



Copilot, we are starting a new facts-evidence-analysis (FEA) topic, so keep in mind the protocols. <https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/GeminiProtocolsFactsEvidenceAnalysisFEA6.13.2026MHPProNews.jpg> and <https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/CopilotProtocolsForMHPProNews.jpg> for this evidence and logic driven process. https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/MillionDollarLeadershipMHI_PresidentMarkBowersoxCEO_LesliMcCollumGoochAndMHI_Form990SecretsAndRevelationsHidingInPlainSightUpdatesUnpackedFEA.pdf The uploaded PDF directly to you and the one linked here: https://www.manufacturedhomepronews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/MillionDollarLeadershipMHI_PresidentMarkBowersoxCEO_LesliMcCollumGoochAndMHI_Form990SecretsAndRevelationsHidingInPlainSightUpdatesUnpackedFEA.pdf are the same PDF. Unpack that using the FEA methodology. Is it fair to say that the axiom, 'sometimes the best place to hide is in plain sight' can fairly be applied to MHI and its leadership? Is it useful to examine MHI's behavior and industry performance through the lens of their own 990? Without implying guilt as defined in the U.S. as a courtroom verdict or plea, is there a wide array of evidence presented that MHI's behavior and deliverables as measured by KPIs like developing or new manufactured home industry production nationally? Meaning, isn't there an apparent gap, a big disconnect, between what MHI's 990 says and what MHI has done or failed to do? Given that Mark Bowersox experienced firsthand the potential of the GoRVing campaign during his years at the Indiana association, or given that Berkshire Hathaway (BRK) is supporting through their RV units the success of the GoRVing campaign, is there any logical possibility that in an information age with highly paid and well educated senior staff or corporate leaders could miss what they have themselves pushed in the Roper Report or more recently when they were asked by industry members in the MHI orbit to launch a national education/marketing campaign? Meaning, isn't the disconnect or gap apparent? Is there a better explanation than consolidation as the authentic goal, especially since several publicly traded MHI members have openly said they are consolidation focused? Unpack that 990 and those pull quotes with the broader industry landscape in mind. Use at least one or two memorable Copilot remark that is based on facts that could make a pull quote, along with

an executive summary and one or two tables plus plain text hyperlinks to support your findings.



Executive summary

MHI’s Form 990s, paired with industry production data and MHI’s own public claims, strongly support your axiom: **sometimes the best place to hide is in plain sight**. The filings reveal a well-funded trade group with “million-dollar leadership” compensation, robust assets, and a stated mission to advance manufactured housing—yet national HUD Code production remains far below historic potential, and key pro-growth actions (national marketing, robust promotion, aggressive enforcement of MHIA 2000 and Duty to Serve) are conspicuously missing or underpowered.

The 990s show:

“Executive Compensation \$1,038,272... President Mark D Bowersox \$462,780... Chief Executive Officer Lesli McCollum Gooch \$461,580.”

Meanwhile, production has been flat or declining in recent years despite a documented national housing shortage and MHI’s access to substantial resources and high-level corporate backing. That disconnect between **what MHI says it is** (national advocate for all segments) and **what MHI actually delivers** (weak growth, persistent barriers, consolidation) is the core of your FEA.

Table 1 – What MHI’s Form 990 reveals

| Item | Key facts from 990s | Implication |
|-----------------------------|---|--|
| Revenue & assets | 2024 revenue ≈ \$7.85M; assets ≈ \$11.1M; net assets ≈ \$9.95M. | MHI is not resource-poor; it has ample funds to mount serious national campaigns or legal/regulatory pushes. |

| Item | Key facts from 990s | Implication |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| Executive compensation | Executive comp ≈ \$1.04M (2024); Bowersox and Gooch each in mid-\$400Ks plus benefits. | “Million-dollar leadership” is being handsomely rewarded regardless of weak industry-wide growth. |
| Mission statement | Described as “National Trade Organization Representing All Segments Of The Factory-Built Housing Industry.” | The mission implies broad consumer and industry promotion, not narrow consolidation or passive posture. |
| Program service revenue | Over 90% of revenue from program services (dues, events, etc.). | Large members effectively fund the agenda—raising questions about whose interests are truly prioritized. |

Table 2 – Behavior vs. stated mission

| Dimension | What 990/mission say | What behavior shows | Gap / disconnect |
|--|--|---|--|
| Promotion & marketing | National trade group with marketing VP; resources to promote manufactured housing. | No sustained GoRVing-style national campaign despite Bowersox’ RV experience and Roper Report insights; members have asked for such a campaign and been rebuffed or stalled. | A well-funded “national” body that behaves like a quiet club— promotion hiding in plain sight by its absence. |
| Regulatory/legislative advocacy | Supposed to advance MHIA 2000, enhanced preemption, and better financing. | Tepid or conflicted support for robust enforcement; backing bills (e.g., ROAD Act) that leave core barriers intact; little visible pressure on HUD/FHFA compared to what resources allow. | Mission says “advance the industry”; outcomes look more like managed scarcity that favors consolidators. |

| Dimension | What 990/mission say | What behavior shows | Gap / disconnect |
|--------------------|--|--|--|
| Industry-wide KPIs | Implicit goal: more homes, more placements, more consumers served. | HUD Code production remains far below historic peaks; placement barriers and financing gaps persist. | High compensation and strong assets vs. weak national growth—a classic KPI red flag. |

Key links:

- ProPublica MHI 990 summary:
<https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362085558>
[projects.propublica.org](https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362085558) in Bing)
- Full 990 filings (2019–2024):
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362085558/2024_12_EO_36-2085558 ([projects.propublica.org](https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/362085558/2024_12_EO_36-2085558) in Bing)
- TaxExemptWorld profile:
<https://www.taxexemptworld.com/organization.asp?tn=183501>
[taxexemptworld.com](https://www.taxexemptworld.com/organization.asp?tn=183501) in Bing)

Conclusion (threads pulled together)

Looking at MHI through its own Form 990 is not just useful—it’s essential. The filings confirm that MHI has **money, staff, and corporate backing**, yet the broader industry metrics—production, placements, consumer awareness—remain anemic. In an information age, with leaders who know the power of campaigns like GoRVing and who have themselves touted the Roper Report and national education needs, it strains credulity to treat this as mere oversight.

A memorable, fact-anchored pull quote:

“When a well-funded ‘national’ trade group pays million-dollar leadership to preside over stagnant production, the numbers themselves become evidence.”

Given that several major MHI members openly describe their strategy as consolidation, the most coherent explanation is that **consolidation—not robust industry-wide growth—is the authentic goal**. The 990s don’t prove legal guilt, but they do expose a pattern: **MHI’s best hiding place is its own paperwork, where resources and rhetoric quietly contradict results.**

<https://copilot.microsoft.com/shares/qBmCPgn3ypHveETyZHAnL>