems – these fundamental bottlenecks: (1) will not go away on their own; and (2) will continue to get worse as time goes on. Indeed, we have already seen these problems, which were once primarily state and local in nature, now bleed-over to negatively impact and suppress national-level production and shipments.

9) When that attorney stressed after the homes “leave the factory” that makes it a “post-production” issue. Meaning, that post-production quality makes it part of the ‘umbrella’ of issues that MHI claims responsibility. Given the statements by MHI’s own past presidents/CEOs, asserting that the industry could return to and surpass the totals achieved in the mid-to-late 1990s, that begs the question. Why is MHI failing to attain the targets set by their own past senior staff leaders?

10) Don’t miss this gem from Copilot in Part III #5 in full context:

“What a Good‑Faith Manufactured Housing Institute Would Have Done Since 2000.”

This MHVille FEA is underway.

Part I Manufactured Housing Production by Year (from the reports linked below).

Per the following reports, that relied upon official HUD production data by year.

 

Table 1
Year	New MH Production
1995	344,930
1996	363,345
1997	353,686
1998	373,143
1999	348,075
2000	250,366
2001	193,120
2002	165,489
2003	130,815
2004	130,748
2005	146,881
2006	117,373
2007	95,752
2008	81,457
2009	49,683
2010	50,056
2011	51,618
2012	54,881
2013	60,228
2014	64,334
2015	70,544
2016	81,136
2017	92,902
2018	96,555
2019	94,615
2020	94,390
2021	105,772
2022	112,882
2023	89,169
2024	103,314

Part II. Per the RVIA data (see graphic above and their page here).

Table 2

Year	Shipments
1980	106,977
1981	133,573
1982	140,653
1983	196,589
1984	215,711
1985	186,868
1986	189,791
1987	211,635
1988	215,741
1989	187,845
1990	173,097
1991	163,233
1992	203,393
1993	227,628
1994	259,489
1995	247,072
1996	247,533
1997	254,558
1998	292,655
1999	321,201
2000	300,085
2001	256,809
2002	311,025
2003	320,851
2004	370032
2005	384454
2006	390,362
2007	353,588
2008	237,095
2009	165,709
2010	242,284
2011	252,407
2012	285,749
2013	321,127
2014	356,735
2015	374,246
2016	430,691
2017	504,599
2018	483,672
2019	406,070
2020	430,412
2021	600,240
2022	493,268
2023	313,174
2024	333,733

Part III. Additional Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) from sources as shown including more MHProNews expert commentary.

In no particular order of importance are the following.

1) For whatever reason, side-by-side or part-by-part comparisons such as those shown herein are not common in manufactured housing. They are found on the pages of MHProNews and MHLivingNews, but are not often (if ever) found elsewhere. That statement will be tested shortly via third-party artificial intelligence fact-evidence-analysis (FEA) checks.

2) While MHProNews and/or MHLivingNews have produced tables and graphs with similar information for years, the following may be the first time that this information was set side-by-side (year-by-year). Keep in mind that RVs are a luxury item normally used for getaways, although some do buy an RV for full time living. By contrast, a manufactured home is intended for full time (sometimes vacation or getaway housing). In short, they are inversions of each other in several respects, yet the RV industry has outperformed manufactured housing starting in the year 2000. That’s ironic, because that is the year that the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 was enacted.

 

Table 3		Table 4
Year	RV Shipments	Year	New MH Production
1995	247,072	1995	344,930
1996	247,533	1996	363,345
1997	254,558	1997	353,686
1998	292,655	1998	373,143
1999	321,201	1999	348,075
2000	300,085	2000	250,366
2001	256,809	2001	193,120
2002	311,025	2002	165,489
2003	320,851	2003	130,815
2004	370032	2004	130,748
2005	384454	2005	146,881
2006	390,362	2006	117,373
2007	353,588	2007	95,752
2008	237,095	2008	81,457
2009	165,709	2009	49,683
2010	242,284	2010	50,056
2011	252,407	2011	51,618
2012	285,749	2012	54,881
2013	321,127	2013	60,228
2014	356,735	2014	64,334
2015	374,246	2015	70,544
2016	430,691	2016	81,136
2017	504,599	2017	92,902
2018	483,672	2018	96,555
2019	406,070	2019	94,615
2020	430,412	2020	94,390
2021	600,240	2021	105,772
2022	493,268	2022	112,882
2023	313,174	2023	89,169
2024	333,733	2024	103,314

 

3) Left-leaning Google’s AI powered Gemini said the following.

 

Based on an analysis of the provided reports and a cross-check of historical data and industry statements, the following Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) breakdown addresses your queries.

---

1. Accuracy of MHI Leadership Quotes

The quotes attributed to prior Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) presidents/CEOs Chris Stinebert and Richard “Dick” Jennison are factually grounded in the historical record.

• Richard Jennison: At the 2014 Louisville Show, Jennison publicly claimed the industry could achieve 500,000 units annually.

• Chris Stinebert: Stinebert previously emphasized the industry’s potential to reach 300,000 to 400,000 units, citing the 1998 peak of 373,143 units as proof of capacity.

• Comparison: The current reality is a stark “revealing comparison.” Despite a national housing shortage estimated at over 7 million units, production has stagnated. In 2023, shipments fell below 90,000 units, and 2024–2025 data shows the industry lingering near 100,000 units—roughly 27% of its 1998 capacity.

2. RV vs. MH: The Luxury vs. Necessity “Yardstick”

The comparison between the Recreation Vehicle (RV) and Manufactured Housing (MH) industries is a significant metric for evaluating MHI’s effectiveness.

• Production Data: In 2021, the RV industry shipped over 600,000 units (RVIA). In contrast, manufactured housing produced only 105,772 units that same year.

• Cost Per Square Foot: You are correct that RVs generally cost more per square foot. While a new manufactured home averaged $87–$124 per square foot in 2024-2025, high-end RVs often exceed $200–$400 per square foot due to specialized automotive components, slide-outs, and luxury finishes.

• Analysis: If a “luxury” discretionary item (RVs) can consistently outperform a “necessity” (affordable housing) by a ratio of roughly 6-to-1, it suggests a failure in market penetration or regulatory advocacy by the primary MH trade group (MHI).

3. Mark Weiss Interview & Regulatory Bottlenecks

Attorney Mark Weiss (MHARR) identifies two primary “bottlenecks” that MHI has allegedly failed to resolve:

1. Enhanced Preemption (MHIA 2000): The Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 was designed to give HUD the power to override local zoning that excludes manufactured homes. Weiss notes that HUD has not enforced this “enhanced preemption,” and MHI has not aggressively litigated to compel them to do so.

2. Duty to Serve (DTS): Despite the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 mandating Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac support manufactured home chattel (home-only) loans, the FHFA has largely permitted the GSEs to avoid the most critical segment of the market.

Confirmation: Online evidence supports Weiss’s contention that production remains “mired” at levels far below historical norms because these legal tools remain “on the shelf” rather than being actively enforced.

---

Summary Table: Rhetoric vs. Reality

Metric	MHI Narrative/Goals	Historical/Actual Data
Annual Production Goal	500,000 Units (Jennison)	~100,000 Units (2024-2025)
Legal Enforcement	Claims “advocacy” for MHIA 2000	Zero landmark litigation for Preemption
Financing (DTS)	Claims “working with GSEs”	Minimal/Zero chattel loan support from GSEs
Market Comparison	Leading “affordable housing”	Outperformed 6:1 by luxury RV industry

The documents provided are faithful and accurate representations of these industry disconnects, substantiated by federal production reports and the legislative history of the MHIA of 2000.

Would you like me to create a breakdown of the specific “Consolidation” arguments mentioned in these reports?

— MHProNews notes that a very similar Q&A on the same topic was performed prior to the one above, which included a glitch that when asked to double check, Gemini corrected as shown. The full Q&A thread is linked here. The screen capture confirming the accuracy of that PDF thread is linked here. —

 

4)

Here’s a clean, sharp Rhetoric vs Reality matrix tailored for your article — no abbreviations until fully spelled out, no numbering, and structured for detail‑minded readers who expect precision. It captures the Manufactured Housing Institute’s public claims versus the measurable outcomes documented in your FEA.

Rhetoric vs Reality Matrix: Manufactured Housing Institute in the 21st Century

Topic	Manufactured Housing Institute Rhetoric	Documented Reality (Facts–Evidence–Analysis)
Industry Growth Potential	Former Manufactured Housing Institute president and chief executive officer Richard “Dick” Jennison publicly stated the industry could reach “five hundred thousand” new homes annually. Former Manufactured Housing Institute president and chief executive officer Chris Stinebert said the industry was positioned to return to mid‑1990s levels.	Production has hovered near one hundred thousand units in recent years. The industry has not reached even half of the mid‑1990s average of roughly three hundred thirty‑eight thousand units.
Representation of “All Segments”	Manufactured Housing Institute claims to represent “all segments” of the manufactured housing industry.	Independent retailers, community operators, and smaller producers consistently report exclusion, marginalization, or policies that favor consolidators.
Enhanced Federal Preemption (Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000)	Manufactured Housing Institute says it supports the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 and its enhanced preemption authority.	No Manufactured Housing Institute‑initiated litigation to enforce enhanced preemption. Local zoning barriers remain widespread. HUD has not been compelled to act.
Duty to Serve (Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008)	Manufactured Housing Institute claims to be “working with” Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency to expand financing.	Zero securitization of mainstream chattel loans since 2008. Government Sponsored Enterprises focused on real‑estate‑secured loans and the “new class” CrossMod program.
Advocacy Effectiveness	Manufactured Housing Institute promotes itself as the national leader in manufactured housing advocacy.	Manufactured housing remains far below historical production levels while recreational vehicles, a luxury product, have surged to over six hundred thousand units.
Support for Independent Retailers and Producers	Manufactured Housing Institute messaging suggests support for all businesses, large and small.	Consolidation has accelerated. Smaller firms face financing barriers, zoning obstacles, and lack of post‑production advocacy.
CrossMod Homes	Manufactured Housing Institute promotes CrossMod homes as a breakthrough solution for zoning and financing.	CrossMod adoption remains minimal. The program diverted Duty to Serve attention away from mainstream manufactured housing.
Post‑Production Advocacy	Manufactured Housing Institute claims to address issues “after the home leaves the factory.”	Post‑production bottlenecks—zoning, placement, financing—remain unresolved. Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform and independent attorneys identify these as the core barriers to growth.
Use of Legal Tools	Manufactured Housing Institute implies it uses all available tools to advance the industry.	No major lawsuits filed to enforce the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 or Duty to Serve. Manufactured Housing Institute members with deep resources (such as Champion Homes, Cavco Industries, and Clayton Homes) have not used litigation to unlock growth.
Commitment to Affordable Housing	Manufactured Housing Institute brands itself as a champion of affordable homeownership.	Production levels remain suppressed during a national housing crisis. Millions of potential buyers remain blocked by zoning and financing barriers.
Professional Expertise	Manufactured Housing Institute presents itself as the industry’s premier “professional housing consultant.”	Long‑term performance metrics show stagnation, missed opportunities, and failure to achieve stated goals.
Transparency and Accountability	Manufactured Housing Institute claims to provide leadership and clarity for the industry.	Key omissions in investor presentations and Manufactured Housing Institute communications—such as ignoring the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000—raise concerns about selective disclosure.
Industry Momentum	Manufactured Housing Institute often highlights “positive trends” and “market opportunities.”	Manufactured housing production fell in 2023 and remains far below long‑term averages, despite record housing demand.
Consumer Benefit	Manufactured Housing Institute messaging emphasizes consumer access and affordability.	Consumers face limited financing options, zoning exclusion, and higher costs due to restricted competition.
Alignment with Federal Policy	Manufactured Housing Institute claims alignment with federal affordable housing goals.	Federal tools designed to expand manufactured housing—Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 and Duty to Serve—remain under‑utilized or ignored.

 

If you want, I can also prepare:

• A “What a Good‑Faith Manufactured Housing Institute Would Have Done Since 2000” contrast model
• A visual version of this matrix for your article
• A timeline showing twenty‑five years of rhetoric vs outcomes

Just say the word and I’ll build the next piece.

—

5)

Here is a fully developed “What a Good‑Faith Manufactured Housing Institute Would Have Done Since 2000” contrast model. It is designed to sit naturally after your Rhetoric vs Reality matrix and to help readers visualize the alternative path the industry should have taken if its national trade association had acted with integrity, urgency, and alignment with federal law.

What a Good‑Faith Manufactured Housing Institute Would Have Done Since 2000

This model outlines the actions a genuinely consumer‑focused, competition‑friendly, and growth‑oriented Manufactured Housing Institute would have taken from the moment the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 was enacted. It contrasts sharply with the pattern of inaction, distraction, and consolidation‑friendly behavior documented in your FEA.

A Good‑Faith Manufactured Housing Institute Would Have…

Immediately Embraced the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 as a Transformational Tool

• Treated enhanced federal preemption as the centerpiece of a national expansion strategy.
• Educated members, policymakers, and the public about HUD’s authority to override exclusionary zoning.
• Pressed HUD—publicly and privately—to issue strong guidance and enforcement actions.

Filed Strategic Litigation When HUD Failed to Act

• Used its substantial legal and financial resources to compel HUD to enforce enhanced preemption.
• Partnered with state associations, independent retailers, and consumer groups to build a unified legal front.
• Pursued precedent‑setting cases to break zoning barriers in key states and municipalities.

Aggressively Pursued Duty to Serve Implementation

• Demanded that the Federal Housing Finance Agency require Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to securitize mainstream chattel loans.
• Opposed any attempt to divert Duty to Serve into boutique products like CrossMod homes.
• Published transparent scorecards tracking Government Sponsored Enterprise performance.

Protected Independent Retailers, Producers, and Communities

• Opposed consolidation‑driven policies that favored a handful of large firms.
• Advocated for competitive financing, fair zoning, and open market access.
• Ensured that smaller firms had equal representation on committees, task forces, and Manufactured Housing Institute leadership roles.

Promoted Manufactured Housing as a National Affordable Housing Solution

• Launched sustained public education campaigns highlighting quality, safety, and affordability.
• Partnered with housing nonprofits, state agencies, and consumer advocates to expand acceptance.
• Countered misinformation from local zoning boards, media outlets, and NIMBY groups.

Used Data Transparently and Honestly

• Published annual performance reports comparing manufactured housing to recreational vehicles, site‑built housing, and accessory dwelling units.
• Highlighted production shortfalls as a call to action—not as a public relations problem to be spun.
• Acknowledged bottlenecks openly and proposed concrete solutions.

Held Members Accountable

• Required large corporate members to support litigation and advocacy aligned with the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 and Duty to Serve.
• Discouraged anti‑competitive behavior and predatory practices.
• Ensured that the association’s agenda reflected the needs of the entire industry—not just consolidators.

Built a Post‑Production Advocacy Division

• Created a dedicated team focused on zoning, placement, titling, consumer financing, and community relations.
• Provided technical assistance to retailers and developers facing local resistance.
• Developed model zoning ordinances and placement standards for states and municipalities.

Leveraged Federal Momentum

• Capitalized on bipartisan interest in affordable housing to push for stronger federal enforcement.
• Worked with Congress to clarify and strengthen enhanced preemption.
• Ensured that manufactured housing was included in federal housing programs, grants, and incentives.

Measured Success by Production, Access, and Consumer Benefit

• Set realistic but ambitious targets tied to historical performance—200,000+ homes annually.
• Evaluated progress based on increased homeownership, reduced zoning barriers, and expanded financing.
• Treated stagnation as a crisis requiring immediate action—not as a “new normal.”

In Short: A Good‑Faith Manufactured Housing Institute Would Have…

• Used the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 as intended.
• Forced Duty to Serve implementation.
• Fought zoning discrimination.
• Protected independents.
• Expanded consumer access.
• Grown the industry back to its proven capacity.

Instead, the industry has endured two decades of stagnation, consolidation, and missed opportunities—despite having the legal tools, market demand, and historical precedent to thrive.

— MHProNews there was more to the above in the full thread and supporting linked items found at this link here and was confirmed as accurate by the screen capture at this link here. —

6)

Wrap‑Up: Bringing the Evidence, the History, and the Industry’s Own Words Into Focus

Taken together, the data, the quotes, the graphics, and the cross‑verified artificial intelligence analysis form a picture that is no longer ambiguous. The manufactured housing industry once demonstrated the capacity to produce well over three hundred thousand homes annually. Its own leaders—Chris Stinebert and Richard “Dick” Jennison—publicly affirmed that such levels were achievable again. Federal law, through the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 and the Duty to Serve mandate of 2008, provided the tools needed to make that recovery possible.

Yet the industry never returned to those levels. Instead, production stagnated for nearly two decades while recreational vehicles—a luxury product—surged ahead. The contrast is not merely ironic; it is revealing.

The facts‑evidence‑analysis presented here, now reinforced by both human intelligence and multiple artificial intelligence platforms, points to the same conclusion: the bottlenecks holding manufactured housing back are not rooted in consumer demand or production capability. They are rooted in post‑production failures—zoning barriers, financing barriers, and a lack of assertive, good‑faith advocacy from the very trade group that claims to represent “all segments” of the industry.

The PDF transcript and screen capture included with this article document the analytical process transparently. They show, in real time, how the evidence was weighed, how claims were tested, and how the Manufactured Housing Institute’s rhetoric was compared to measurable outcomes. The result is a clear, consistent, and independently validated narrative.

This article’s title signals the core theme: reality versus rhetoric. The segments that follow—production data, recreational vehicle comparisons, legal frameworks, investor presentations, and expert commentary—demonstrate that the gap between what the Manufactured Housing Institute has promised and what the industry has achieved is not a matter of opinion. It is a matter of record.

And that record shows that the industry’s potential has been throttled not by consumers, not by builders, and not by the homes themselves, but by a failure to use the laws already on the books.

Landing the plane, the evidence leads to one unavoidable truth:
Manufactured housing could be thriving. The tools exist. The demand exists. The history proves it. What has been missing is the will to act.

This article, supported by transparent documentation and cross‑checked analysis, invites the industry—and policymakers—to confront that reality and choose a different path forward.

 

7) There is no one else in all of MHVille known other than MHProNews and MHLivingNews which are providing readers with this level of facts, evidence, analysis and then has those cross-checked by third-party AI.  No one. Who says? Those third-party AIs.

It is simply a truism that:

There is always more to know.

As MHVille and the world enter a new year, stay tuned to the industry’s documented runaway #1 source for more “News through the lens of factory-built homes and manufactured housing” ^©  and “Industry News, Tips, and Views Pros Can Use”^© where “We Provide, You Decide.”^© This is the place for “Intelligence for your MHLife.” ^© As an upcoming report will show, MHProNews appears to have roughly tripled its traffic (visitors) in 12.2025 than in 12.2024. MHProNews appears to once more have averaged over a million visits for this specialized media site in December and over each of the last 4 months. MHProNews dwarfs our rival industry ‘news’ sites in combined, per SimilarWeb and Webalizer data. Webalizer reports that over half of our visitors are ‘direct request,’ so there is a strong and loyal returning audience coming to discover uniquely informative articles that are based on transparently provided facts-evidence-analysis. According to a recent email from a mainstream news editor, perhaps as soon as tomorrow MHProNews’ content will be cited on their platform. Stay tuned for updates on that and more.

Thanks be to God and to all involved for making and keeping us #1 with stead overall growth despite far better funded opposing voices. Transparently provided Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) matters. ##

 

 

 

 

 

 

Statement of William C. “Bill” Boor President and Chief Executive Officer CAVCO Industries (CVCO) Chairman of Manufactured Housing Institute on Behalf of MHI-What MHI and Boor Did and Didn’t Say