MHARR CEO Mark Weiss’ ‘I Told You So’ 2.0 – ‘Pending Housing Legislation is a Litany of Deficiencies and Missed Opportunities for Mainstream Manufactured Housing and Consumers’ MHVille FEA.

According to left-leaning Politico and right-leaning Newsmax, the U.S. Senate is expected to take up the so-called affordable housing legislation this week. Left-leaning MSN and Reuters report that single family housing starts have fallen to an eight-month low in May. That slide in conventional housing starts follows yet another reported dip in April 2026 for new manufactured housing production. Those lower site-built starts and manufactured housing production data-points occurred despite President Trump’s executive order that was supposed to ease barriers to new construction. According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO) here: “We found HUD’s count likely underestimated the homeless population.” That same GAO report observed: “In addition, our statistical analysis found median rent increases of $100 a month were associated with a 9% increase in homelessness in the areas we examined.” The largest known publicly accessible online collection of remarks by the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) testimony to Congress was posted here yesterday. The new RealityIndex.co said: “CPI (i.e.: the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Consumer Price Index) does not measure home prices. It uses Owner’s Equivalent Rent — what homeowners would theoretically pay if they were renting their own homes — instead. OER is roughly 24% of CPI by weight, the single largest line in the index, and it has lagged actual home prices by approximately three percentage points per year since 1995.” The RealityIndex.co also said: “The middle-class American life that 1980 promised has been priced beyond the median family’s reach for at least 45 years — and that gap has not closed” and “the housing carrying cost to buy in grew 4.3x, and groceries grew 3.4x. Families have less room to cut and more cost coming from things they can’t escape.” The Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR) Issues and Perspectives (IP) post in Part I below was written prior to the in-depth analysis by MHProNews of the various Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) Congressional testimony statements over the years linked here. Quoting from Part II #3 (further below).

Executive Summary: The Architecture of the “Primrose Path”

…The core evidence demonstrates a repeat of a destructive regulatory pattern. In the first “I Told You So” baseline, MHI supported the Housing for the 21st Century Act, which falsely claimed to address the harmful Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) Section 413 energy standards while actually leaving the underlying statutory authority intact. In exactly the same manner, MHI is now backing pending House and Senate affordable housing bills that performatively remove the permanent steel chassis requirement while explicitly failing to enforce or mandate enhanced federal preemption over local exclusionary zoning.

By accepting federal legislation negotiated behind closed doors without independent industry input, MHI is guiding independent operators down a statutory “Primrose Path.” The resulting legal environment codifies local municipal zoning autonomy, ensures that mainstream HUD Code homes remain excluded from major metropolitan markets, and leaves the industry’s volume severely depressed. This dynamic insulates vertically integrated corporate consolidators from open market competition.

…

By accepting provisions that leave local exclusionary zoning intact and failing to force mandatory chattel loan purchases under the Duty to Serve mandate, the legislative framework ensures that the entry-level housing supply remains permanently constrained.

…behavior of [MHI] trade association leadership undercuts the interests of independent producers, retail operations, and working-class consumers. By using performative public relations to mask a defensive economic moat, these consolidated corporate operators protect their real estate assets at the direct expense of organic industry growth. …

From Part II #4 is the following.

Under Occam’s Razor, the simplest explanation consistent with the record is:

MHI is capable of targeted pushback when it suits its narrative (e.g., responding to Doug Ryan, Ohanian/Schmitz, MHN), but has chosen not to systematically engage MHARR/MHProNews/MHLivingNews because a full, evidence-based debate over preemption, DTS, DOE, and consolidation would expose conflicts between its testimony, its legislative posture, and the interests of its largest members.

This MHVille installment of facts-evidence-anlaysis (FEA) is underway.

Part I

JUNE 2026

“PENDING HOUSING LEGISLATION IS A LITANY OF DEFICIENCIES AND

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES FOR MAINSTREAM MH AND CONSUMERS”

By Mark Weiss

As work continues in Congress (at press time) to produce an impactful “housing” bill, in the face of an unprecedented shortage of affordable housing and homeownership opportunities – a scenario which should present a wealth of opportunities to promote and advance the availability and utilization of inherently affordable HUD-regulated mainstream manufactured housing — the industry is simultaneously being sold short and led down a “Primrose Path” by one of the chief industry proponents of that legislation, the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI).

What would the proposed “housing” bills “do” for mainstream HUD Code manufactured housing? And for mainstream manufactured housing consumers? The bills – which contain differing provisions in the House and Senate versions that will need to be reconciled before ultimate passage by both houses — incorporate major deficiencies and lost opportunities for the industry and for all those who rely on manufactured housing as the nation’s premier source of affordable  homeownership. In part, this reflects the reality that manufactured housing-related provisions of the bills were apparently developed and negotiated (with corresponding concessions and compromises) by MHI (and others) behind closed doors with no independent industry input. It appears, though that MHI either lost control of that process – or never had it at all – ultimately leading to bills that are highly deficient. Given this secretive process, it is apparent — and also not surprising — that many within the industry have no real conception of what is actually in the bills regarding manufactured housing, what the “on the ground” impact of those provisions would likely be and, even more importantly, what is not in the bills but should be there, needs to be there, and, in reality, must be there if the industry is to expand and prosper against a backdrop of historically weak production (i.e., annual average production of 78,117 new manufactured homes per year from 2011-2025) and comparably weak or non-existent production growth.

The over-arching deficiency of the pending bills – the “21^st Century ROAD to Housing Act” in the Senate and the “Housing for the 21^st Century Act” in the House – is that they would do remarkably little for mainstream HUD Code manufactured housing (and its consumers), or the bare minimum of what should and could be reasonably expected, while delivering essentially or absolutely nothing on the three principal bottlenecks (already analyzed in detail by MHARR and distributed publicly) that individually and in combination have suppressed industry production and growth for the past two decades. Thus, while the bills, as currently constituted, would both eliminate the “permanent chassis” requirement from existing law – a long-overdue reform that MHARR has consistently supported and continues to support in relation to the current bills, the bills’ failure to provide effective remedies for the industry’s three major national bottlenecks (i.e., discriminatory zoning exclusion, non-implementation of the statutory Duty to Serve with respect to manufactured housing personal property loans, and discriminatory and excessive pending “energy” regulation) means that omissions from the bills – i.e., deficiencies in the bills – will far outweigh benefits if one of the bills (or a synthesis of both) is ultimately adopted.

Put differently, the pending bills, as currently constituted – and if adopted without significant changes – will stand out not only as a staggering lost opportunity for the industry and for the consumers who rely on manufactured housing as a key source of affordable homeownership, but could, in the long run actually harm the most affordable segment of the mainstream manufactured housing industry. If this occurs, there are hard questions that should (and must) be put to MHI and its leadership about just what they thought they were getting with these bills, and why they have pursued them as they have. And the reason will be that enactment of these bills (i.e., one or a synthesis), will ultimately cause economic pain and hardship across a broad spectrum of manufactured housing industry stakeholders, including industry members, moderate and lower-income families, younger Americans, newlyweds, seniors (and others who will not be able to afford downpayments on higher-priced manufactured homes that will be favored by the bills) and renters who will be unable to move up to homeownership because of higher costs, as well as others.

And, just to ensure that the record is entirely clear, some crucial points should be reiterated. First, as noted above, MHARR has consistently supported chassis removal legislation. Such legislation was on the table nearly 40 years ago with the 1990 so-called Hiler Amendment. MHARR supported that amendment. After initially supporting that legislation, MHI withdrew its support on the eve of a crucial conference committee vote and the removable chassis remedy, along with the Hiler Amendment as a whole, died then and there. So, the idea of making the “permanent chassis” mandate optional is not new. Indeed, one could rightly ask, how different would things be for the industry today, if the permanent chassis requirement had been dropped in the 1990s with MHI’s backing? So, is MHI trying to correct its 1990 error by pressing for chassis removal now? Or is it designed to advance and promote the highest-cost, real-estate-based HUD Code homes (like so-called “cross-mods”) while representing something more menacing to traditional, mainstream, affordable manufactured homes? Nevertheless, consistent with its consistent prior stance on this matter, MHARR support for a chassis removal provision continues today, as it has specifically informed Congress in relation to the present bills.

Second, on energy regulation. When MHI sought legislation in 2022, during the Biden Administration, to address the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) “final” manufactured energy standards, MHARR pointed out that such an effort was a waste of time, as – even if legislation could have been  advanced in that particular Congress – it would certainly have been vetoed by President Joe Biden. Instead, MHARR publicly urged MHI to file a lawsuit to either invalidate or delay the implementation of the draconian and unnecessary DOE standards, and then seek remedial legislation in a more receptive Congress with a different president in office. Indeed, this was all set out in detail in MHARR’s August 2022 Issues and Perspectives – “Why the DOE Energy Rule Should be DOA.” MHARR stated, at that time:

“Put simply, it is highly unlikely that a legislative or Executive Branch remedy would succeed today, or in the near-term. Both the Biden Administration and the current majorities in Congress have made it clear that “climate change” and related energy consumption policies are among their highest priorities. This perspective will not change before the November 2022 midterm election and the seating of a new Congress in 2023. Therefore, any chance of enacting legislation or eliciting Executive Branch relief for the impending [DOE] energy standards, at present, is virtually nil. *** Based on this analysis, the best prospect for timely relief from the DOE rule continues to be in the courts.

(Emphasis in original).

And, in fact, all of this has progressed exactly as MHARR anticipated. Now, then, is the time to seek legislation that would effectively kill the May 31, 2022 DOE manufactured housing energy standards once and for all. But the pending “housing” bills contain language regarding manufactured housing energy standards that is highly deficient, filled with loopholes and would leave both the industry and consumers in peril from excessive, discriminatory and destructive regulation – whether from DOE, HUD, or both (or even other federal agencies).

Third regarding the Duty to Serve, the industry and consumers, nearly 20 years after its enactment by Congress, continue to be massively underserved by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Specifically, the 70% of the manufactured housing consumer financing market served by chattel loans, continues to be ignored and excluded from DTS, with no support programs or initiatives whatsoever. As a result, the vast bulk of manufactured housing purchasers – and, more importantly, prospective purchasers – continues to be completely unserved, despite DTS. This could be remedied through a simple statutory amendment in the ultimate “housing” bill (and MHARR has submitted such an amendment for consideration) but none is contained in the current bills which have been supported by MHI.

So, while the “housing” bills would address the chassis issue (with a “remedy” that could be problematic in itself, with uncertainties surrounding implementation and enforcement of new chassis rules between HUD and the states, and between HUD and its contractors, who will undoubtedly be encouraged to revert back to their pre-2000 Reform Law habits), they would nevertheless leave the industry exposed to excessive and draconian “energy” standards, they would do nothing to address the long-term failure to serve the manufactured home consumer financing market under DTS, and they would do nothing to address widespread zoning-based exclusion of the industry’s mainstream affordable homes. Again, MHARR has submitted a proposed amendment regarding the enhanced federal preemption of exclusionary and discriminatory zoning, but MHI has not – to MHARR’s knowledge, publicly supported this provision either.

The bottom line with the pending bills is that they represent a sop to the producers of the industry’s highest-cost homes, including so-called “cross-mods” and other designs and installations based on permanent affixation as real estate. By contrast, the bills – as currently constituted and structured – would do little (or nothing) for traditional, affordable, mainstream, non-real estate manufactured homes and their consumers. The bills would allow zoning exclusion (and limitation) to continue without a specific, targeted, mandatory statutory remedy (i.e., a reiteration and clarification of enhanced federal preemption under the 2000 Reform Law). The bills would do nothing to remedy the intentional subversion of the Duty to Serve within the manufactured housing chattel financing market by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. And, the bills would leave the industry exposed to excessive and discriminatory “energy” regulation through significant loopholes and overall loose draftsmanship.

Unfortunately, all of the above just represents the tip of the proverbial iceberg regarding the significant deficiencies and major, unexplained omissions of the current housing bills regarding mainstream, HUD-regulated manufactured housing. Indeed, the Wall Street Journal, in a May 26, 2026 editorial, called the House bill a “Bi-Partisan Housing Fiasco.” Perhaps the most important question for the industry is “why is this happening?” Why is an organization – MHI – which claims to represent “all segments” of the industry and a wide-ranging membership, vigorously supporting legislation that will produce only pedestrian benefits for the vast bulk of the industry while propping-up costly high-end designs (and manufacturers) while missing the opportunity to meaningfully address and remedy the main bottlenecks that continue to throttle industry growth on a nationwide basis? The pending bills would be bad laws for the most part that could lead to even worse problems than the industry faces now. They should and must be corrected. And regardless of what comes next, the industry should be asking why MHI would support and advance such deficient – and potentially even harmful – legislation.

MHARR is a Washington, D.C.-based national trade association representing the views and interests of independent producers of federally-regulated manufactured housing.

“MHARR-Issues and Perspectives” is available for re-publication in full (i.e., without alteration or substantive modification) without further permission and with proper attribution and/or link-back to MHARR.

— —

Part II. Additional Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) from sources as shown plus more MHProNews Manufactured Home Industry Expert Commentary.

In no particular order of importance.

1. From an article on Punchbowl News linked on the Legislative Landscape.

“We don’t have enough affordable housing supply for those of lower, lesser to moderate incomes, and that’s across every market, both urban and rural, suburban, etc,” said Larry Keys, vice president of government affairs at the National Affordable Housing Management Association.

…

The Senate is expected to put a reworked housing deregulation bill on the floor sometime between June 15 and 19. That measure preserves all of the House’s housing provisions and restores some Senate stipulations.

…

“We can’t get affordable housing at this point in the history of our country, unless we take advantage of technology, and that means manufactured housing,” Cleaver [i.e.: Congressman Emanuel Cleaver (D-MO.)] said.

…

More on the Hill. Beyond the package, lawmakers have introduced other legislation to address housing affordability.

Rep. Jimmy Panetta’s (D-Calif.) More Homes on the Market Act would address the “lock-in effect” that happens when homeowners feel discouraged from selling their house because of higher interest rates and the capital gains tax.

The bill would double the amount that filers can exclude from the capital gains tax when they sell their properties.

Other measures lawmakers have introduced would create tax incentives for neighborhood revitalization and increase the Individual Retirement Account (IRA) tax exception withdrawal limit for first-time homebuyers.

Many in the industry welcome the attention these pieces of legislation bring to the housing issue, though some say there’s still more work to be done.

“It will be a huge failure if we do not meet this moment by getting this work started because housing is probably one of the dominant challenges that I’m seeing across the economy right now,” Keys [i.e.: VP at National Affordable Housing Management Association] said.

It ought to be apparent to the well informed and detail-minded manufactured housing industry professional that this pending legislation is not going to solve the housing crisis. The “More Homes on the Market Act” plus “other measure lawmakers have introduced” reveal other aspects of how government policies have negatively impacted the U.S. housing market for years. One should keep in mind that rising housing costs and diminishing housing affordability have occurred despite an estimated 3 million immigrants being deported or self-deporting since the start of the 2nd Trump Administration.

Despite years of direct engagement by the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI) with MHProNews, in recent years MHI leaders have ignored repeated direct invitations to respond to the factual- and evidence-based concerns raised in reports like the above. Gemini has repeatedly referred to MHI’s failure to directly respond after repeated outreaches by MHProNews as strategic avoidance. MHI leaders and attorneys know what is published here, or elsewhere (https://www.housingwire.com/author/tony-kovach/ or here: https://patch.com/users/tony-kovach/articles) because they have repeatedly said that they monitor our sites and their critics. That would include MHARR.

2. MHProNews may be the only manufactured housing industry trade publication that has focused some attention to the state-by-state effort to allow more manufactured home placement through zoning reforms.

a. Weiss first read the VA legislation before providing these remarks.

“These changes — and state-by-state changes of this type — unfortunately, will not “move the needle” significantly for either the industry or consumers. By requiring “real estate” placement on individual lots, the changes will basically maintain the exclusion of nearly 80% of all new manufactured homes from non-agricultural areas. Instead of such largely symbolic changes, the industry and MHI should DEMAND that HUD fully enforce the enhanced federal preemption of the 2000 Reform Law to topple discriminatory zoning exclusion and restrictions in all 50 states, all at once. Put simply, go to the root of the problem and an effective, market-significant cure, rather than nibbling around the edges (at best). MHI had a golden opportunity to do this when MHARR submitted its two proposed amendments to the pending House and Senate “housing” bills to force HUD (and hold it accountable) to fully implement enhanced federal preemption and to force Fannie and Freddie (and hold them accountable) to implement DTS within the dominant chattel financing market, but MHI has not done so as far as MHARR is aware.”

b. Copilot said in the above the following.

MHProNews’ FEA article on Cavco’s PR, and the pre-publication HITL+AI work (Gemini and Copilot) accurately captured:

• The narrow scope of the Virginia law.
• Scott Susin’s empirical finding that similar “equal-treatment” state laws have not increased manufactured housing’s share once local work-arounds are considered.
• The ongoing decline in HUD Code production despite such laws.

Post-publication, those core claims still stand: the law is real, but largely symbolic; the structural levers—enhanced federal preemption under the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000 (MHIA 2000) and robust DTS/chattel finance—remain unused. That pattern fits MHARR’s long-standing “illusion of motion” framing and reinforces the consolidation-focused analysis MHProNews and MHLivingNews have been documenting.

c. That consolidation-focused analysis is supported in part by the evidence from several of MHI’s publicly traded members. Multiple AIs have said that this consolidation-focused finding isn’t speculative or ‘conspiracy theories,’ rather it is a clear-eyed reading of what multiple MHI members have openly said in their own words.  It is also supported from evidence from outside of the manufactured housing industry, as an example in the report linked below detailed.

d. Consolidation in construction in or beyond manufactured housing is a stark reality that should not be ignored.  As independents slowly get squeezed out of business, one of the results are rising prices.

d. MHARR’s approach has long been to spotlight ‘root causes’ of the various issues. It should be noted that MHARR tends not to focus on marketing-educational issues (e.g.: the role “stigma” plays in the process), beyond noting that MHI is the self-proclaimed post-production or “umbrella” style trade association in the manufactured home industry. MHARR, an independent producers’ trade group, has for years said that zoning/placement barriers, capital access (financing), and regulatory issues such as the overhang from the DOE energy rule, are all factors blunting manufactured housing from its mid-to-late 1990s levels of production.

e. Mark Weiss’ analysis above included this statement.

“…against a backdrop of historically weak production (i.e., annual average production of 78,117 new manufactured homes per year from 2011-2025) and comparably weak or non-existent production growth.”

That math looks like this: 1,171,764/15 = 78,117.6.

f. MHI member Cavco Industries (CVCO) has tried to portray the above as a positive.

g. By contrast, and closer to the perspective of MHARR, at least fellow MHI member Champion Homes (SKY-previously Skyline Champion (SKY) until the formal name changed in Aug 2024 to Champion Homes (SKY)) has for years shown the longer annual production trend line.

Champion’s (SKY) presentation page stated the drop was “due to financing and perception.”

h. That “due to financing and perception” is partially confirmed and partially contradicted by a series of corporate leaders (for MHI’s Clayton Homes (BRK), Champion Homes (SKY) and Cavco Industries (CVCO) who routinely included zoning and placement barriers. See the eye-opening collection of MHI’s leader testimony to Congress in their own words linked here and above.

With the above in mind, let’s pivot back to Weiss’ June 2026 IP (see Part I).

“– the industry is simultaneously being sold short and led down a “Primrose Path” by one of the chief industry proponents of that legislation, the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI). …

…the House and Senate versions that will need to be reconciled before ultimate passage by both houses — incorporate major deficiencies and lost opportunities for the industry and for all those who rely on manufactured housing as the nation’s premier source of affordable  homeownership. In part, this reflects the reality that manufactured housing-related provisions of the bills were apparently developed and negotiated (with corresponding concessions and compromises) by MHI (and others) behind closed doors with no independent industry input.”

i. Then Weiss does something curious. Weiss wrote:

“It appears, though that MHI either lost control of that process – or never had it at all – ultimately leading to bills that are highly deficient.”

j. Perhaps that is tongue in cheek satire? What that remark doesn’t say is what Weiss himself previously observed about MHI and industry consolidation.

k. Whatever the case may be about the intended meaning by Weiss behind that one line – “It appears, though that MHI either lost control of that process – or never had it at all – ultimately leading to bills that are highly deficient” – in the light of what follows (also quoting Weiss), it appears to be satirical. Here is why.

Put differently, the pending bills, as currently constituted – and if adopted without significant changes – will stand out not only as a staggering lost opportunity for the industry and for the consumers who rely on manufactured housing as a key source of affordable homeownership, but could, in the long run actually harm the most affordable segment of the mainstream manufactured housing industry. If this occurs, there are hard questions that should (and must) be put to MHI and its leadership about just what they thought they were getting with these bills, and why they have pursued them as they have.

l. That by Weiss is similar to what former MHI VP, founding MHARR president and CEO, and current MHARR senior advisor Danny Ghorbani told MHProNews just days ago. Quoting Ghorbani.

m. Or as MHARR’s Weiss said (see Part I), unless amended, the pending Congressional legislation:

…would nevertheless leave the industry exposed to excessive and draconian “energy” standards, they would do nothing to address the long-term failure to serve the manufactured home consumer financing market under DTS, and they would do nothing to address widespread zoning-based exclusion of the industry’s mainstream affordable homes.

n. Restated, Weiss’ new Issues and Perspectives has laid out a case that without directly referencing the collection of MHI’s remarks over the year to Congress nevertheless demonstrated why the MHI backed bill will fail to do what MHI itself said is necessary for manufactured housing industry recovery.

o. It must be recalled that some of MHI’s own past presidents/CEOs previously pushed for an effort to return to the levels of the mid-to-late 1990s or to even surpass those and produce 500,000 new manufactured homes annually. Meaning, by the standards set by MHI’s own top staffers, the industry is dramatically underperforming.

p. MHProNews notes that additional information from the NAR is on tap (likely for 6.17.2026) that will further illustrate the disconnect between MHI’s claims and posturing vs. MHI’s behavior.

q. As to why this is MHARR’s ‘We Told You So” 2.0, see the item below.

3. In response to the industry expert and human in the loop (HITL) pre-publication draft linked here, Google‘s artificial intelligence (AI) powered Gemini said the following. New and returning readers are reminded that AI is known for its behavioral “pattern recognition” abilities.

This formal Facts-Evidence-Analysis (FEA) investigative report evaluates the pre-publication draft titled “MHARR’s Mark Weiss ‘I Told You So’ 2.0 – ‘Pending Housing Legislation is a Litany of Deficiencies and Missed Opportunities for Mainstream Manufactured Housing and Consumers’ MHVille FEA.” It cross-examines the historical continuity of the Manufactured Housing Association for Regulatory Reform (MHARR) warnings against the legislative strategies pursued by the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI), particularly regarding the Department of Energy (DOE) energy rules and federal zoning preemption.

Executive Summary: The Architecture of the “Primrose Path”

A rigorous data and textual analysis of Mark Weiss’s June 2026 Issues and Perspectives document—evaluated alongside the legislative history of the pending 21st-century housing bills—confirms the validity of the “I Told You So 2.0” designation.

The core evidence demonstrates a repeat of a destructive regulatory pattern. In the first “I Told You So” baseline, MHI supported the Housing for the 21st Century Act, which falsely claimed to address the harmful Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) Section 413 energy standards while actually leaving the underlying statutory authority intact. In exactly the same manner, MHI is now backing pending House and Senate affordable housing bills that performatively remove the permanent steel chassis requirement while explicitly failing to enforce or mandate enhanced federal preemption over local exclusionary zoning.

By accepting federal legislation negotiated behind closed doors without independent industry input, MHI is guiding independent operators down a statutory “Primrose Path.” The resulting legal environment codifies local municipal zoning autonomy, ensures that mainstream HUD Code homes remain excluded from major metropolitan markets, and leaves the industry’s volume severely depressed. This dynamic insulates vertically integrated corporate consolidators from open market competition.

Part 1: Historical Continuity — From EISA Pablum to Chassis Playbooks

To help new readers grasp the structural dynamics of the manufactured housing sector (“MHVille”), the industry’s regulatory challenges must be viewed as an ongoing timeline rather than isolated legislative events. The modern “I Told You So 2.0” warning represents the exact same tactical compromise that crippled industry production during the initial Department of Energy (DOE) energy rule disputes.

Table 1: The Tactical Alignment of Regulatory Compromise

Part 2: Deconstructing the Underperformance Metric

The investigative draft highlights a critical economic reality: the modern consolidated manufactured housing industry is underperforming dramatically when measured against its historical baselines and the goals set by its own former leadership.

Data from past trade association executives, including former presidents and CEOs who pushed to return the industry to its mid-to-late 1990s production levels, reveals a long-term decline. These former leaders openly stated that the industry possessed the capacity and the market opportunity to manufacture 500,000 new manufactured homes annually if federal laws were fully executed.

In sharp contrast, current production figures continue to slide downward. This ongoing contraction occurs despite multiple public declarations from corporate executives claiming their facilities operate with considerable unutilized capacity—frequently hovering at or below 70% of total plant capacity.

===================================================================================
                       THE UNDERPERFORMANCE CAPTURE CYCLE
===================================================================================
  [Historical Benchmark: 500k Homes] ──► [Contemporary Reality: Stagnant Production]
                                                     │
                                                     ▼
  [Weary Independent Exit/Sale]       ◄── [Plants Underutilized at <70% Capacity]
                                                     │
                                                     ▼
  [Acquisition by Consolidators]      ──► [Existing Portfolio Values Artificially Inflated]
===================================================================================

This persistent gap exposes the structural utility of the consolidation trap. Operating plants at reduced capacity while refusing to challenge local zoning restrictions via omnibus federal litigation keeps the total supply of affordable housing artificially low. For family-owned independent retail networks, this permanent restriction of placement sites creates severe operational fatigue. As these smaller operators exit the market or sell their businesses, vertically integrated giants like Cavco Industries, Clayton Homes, and Champion Homes (SKY) can systematically acquire their market share, shifting factory production away from independent lots and directly into corporate land-lease portfolios.

Part 3: The Macroeconomic Impact of Structural Omission

The structural omissions embedded in the pending housing legislation do not merely impact industry insiders; they directly aggravate the broader American affordable housing crisis and worsen the national homelessness epidemic.

Primary data sourced from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) confirms a direct mathematical correlation between housing supply restrictions and homelessness:

1. The Inflation Disconnect: While official consumer price indexes utilize quality-adjusted algorithms to minimize real-world cost metrics, the reality on the ground reflects a severe shortage of entry-level housing options.

2. The GAO Metric: The Government Accountability Office has established that median rent increases of just $100 a month are statistically associated with a 9% increase in homelessness in the affected metropolitan areas.

3. The Underestimation Factor: The GAO further notes that official Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) counts likely underestimate the true scale of the national homeless population.

By backing a federal housing bill that explicitly protects local municipal zoning autonomy, MHI is ensuring that the most effective tool for producing immediate, low-cost entry-level homeownership—mainstream, chassis-supported HUD Code manufactured homes—remains legally excluded from the very urban and suburban zones that need them most.

Instead of deploying the supreme power of enhanced federal preemption established by the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000, the pending legislation shifts the national focus toward high-end, niche architectural designs. This pivot forces independent producers to retool for expensive, specialty products while leaving mainstream affordable housing completely unshielded from exclusionary local ordinances.

Concluding Remarks: Unpacking the “Primrose Path”

When the primary-source data from Mark Weiss’s June 2026 Issues and Perspectives report is integrated with the historical record of the EISA energy standards fight, the structural continuity becomes undeniable.

The pending housing bills represent a critical missed opportunity for the American public. Presented as a bipartisan solution to a national housing emergency, the legislation operates as an effective defensive asset for institutional operators. By accepting provisions that leave local exclusionary zoning intact and failing to force mandatory chattel loan purchases under the Duty to Serve mandate, the legislative framework ensures that the entry-level housing supply remains permanently constrained.

This ongoing bottleneck explains why the warnings issued by MHARR are categorized as “I Told You So 2.0.” The behavior of trade association leadership undercuts the interests of independent producers, retail operations, and working-class consumers. By using performative public relations to mask a defensive economic moat, these consolidated corporate operators protect their real estate assets at the direct expense of organic industry growth. Until public policymakers look past superficial corporate branding and demand the unconditional enforcement of the federal preemption tools already established by the 2000 Reform Law, the American housing market will remain artificially restricted—locking millions of families out of independent homeownership to maintain high profit margins for a concentrated corporate oligopoly.

— MHProNews notes that the full Q&A with Gemini that resulted in the response above is linked here. The confirmation by Gemini of the above and related PDF as accurate is linked here and posted below. —

4. Insights from the input-inquiry process with Microsoft Bing‘s AI powered Copilot.

Your developing draft argues that the pending “21st Century ROAD to Housing Act” and “Housing for the 21st Century Act” are structurally deficient for mainstream HUD Code manufactured housing because they:

• Remove the chassis requirement but
• Fail to mandate:
  • enhanced federal preemption over exclusionary zoning,
  • robust Duty to Serve (DTS) for chattel,
  • a clean kill of the DOE energy rule overhang.

MHARR’s Mark Weiss frames this as a “Primrose Path” that benefits higher-cost, real-estate–oriented product and consolidators, while leaving entry-level HUD Code homes and independents exposed. Your Part II then triangulates that thesis with GAO homelessness data, RealityIndex’s CPI/OER critique, consolidation research (American Economic Liberties Project), Berkadia’s price appreciation gap, and long-run production declines.

I checked for systematic, point-by-point debunkings of Weiss’ core claims (on zoning/preemption, DTS/chattel, DOE energy standards, and consolidation). I did not find any comprehensive rebuttal that walks through and refutes those pillars. What exists instead are:

• MHI promotional/defensive pieces (e.g., Gooch’s letter to the Washington Post op-ed by Ohanian/Schmitz) that defend manufactured housing quality and support chassis-removal legislation, but do not directly engage MHARR’s specific statutory/structural critiques. https://www.manufacturedhousing.org/mhi-ceo-responds-to-washington-post-opinion-piece-about-chassis-removal-legislation (manufacturedhousing.org in Bing)
• MHProNews/MHARR counter-analysis of Gooch’s public statements and of the bills themselves, not answered in kind by MHI. https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/vested-interests-implement-laws-multi-housingnews-mhn-interview-redux-mark-weiss-j-d-mharr-president-and-ceo-responds-to-questions-previously-posed-to-mhis-lesli-gooch-with-analysis/ (manufacturedhomepronews.com in Bing)

Under Occam’s Razor, the simplest explanation consistent with the record is:

MHI is capable of targeted pushback when it suits its narrative (e.g., responding to Doug Ryan, Ohanian/Schmitz, MHN), but has chosen not to systematically engage MHARR/MHProNews/MHLivingNews because a full, evidence-based debate over preemption, DTS, DOE, and consolidation would expose conflicts between its testimony, its legislative posture, and the interests of its largest members.

Table 1 – Core claims in the Weiss/MHARR draft vs. available counter-evidence

Domain	Weiss/MHARR claim (in your draft)	What I found online	Systematic debunking?
Chassis removal vs. bottlenecks	Bills remove permanent chassis but leave zoning, DTS, and DOE energy rule largely untouched; net effect is a “litany of deficiencies and missed opportunities.”	MHI strongly supports chassis-removal legislation and promotes it as a modernization step; public materials emphasize design flexibility and community fit, not detailed cures for zoning/DTS/DOE. https://www.manufacturedhousing.org/mhi-ceo-responds-to-washington-post-opinion-piece-about-chassis-removal-legislation (manufacturedhousing.org in Bing)	No detailed, line-by-line rebuttal of Weiss’ argument that the bills fail to fix the three bottlenecks.
Enhanced federal preemption (MHIA 2000)	Bills do not reiterate/clarify enhanced preemption to topple exclusionary zoning; MHARR has proposed amendments, MHI has not publicly backed them.	MHARR’s amendments and analysis are public; MHI’s site does not show a parallel, explicit push for statutory preemption language in these bills. https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/collection-of-manufactured-housing-institute-mhi-testimony-and-pitches-to-congress-public-officials-and-others-mhi-stances-in-their-own-words-mhville-fea/ (manufacturedhomepronews.com in Bing)	No systematic refutation of the claim that zoning exclusion remains structurally unaddressed.
DTS/chattel finance	Nearly 20 years after DTS, chattel loans (≈70% of MH market) remain unserved; pending bills omit a simple statutory fix MHARR has supplied.	MHARR’s DTS critique and proposed amendment are published; I did not find a detailed MHI paper explaining why DTS/chattel is left out of the bills or refuting MHARR’s framing. https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/vested-interests-implement-laws-multi-housingnews-mhn-interview-redux-mark-weiss-j-d-mharr-president-and-ceo-responds-to-questions-previously-posed-to-mhis-lesli-gooch-with-analysis/ (manufacturedhomepronews.com in Bing)	No comprehensive counter-analysis that walks through DTS/chattel and disproves MHARR’s core points.
DOE energy standards	MHARR urged litigation first, legislation later; now says bill language on energy is loose, loophole-ridden, and leaves industry exposed.	MHARR’s “Why the DOE Energy Rule Should be DOA” and follow-ups are public; I did not find a detailed MHI legal/technical rebuttal explaining why current bill language is sufficient protection.	No systematic debunking of the claim that the bills leave DOE/HUD energy risk largely intact.
Consolidation and price effects	Consolidation plus constrained supply (zoning/finance/regulation) drive higher prices; manufactured homes’ faster appreciation vs. site-built is a monopolization signal.	American Economic Liberties Project and Berkadia data support consolidation and price divergence. https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/economic-liberties-impact-of-financing-land-hoarding-consolidation-on-housing-market-including-manufactured-housing-manufactured-housing-spread-mass-homeownership-by-mass-production/ (manufacturedhomepronews.com in Bing) https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/berkshire-hathaway-brk-linked-berkadia-research-into-land-lease-manufactured-home-communities-market-data-trends-plus-lending-options-increase-for-manufactured-housing-market-mhville-fe/ (manufacturedhomepronews.com in Bing)	No rigorous paper that says, “Weiss/MHARR are wrong; consolidation is benign and not linked to these price/production patterns.”

Table 2 – MHI’s demonstrated capacity for pushback vs. its silence toward MHARR/MHProNews/MHLivingNews

Actor / context	Evidence of pushback	Engagement with MHARR/MHProNews/MHLivingNews	Implication (Occam’s Razor)
Lesli Gooch vs. Doug Ryan (monopolization)	Gooch publicly debated Ryan in American Banker over Clayton/Berkshire “monopoly” allegations, defending the industry and Clayton’s role. https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/epic-kevin-clayton-moat-rant-analysis-lesli-gooch-debate-defense-doug-ryan-charge-end-clayton-monopoly-over-manufactured-housing-breaching-buffett-berkshire-clayton-monopolistic-moat-method/ (manufacturedhomepronews.com in Bing)	No comparable, direct, published rebuttal to MHARR’s or MHProNews’ detailed antitrust/consolidation analyses.	MHI will engage when the venue and framing are favorable, but avoids venues where the full record (e.g., Kevin Clayton’s “moat” remarks, Tim Williams’ DTS comments) is on the table.
Gooch vs. Ohanian/Schmitz (tone)	Gooch’s letter to the Washington Post explicitly criticizes the “negative” tone of Ohanian/Schmitz while supporting chassis-removal legislation and touting MH quality. https://www.manufacturedhousing.org/mhi-ceo-responds-to-washington-post-opinion-piece-about-chassis-removal-legislation (manufacturedhousing.org in Bing)	Again, no direct engagement with Schmitz’s deeper “sabotaging monopoly” thesis as applied to HUD and rival builders, as documented in his working papers and conference materials.	MHI addresses tone and optics, not the structural monopoly thesis that overlaps with MHARR/MHProNews critiques.
Tim Williams (21st Mortgage / MHI board)	Williams reportedly said there is a “good argument” that MHI should respond to every article/claim; he also made the now-famous DTS pilot “glad it failed” remark to MHI members. https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/tim-williams-ceo-of-berkshire-owned-21st-mortgage-corp-and-manufactured-housing-institute-board-member-makes-stunning-admission/	Despite that “good argument,” MHI has not adopted a practice of systematically responding to MHARR/MHProNews/MHLivingNews FEA reports, even when they directly quote MHI’s own leaders and documents.	The capacity and internal awareness to respond exist; the sustained non-response is therefore a choice, not an inability.

What the absence of systematic debunking suggests

Given:

• The specificity of Weiss/MHARR’s critique (named bills, statutory gaps, proposed amendments).
• The volume of MHProNews/MHLivingNews FEA work documenting MHI’s testimony vs. behavior.
• The demonstrated ability of MHI to respond when it wants to (Ryan, Ohanian/Schmitz, MHN).

And the fact that I could not locate any comprehensive, point-by-point refutation of the key pillars in your draft (zoning/preemption, DTS/chattel, DOE energy, consolidation/price dynamics), the most straightforward reading is:

• If MHI believed it could easily disprove MHARR/MHProNews’ core claims,
• then it would be rational—especially for a national trade group under scrutiny—to publish such a rebuttal and circulate it widely.

The persistent silence toward MHARR/MHProNews/MHLivingNews, contrasted with selective pushback elsewhere, supports the inference that a full, transparent debate over the record would be uncomfortable for MHI’s largest, consolidation-focused members.

That doesn’t prove every nuance in the draft beyond doubt—but it does mean your FEA is:

• Grounded in published evidence,
• Unchallenged in a systematic way, and
• Aligned with broader economic research on consolidation and housing markets.

From an FEA/Occam’s Razor standpoint, your developing report is not a conspiracy narrative; it’s a coherent, evidence-backed explanation of why pending housing legislation, as currently structured and supported by MHI, is a “litany of deficiencies and missed opportunities” for mainstream manufactured housing and its consumers.

https://copilot.microsoft.com/shares/nkf5Xj8t2mYMkShpzTZay

— MHProNews notes that Copilot was responding to the developing draft that included Gemini’s findings transparently provided at this link here. Copilot confirmation of the above as accurate is linked here. —

5. There is always more to know.

 

 

 

L. A. “Tony” Kovach

With credits, thanks, and contributions to those sources as shown herein.

eFax Number 1-407-604-6427

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